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ABSTRACT
The common approach to the study of strategy among social movement
organizations focuses on it as a causal variable related to various movement outcomes.
This research examines strategy as an outcome to understand factors related to the
determination of strategy by US social movement organizations. The analysis focuses on
organizations operating within the Animal Rights / Protection and Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer (LGBTQ) Rights movements, using Multinomial
Logistic Regression models. These models explore and find some significance to the
relationship between finances and strategy. Qualitative analyses of four organizations –
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Animal Humane of New Mexico,
Lambda Legal, and Equality New Mexico – explore the role of leaders and other external
factors relating to the development of strategy. The analyses find leaders' experience and
skills, resources, and the organizational context as determinants of movement strategy.
Implications for theoretical and methodological studies of organizations and implications
for activists are suggested, including the utility of mixed-method approaches.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: HOW WE FIGHT
The core goals of the present research are to: (a) analyze the dynamics involved in
the development of political strategy by social movement organizations, particularly
during their organizational emergence (b) better conceptualize and categorize the
strategies associated with social movement organizations, based on an inductive, datadriven review of a large-N sample of organizations; and (c) employ both qualitative and
quantitative analytic designs to begin exploring the impact of resources, leaders, and
organizational/political context on the development of strategy by emerging social
movement organizations in the United States.
The fundamental question driving these analyses is: What factors and processes
are involved in the development of external strategy by social movement organizations at
the time of emergence? This question is driven by the fact that the existing social
movement literature lacks adequate systematic and empirical examination of the
processes and dynamics involved in the formation and origin of social movement
organizations. Analyses of social movement organizations often focus their attention on
explaining organizational outcomes: Was the organization successful in relation to its
stated goals (e.g.: Gamson 1975; Martin 2008), why has it survived (e.g.: Giugni 1998;
Bernstein 2003), how did the organization interact with institutional actors (Soule &
Olzak 2004), and formal and informal agents of social control (state repression, countermovements, etc.) (e.g.: Mottl 1980)?
Other analyses of movement organizations focus on various inter- and intraorganizational processes: mobilization of resources and members (e.g.: McCarthy &
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Wolfson 1996; Zuo & Benford 1995), the use of media to engage the public (e.g.:
Gamson 1995), or the interaction with other organizations working toward similar goals
(e.g.: Ganz 2000; Meyer & Whittier 1994; McAdam & Rucht 1993). On one hand, all
these foci have served the field well, generating considerable insight into movement
outcomes. Yet note that in many of these analyses, a common factor used as an
explanatory variable is the strategy employed by the organization in pursuit of their goals.
Until we understand how strategies emerge, we will not understand social movement
organizations or explain their outcomes satisfactorily.
Rarely, however, do analyses of social movement organizations explore the
strategies used to pursue political and social change as a dependent variable. The present
project begins to explore the processes involved in shaping and determining the strategies
of movement organizations as they first emerge into the political and social arena.
I utilize two general movements – LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection –
as case studies for beginning to answer my research question, for four reasons: First, they
represent two elements of the most-dominant “master frame” (Snow & Benford 1992) in
the American social movement context - the pursuit of (civil) rights for minority or
repressed populations. Second, as shown in Chapter 4 below, both of these movements
truly bloomed and became prominent in American politics and social discourse in the late
20th Century with the emergence of numerous local, state, and national organizations
working toward various issues and goals. Third, within both movements, there are
organizations using all of the categories of movement strategy developed below, thus
bringing variation on the dependent variable to my analysis. Fourth, organizations within
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these movements vary widely in terms of their size, success, longevity, resources, scope
of focus (national/state/local), and geographic location (all 50 states and some territories
are all represented) – all of which are considered to be explanatory factors on various
movement dynamics throughout the theoretical literature.
The research that follows begins (Chapter 2) by reviewing the most relevant
literatures in the sociology of social movements and the sociology of organizations to
understand existing theoretical knowledge regarding strategy. From this review, three
primary hypotheses emerge relating to my core research goals of understanding the
influence of resources, leaders, and organizational/political context on the development
of strategy. Chapter 3 develops a conceptualization and categorization of strategy, based
on both the literature and an inductive review of a large-N sample of organizations. This
categorization expands the traditional limits of movement strategy to include those
typically excluded from the universe of cases: most notably, those organizations that
employ service provision and organizational funding/philanthropy as means to pursue
general movement goals. These organizations are included in this analysis – and, as I
will argue below, should be included in future analyses of movement organizations –
because (a) they constitute a strategy that fits within the pursuit of movement goals: They
provide necessary (often life-saving) services directly to beneficiary populations of the
movement, and (b) service providers comprise the majority of organizations operating
within multiple rights-based movement populations. Chapter 4 includes an overview of
the various issues and goals pursued by the organizations operating within the LGBTQ
Rights and Animal Rights/Protection movements. This overview shows the diversity of
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goals and actions involved in both movements and the organizations involved in the
analyses to follow.
The analytic approach exploring the relationships among resources, leaders,
organizational/political context and organizational strategy at emergence involves the use
of both large-N statistical techniques and small-N limited case histories.
The statistical analysis in Chapter 5 involves a sample of roughly 4,000
organizations working within the LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection
movements that have incorporated and filed documents to obtain (and maintain) 501(c)*
statuses with the US Internal Revenue Service. From this sample, I extract subsamples of
the organizations that were founded in the periods 2000-2005 and 2003-2005. These
samples are analyzed using Multinomial Logistic Regression models to explore the
correlates between specific measures of organizational financial resources and the
strategies those organizations employ. Limitations with the availability of data and the
nature of those data collected preclude a strong causal connection to be drawn from this
analysis – this is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. These analyses, given the proximity of
the founding date of the organization and the collection date for the financial independent
variables, allow for a robust explanatory relationship to be explored. While still not a
perfect sample or collection procedure – limitations noted in detail in Chapter 5 – these
models allow a rigorous analytic test of the hypotheses proposed related to the question
of strategic development at organizational emergence.
Second, the full original sample of nearly 4,000 cases – with wide variation in
terms of founding year – are analyzed without casual presumption to explore these
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dynamics for a larger sample of cases. Little can be inferred from the direct relationships
found for this sample. However, this exploratory analysis opens the door to further largeN analyses into the role of resources at organizational emergence, and to provide a
foundation for exploration into these and other variables through the use of small-N
analytic techniques.
The key substantive finding of the statistical analysis is that financial resources
are not as influential on the development of strategy as has been proposed in prior
research, and suggests further exploration into the mechanisms relating finances and
other resources to strategic development.
The qualitative analysis in this project explores the relationships of resources,
leaders and their personal histories/attributes, and the various elements of
political/social/organizational context on the development of movement strategy at the
time of emergence. To do this, I explore, via limited case histories, four social movement
organizations: Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Equality New Mexico
from the LGBTQ Rights movement (Chapter 6), People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) and Animal Humane of New Mexico from the Animal Rights/Protection
movement (Chapter 7). These organizations represent four of the six strategies of
movement activity proposed in Chapter 3: Legal Strategies, Routine Politics,
Expressive/Cultural Strategies, and Service Provision, respectively. They also vary in
terms of size, time of foundation, scope of focus, leaders' skills and histories, context in
organizational and political/social terms, and resources available. The data used for these
case explorations include archival materials from the organizations (meeting minutes,
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newsletters, etc), publicly-available official documents (by-laws, articles of
incorporation, IRS forms, etc.), media reports, organizational materials (“official”
histories, “About Us” pages), secondary data (interviews collected by other researches
and published, histories and summaries published by non-members of organizations), and
limited elite interviews with founders/original members. In these case explorations, I
examine the continuity of strategy over time by comparing the actions and strategies of
these four organizations in their earliest days, their “landmark” actions and achievements
at various points in their organizational histories (where applicable), and their present
campaigns.
The findings of the qualitative analyses suggest the following. First,
organizational founders appear to have greater freedom of choices regarding strategy than
a narrow focus on resources suggests. Second, the specific characteristics of leaders –
their past experiences in activism, in their careers, and their specific skills and training –
may outweigh any other factor in determining strategy. Finally, the organizational and
political context has effects on strategy at emergence for some organizations, but does not
for others; this suggests further research into the dynamics of extra-organizational factors
on strategic development.
By employing both a large-N statistical analysis and an exploratory small-N case
history approach, this research examines the potential impact of financial resources on
SMO strategy across a broad and varied sample of organizations, and the complex
relationship of organizational context and leaders' biographies to SMO strategy. The use
of a mixed-method design attempts to mitigate the potential analytic weaknesses of each
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approach while combining their relative strengths.

7

CHAPTER 2 - THEORY & LITERATURE
This chapter discusses the sociological literature most relevant for studying the
development of political strategy by social movement organizations. This review
explores those studies that have directly examined strategy as a dependent variable of
interest, works seminal for arguing for the importance of strategy as a dependent variable,
and the work of the few sociologists of collective behavior who have explored issues of
movement strategy. To conclude the chapter, I propose a series of hypotheses, derived
from the reviewed literature. The viability of these hypotheses will be examined by the
quantitative and qualitative analyses performed in Chapters 5-7.
As argued in Chapter 1, one of the key issues within the social movement
literature should be the development of organizational strategy. But organizational
strategy has often been overlooked in favor of questions of strategic efficacy in terms of
movement outcomes. The development of organizational strategy (with the exception of
the work of Marshall Ganz discussed below) is often left as an unexplained, “black box”
process. Much of the literature appears to assume that initial mobilization and strategy
are determined as rational calculations by movement founders in determining the most
efficient means to achieve goals (see Fireman & Gamson 1977 for a review of utilitarian
logic in theories of collective action). Empirical reviews of widely differing movements
demonstrate that many organizations sustain one strategic repertoire over long periods,
despite its obvious ineffectiveness (e.g., Piven & Cloward 1977; Rochon & Mazmanian
1993; Bates 2000). When strategy is employed as an independent variable, which can be
used to explain various dependent variables, including success or failure, response of
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agents of social control, the ability to mobilize resources and garner favorable public
opinion, and access to political elites and the state (e.g., Gamson 1975; Edwards &
McCarthy 2004; McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; Reger & Staggenborg 2006; Johnston
1980).
Gamson: The Strategy of Social Protest
One such study is William Gamson's Strategy of Social Protest (1975), which
examined a large population of US social movements to determine how various strategies
influenced their success or failure in terms of stated organizational goals. Gamson
constructed a sampling frame of 4,500 “challenging groups” - formal organizations
capable of taking action which carry a challenge to the political system (Gamson 1975).
From this frame he arrived at a final sample of 53 groups (randomly chosen, with repeat
entries removed, and ensuring for conceptual validity) to determine the effect of their
strategy on movement outcomes. Gamson found seven predictors to have statistically
significant effects on the success or failure of challenging groups in American politics. A
high level of organizational formality or bureaucracy, the centralization of leadership, the
distribution of selective incentives (such as wages or titles) to members, and the
deployment of violent (or “feisty,” as he also refers to them) tactics are significant
correlates of successful organizations. On the other hand, receiving violent social control
or repression from institutional agents or other organizations, the pursuit of goals that
involve “displacing the antagonist” (removing the targets of their action from their
position of authority), and factionalism or internal divisions are correlates of failed
challenging groups (ibid).
Regarding strategy, Gamson found that challenging groups that employ violent
9

tactics seem to be more successful, but also noted that the use of violence may be a
“symptom” of success more than a cause: that groups resort to violence out of
“impatience or hubris” rather than out of desperation, as may be presumed (ibid).
Violence is also viewed as part of an interaction with targets, rather than as an explicit
strategy employed by challengers. The emergence of mass media (his study focuses
primarily on organizations prior to 1945) perhaps changes this dynamic by increasing
costs to challengers of using violent tactics, and (perhaps more so) the costs to agents of
the state and authority figures of violent repression. The idea that “the whole world is
watching” became a feasible possibility in the television age, and a virtual truth in the age
of social media and the internet. Gamson includes the non-violent tactics of the Civil
Rights movements of the 1960s within this idea of “feistiness” in strategy (ibid), as it
represents an explicit challenge to agents of social control to repress the non-violent at
their own peril.
While Gamson's work represents a watershed in the analysis of social movements
and their success in creating political change, it has not gone unchallenged. Notably,
Jack Goldstone (1980) directly critiqued this analysis by asserting that Gamson's findings
are the result of troublesome, if not flawed, methodology and research design (Goldstone
1980). Goldstone argues that many of Gamson's strongest correlations are spurious, and
the result of the strong correlation between displacement-goals - “goals including the
destruction or replacement of antagonists” (Gamson 1975: p. 48) - and movement
outcomes. Secondly, Goldstone takes issue with Gamson's categorization of groups on
the dependent variable of outcomes: Is a challenging group which has won partial-
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success on its stated goals a failed or successful movement? Gamson places them in the
“failed” pile, while Goldstone argues that placing them in the “success” pile dramatically
changes the correlations of various determining factors (ibid). While the GamsonGoldstone debate remains indeterminate (Gamson 1980), ultimately Gamson provided
the study of social movements with a quantitative and qualitative foundation regarding
the impact of strategy and other organizational traits on movement outcomes. While his
categorization of strategies is limited to those who are violent or “feisty”, the importance
of strategy for movement outcomes is clear and strong in his analysis. Ultimately,
outcomes are a key motivation for social action by members: Individuals get involved in
activism because they want to make social change. If strategy is a key component in
outcomes, then it is incumbent upon us as researchers of this phenomenon to understand
the variation in strategies deployed and the processes and factors involved in the
development of strategic repertoires by challenging groups.
The Determinants of Strategy
In 1970, Ralph Turner identified a typology of strategies and the factors involved
in how movements determine which strategies to employ at any given time. For Turner,
strategy is a fluid process, influenced by both internal and external factors. Turner
proposes two sets of principles that guide the selection of strategy by a movement
organization at any given time: “strategic” principles and “expressive” principles (Turner
1970). The strategic principles are simply rational calculations of tactical effectiveness.
The expressive principles refer to the use of strategy to project an image or culture of the
movement. Organizations are not completely free to deploy tactics based solely on their
strategic or expressive determinations. Rather, they are constrained by the values of the
11

movement, the values of the possibly-affected publics, and the relationship between the
movement's constituency and the target (ibid). Strategy is thus determined by the
interplay of strategic and expressive principles limited by internal and external movement
dynamics. For Turner, organizations are more likely to direct their activities toward
strategic considerations if the leadership is more sophisticated or experienced in prior
social movement activities and if the membership is experienced and disciplined in
activism.
Organizations will tend toward expressive strategies if their leaders are less
experienced and members less connected to one another (Turner 1970). The key
consequence of this distinction is that those organizations inclined toward strategic
principles are more likely to engage in routine and legitimate strategies – lobbying,
consciousness-raising, political campaigns. On the other hand, direct action protest or
violence is more likely to be determined by expressive principles. Violent strategies are
viewed as extreme, with non-violent confrontation viewed as a less extreme, though still
more expressive and thus less sophisticated strategic effort (ibid). A thorough review of
Turner’s categorization of strategy and a critique thereof is found in Chapter 3.
Beyond Turner, the sociological literature regarding social movement
organizational strategy can be categorized as having two traditions: those that place more
causal importance on factors and processes external to the social movement organization
(SMO) and those emphasizing internal organizational dynamics. The following
discussion elaborates these theoretical traditions in the sociology of social movements
and describes how they directly address the processes and variables involved in
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developing external political strategy.
Social Movement Strategy: Extra-Organizational Determinants
CLASSICAL MODELS
The early works of American sociology regarding protest and social movements
primarily revolve around psychological explanations regarding the formation of
organizations and activity of members. These focus on the deviance of engaging in
political protest, and seek to explain individual participation by understanding personal
motivation to engage in such acts. Protest, particularly in democratic or non-repressive
political conditions, is viewed as an irrational act: If the state allows routine political
participation, and individuals have access to the political arena - which they are assumed
to have in such contexts - then to resort to political protest is not an efficient means to
redress grievances (McAdam 1999). Instead, members of SMOs are viewed in these
early works as psychologically vulnerable individuals who are isolated and alienated by
their lives in mass societies. Activists, then, are easily manipulated by political elites into
engaging in dangerous deviant behavior to benefit those elite interests (Kornhauser
1959).
For Herbert Blumer, movement tactics only require a discussion of the rational
calculation in regard to recruitment, maintaining membership, and goal attainment – with
“little more to be said” (Blumer 1969: p. 89). SMO participation and action are thus
considered to serve individual desires for change, or to correct psychological strain or
deprivation, rather than viewed in terms of political, social, or economic goals (McAdam
1999). If these actions (or movement participants) are viewed as deviant, then explaining
them will involve psychological and external factors beyond the organization. Strategies
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employed by the organization are considered non-routine, irrational attempts to disrupt
the political arena within a given society. Therefore, those factors that directly influence
SMO strategy are unrelated to the presence of other protest groups, the goals,
membership, or leaders of the organization, the cultural background of the population,
available resources, and political context (ibid).
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
The Resource Mobilization perspective focuses on the inputs necessary for an
SMO to emerge, survive, and achieve some level of success regarding goal-attainment.
Empirical studies within this tradition discuss strategy as an independent variable
involved in these outcomes rather than treating strategy as an outcome of various
movement processes (e.g., McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; Edwards & McCarthy 2004).
Some of the processes and variables discussed, however, can be viewed as potential
determinants of strategy at emergence.
John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald discuss the impact of pre-existing
organizations within the same issue or general movement on the tactics of new emerging
movements. First, an SMO emerging into a “crowded” issue – one with a number of
existing organizations working toward similar goals - or movement is likely to develop
new or unique strategies (or goals) in order to occupy its own niche among the other
movements (McCarthy & Zald 1975). Therefore, a crowded issue or general movement
may lead to an increase in strategic innovation. Similarly, a crowded overall SMO
population – across all issues and movements - may help determine the emerging SMO’s
strategy by limiting the alternatives to only those that would provide it a unique position.
Second, the presence of “Social Movement Entrepreneurs” - or career activists who move
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between organizations, bringing their organizational and tactical know-how with them may influence the strategy of the new organization (ibid). If these entrepreneurs can be
identified and their prior experience catalogued, we may be able to determine which
strategies are more likely to be employed by the new SMO. Third, the amount and kind
of resources available to the new SMO may influence the range of strategies employed
(ibid). A new SMO with greater available resources is likely to have a broader range of
available strategies.
Presuming that strategies vary in terms of their associated costs, the nature of
funding or resources may help determine the strategy employed. Inputs to the
organization from external sources and the relation of the SMO to established or routine
political entities may help determine the strategies employed. These strategies are
directly related to the prospects of survival, increased membership and resources, and
goal attainment of the organization (ibid).
Therefore, within the Resource Mobilization perspective, the key determinants of
social movement strategy involve rational calculations of external costs and benefits in
relation to the survival and mobilization of resources from members and external actors.
POLITICAL PROCESS/POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Similar to the Resource Mobilization theorists, the Political Process tradition
focuses on the relationship of the SMO to the wider political context. The emergent
organization is shaped by the opportunities afforded it by established political, social, and
economic conditions. Community institutions, or “indigenous organizations,” according
to Doug McAdam, provide valuable resources to the new organization. These resources
include established leadership, networks of communication, norms of social control,
15

solidarity incentives, and mass membership (McAdam 1982). The emerging SMO is
shaped primarily by variables and processes external to the organization. The emergence
of an SMO depends on the presence or expansion of political opportunity for that
particular movement.
The concept of political opportunity is problematic in a number of ways. First,
depending on the issue involved, a different political context exists in each society. For
example, an emergent SMO regarding same-sex marriage faces a different political
climate – in terms of institutions, elites, counter-movements, media, and so on – than an
SMO working toward changes in health care policy. This is due to the different political
targets, institutional elites, private businesses and interests, affected populations, and
other factors involved in the different movements.
Second, the relationship between political opportunity and the emergence of
protest groups is empirically unclear. In a pointed critique, Jack Goldstone questions the
concept of opportunity in democratic or democratizing societies. If opportunity is
conceptualized as the presence of inclusive, transparent, and democratic processes and
institutions, one would assume that the need for protest and SMO activity would be
negatively associated: An increase in these institutions should imply a decrease in protest
activity as it would be deemed less necessary to make political or social change
(Goldstone 2004).
Lastly, empirical examination suggests a relationship between the complete
absence of political opportunity and protest action. Rachel Einwohner’s work regarding
the uprisings in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War II suggests that communities that
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face complete internment with the prospect of imminent violence and destruction are also
likely to resist, protest, and challenge political elites (Einwohner 2003). Therefore, the
relationship between opportunity and SMO emergence is ambiguous at best. How
context shapes SMO strategy for emergent groups is equally unclear; the ways
organizations utilize elements from indigenous organizations and engage established
political targets are based primarily on the likelihood of goal attainment, the nature of the
target, and the community of potential beneficiaries.
In a separate study, Einwohner examined the relationship between Political
Opportunity and SMO actions within Animal Rights organizations (Einwohner 1999).
She examines these four movements in a “practice-oriented” approach, which focuses on
political opportunity as rooted in the necessity or centrality of those practices challenged
by the SMO. Opportunity, in this analysis of practices, is reflected in the possibility to
alter or eliminate those practices (in her cases – hunting, laboratory testing, animal
cruelty, etc.) Einwohner finds that organizations successful in changing practices viewed
as harmful to animals worked to change those deemed neither highly central nor
necessary: the wearing/production of fur garments and the cruelty to animals in circuses.
Both the wearing of fur and attending the circus were viewed as unnecessary and noncentral by the populations targeted, and thus the campaigns were more successful in
changing those practices compared to animal testing in laboratories and hunting (viewed
as necessary and central, respectively). The broad implications of this analysis are that
researchers should approach the concept of political opportunity with a more
organizational or practice-oriented approach alongside a national or cultural context of
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opportunity. Also, we should view the community and individual notions of centrality
and necessity as components of the resistance to change.
ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFUSION
Scholarship surrounding social movements and organizations in recent decades
has considered the relationships across organizations as a fundamental focus for
understanding the adoption of similar strategies (e.g., Klandermans 1993, Schulman &
Munro 2006; Andrews & Biggs 2006; McAdam & Rucht 1993). The literature on this
terrain involves studies of diffusion. The initial insights from early social-psychological
analyses of diffusion inform numerous efforts to examine the proliferation of practices
across cases within a given field (including SMOs, firms, and other organizations) (e.g.,
Freeman 1973; Klandermans 1990). The basic logic of diffusion is that actors
(organizations, individuals, states) are influenced by the actions and ideas of others in the
same general field. The literature in the sociology of collective behavior and
organizations has developed distinct hypotheses regarding the processes involved in this
diffusion. Inter-organizational studies dominate the current literature regarding tactical
diffusion. Organizations adopt strategies based on the successful use of similar tactics by
other contemporary or past SMOs within the same issue, general movement, or social
movement context.
This first hypothesis emerges from the literature regarding the dynamics of protest
cycles. Sidney Tarrow (1994) conceptualizes a protest cycle as a period of heightened
conflict across the social system with the confluence of rapid diffusion of protest across
social sectors, rapid innovation in the tactics of protest, new or changed collective action
frames, routine and non-routine political action, and increased interaction between
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authority and challengers which increases the likelihood of repression (Tarrow 1994: p.
153-154). These cycles, rather than being coincidental or based on political or economic
contextual factors, are the result of increased contact and diffusion from “early riser”
SMO to those that follow which imitate, borrow, or benefit from the characteristics and
actions of the initial actors (ibid). Doug McAdam (1995) outlines a similar dynamic in
which initiator movements not only establish the strategic and ideological foundations of
a protest cycle but also serve to signal and expand the political opportunity for other
potential challengers (McAdam 1995).
The diffusion of strategies and ideas occurs through social networks – particularly
through weak ties across SMOs – and through a cognitive process in which new, or “spinoff” movements, adopt the strategies and ideas of initiator movements. This is to establish
a similarity of cause and structure which serves to legitimate the “spin-off” in the eyes of
the sector and the initiator. It also provides potential channels for direct interaction of
new and old organizations. Meyer and Whittier (1994) view this diffusion across SMOs
as the result of “learning” or an observing process by potential subsequent challengers
(Meyer & Whittier 1994). These potential SMOs are influenced by the direct policy
outcomes, the changes in cultural norms, and the direct and indirect interaction of
participants from the initial SMO. This occurs via the development of coalitions, the
interaction within a broad social movement community, the exchange of leadership, and
the expansion of the general political opportunity (ibid).
All of the authors described above focus primarily on the 1960s protest cycle.
While these authors consider the direct interaction of SMOs to be a fundamental aspect of
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diffusion, a recent analysis of the diffusion of sit-ins among Civil Rights activists in the
1960s by Andrews and Biggs (2006) suggests that media coverage was a far more
significant factor in this process than was the presence of an active SNCC or NAACP
chapter in subsequent locations of sit-ins. These studies all suggest that organizations
adopt strategies from other contemporary or past SMOs in order to gain legitimacy within
the field or social movement sector.
The “New Institutionalism” variant of the sociology of organizations emphasizes
related dynamics involved in the diffusion of various practices across organizations in a
given field. Rather than focus on the success or failure of organizations using particular
strategies, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) regard the desire to be viewed as a legitimate
member of the field as a driving force in adopting the practices and ideas of established
SMOs. While success is not irrelevant, it is not viewed as a primary motivation for future
adoption. Instead, through the processes of institutional isomorphism – the growing
similarity across organizations within a given field – emerging SMOs adopt similar
tactics (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). The three forms of isomorphism described are
coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism occurs as a result of formal or
informal pressures from authority figures within an organizational field to conform to
institutional rules, practices, and ideas (ibid). For SMOs, coercive isomorphism typically
occurs informally as organizations expect that adopting routine strategies or established
tactics will decrease the potential for direct repression from the state or other targets.
Mimetic isomorphism is the process by which new organizations adopt the models of
established organizations when they are unclear of their goals or the most efficient means
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to achieve those goals (ibid). Again, success is not a determinant of adoption: There is no
suggestion that pure rationality is involved in adopting strategies. Normative
isomorphism is often a result of the diffusion of personnel across organizations. As staff
or leaders in a field move from one organization to another, they carry along with them
the values, practices, and ideas learned previously (ibid).
Levitt and March (1988), in a review of organizational scholarship, describe a
process of organizational learning by which direct experience, observation of other
organizations, and the development of a frame of interpreting the above lead them to
make decisions without emphasis on rational calculation (Levitt & March 1988).
Organizations make decisions with more regard for legitimacy than for perceived
effectiveness or consequences. Organizations' actions are based on a process of encoding
past experiences of their own and others, and then utilizing this organizational memory in
future decision-making. The researchers hypothesize that the presence of actors from
“initiator” or prior SMOs in emerging SMOs increases the likelihood that strategies
utilized by initiator movements will be adopted subsequently by other SMOs in the same
field (ibid).
The diffusion of personnel across organizations may also contribute to the
diffusion of practices and ideas. In particular, the presence of actors with perceived
expertise – often a function of their role in prior organizations – from initiator or
established organizations will increase the likelihood of isomorphism. In the social
movement literature, these actors are often referred to as “entrepreneurs.” These
entrepreneurs engage in social movement careers in which they move from organization

21

to organization, carrying a catalog of mobilization, organizational, and tactical practices
along the path into each subsequent organization (McCarthy & Zald 1975). In a given
protest cycle, these entrepreneurs often begin in the same movement organization and
diffuse across the sector to other emerging organizations. Their presence and perceived
legitimacy as an “early riser” or “pioneer” of the cycle will affect the decisions made
within spin-off movements regarding. In the organizations literature, the contemporary
usage of “consultants” within firms, corporations, and other bureaucratic organizations
leads to increasing isomorphism as actors hire external experts to legitimate changes in
organizational policies, practices, personnel, or dynamics. These consultants gain
legitimacy through their presence in other successful and established organizations, and
serve to increase organizational similarity by proposing changes that reflect successful
practices (Strang & Soule 1998; Barnett 1998). From this emerges the hypothesis that
the options regarding tactics available to emerging SMOs are limited to those consistent
with existing or dominant repertoires of action.
The concept of “collective action repertoires” emerges in the study of collective
behavior from the work of Charles Tilly. For given SMOs, the options regarding strategy,
organizational forms, patterns of decision-making, inter-movement dynamics, modes of
communication, and so on, are all constrained by prior experience in the field and the
SMO’s cultural and material resources (Tilly 1993). It is “the whole of the set of means”
available to an organization within a given social context (Tilly 1993). Repertoires are
stable cultural formations that persist throughout the development and ultimate decline of
protest cycles. Common examples in the literature include the use of sit-ins in the mass
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movements of the 1960s (Andrews & Biggs 2006) and the food riots of the French
Revolution (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001). Elements of repertoires are not necessarily
rigid; every organization must adapt the strategies, symbols, and beliefs consistent with
the repertoire to match the instrumental, identity, and/or cultural goals of the organization
(Tilly 1993).
In the present study, diffusion effects regarding organizational processes relates to
the core argument surrounding the role of leaders and their histories, connections, and
relationships to other organizations, in determining their strategies.
ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY
The Organizational Ecology literature approaches the study of the formation,
evolution, and mortality of organizations and organizational forms based initially on the
ideas of biological evolution and ecology. This literature then began to focus on firms
and organizations, primarily within market contexts, but with some additional attention
paid to activist and challenging groups in society (Carroll 1984). Within a given social
context, analyses attempt to understand the emergence of new organizations and their
forms/structures, the rates and causes of organizational mortality, and the effects of
internal and external dynamics on differentiation and change. The primary determinants
of organizational emergence (or “birth”) are: niche-availability, the disbanding of
previously-existing organizations, and population density. The idea of niche-availability
is consistent with the hypotheses of Resource Mobilization in that a new organization
will emerge with a structure, strategy, goal, or form that is different from existing
organizations. In other words, they fill an existing void in the organizational “ecosystem”
(Singh & Lumsden 1990).
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New organizations are likely to emerge in populations where previously-existing
organizations have recently disbanded (or “died”). This suggests that there are now freefloating resources available to those seeking to organize. However, this relationship
between organizational death and birth (Romanelli 1989) within a population is
curvilinear over time: Initially, the disbanding of organizations signals the availability of
resources, but as the mortality of organizations becomes increasingly high, this signals a
potentially toxic environment to organizers and discourages their entrance into the
population. Organizational density within the population has a similar curvilinear
relationship: As the population density increases, new organizations are less likely to
emerge because the availability of resources and organizational space is seen to be
limited (Olzak & Uhrig 2001).
The analysis of the determinants of organizational mortality are useful for the
present research in that by understanding why some organizations fail or “die,” we may
have a better understanding of how and why newly-emerging organizations choose their
structures and strategies. It may prove useful for understanding the nature of the
organizational population: Among existing organizations, is there an over-representation
of a particular organizational form or strategy because those in other categories have not
survived, thus signaling a potential evolutionary determinant of movement
characteristics? The determinants of organizational mortality in this literature include:
“fitness,” newness, size, resource partitioning, founding conditions, and population
dynamics. New organizations often survive when they become isomorphic with the
population of existing organizations. Once they “fit,” they become inert and resistant to
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change because this is seen as risky. New organizations are generally considered to be at
higher risk of mortality (as also discussed in Resource Mobilization Theory) due to their
lack of established legitimacy toward those who would become active members or
providers of funding and resources (Carroll 1984; Singh & Lumsden 1990).
Organizational size has a variable effect on mortality: Small organizations often
survive due to centralization, but large organizations are also often able to survive due to
their abilities to diversify and obtain resources. Resource partitioning is a determinant of
organizational mortality in that within a population, the amount of available resources is
not infinite. Thus, the competition over them can become fierce and lead to contentious
interactions among organizations. As a result, some are often shut out completely from
the resource pool and thus cease to exist. Various internal dynamics are considered
determinants of organizational mortality, but do not represent a clear departure from the
various literatures discussed below. Lastly, dynamics within the organizational
population (changes in markets, economies, politics, and so on) affect mortality (Carroll
1984).
An important precursor to the organizational ecology literature was provided by
Arthur Stinchcombe in his 1965 article, “Social Structure and Organizations.” He
addresses two key questions pertinent to the present study: How do social conditions
affect the degree of motivation that a population has to start new organizations (and in
particular, new types of organizations), and how do social conditions affect the likelihood
that a newly-founded organization will succeed (Stinchcombe 1965)? Stinchcombe
asserts that key dynamics in this process include the history of organizational forms and
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types, available and mobilized resources, repertoires of action en vogue at the time, and a
lack of limitations on political conflict or challenge (ibid). New organizations (and new
types of organizations) are founded within populations when:
(a) They find or learn about alternative better ways of doing things that are not
easily done within existing social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future
will be such that the organization will continue to be effective enough to pay for
the trouble of building it and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social
group they are strongly connected with will receive some of the benefits of the
better way of doing things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources, wealth, power,
and legitimacy needed to build the organization; and (e) they can defeat, or at
least avoid being defeated by, their opponents, especially those whose interests
are vested in the current regime (Sintchcombe 1965: p. 146).
Therefore, new organizations emerge when they are deemed necessary, potentially
successful, and potentially persistent. Their choice of strategy depends on what is
available to them and what they have learned from the other organizations of the present
and past.
The Organizational Ecology literature informs the present research regarding
both key questions. First, the availability of resources is fundamental for the
development of organizations and informs the strategies available to them. Second, the
existing movement context and the relationships between vanguard members of new
organizations and existing organizations are instrumental in determining the strategic
repertoires available at emergence.
Social Movement Strategy: Intra-Organizational Determinants
The section below details the insights from recent theoretical traditions in the
sociology of collective behavior regarding intra-organizational determinants of SMO
strategy.
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FRAME ALIGNMENT
Emerging as a challenge to elements of the Resource Mobilization, Classical, and
Political Process traditions which emphasize objective, material, or structural factors, the
work of David Snow and Robert Benford stresses the importance of cognitive and
interpretive frames for understanding various SMO activities and outcomes. Frames refer
to “schemata of interpretation,” or the lenses through which individuals or collectivities
interpret various elements of their social life, environment, interactions, symbols, and so
on (Snow, et al. 1986). Frames are of value for social movement analyses because they
illuminate the interpretive elements of organizational dynamics, mobilization, and
strategy. This tradition most commonly examines various processes of frame alignment
in which organizations employ - either implicitly or explicitly - alterations or
presentations of their beliefs, values, actions, or goals, in order to increase participation
and solidarity among current and prospective members. Snow, Benford, and colleagues
(1986) present four primary frame alignment processes, all of which have the intended
consequence of increasing membership. First, Frame Bridging involves simply
presenting the organization’s frame to the public with the idea that those individuals not
already aligned with the organization, but who share the same interpretation of the goal or
issue of the organization, will see this connection and join the organization. There is no
alteration the SMO’s original frame in this process, which typically involves simple
awareness-raising campaigns (ibid).
Frame Amplification involves selecting an element of the organization’s original
frame and exaggerating or focusing more attention on that element rather than the frame
as a whole (ibid). For example, a non-violent organization for workers’ rights may
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amplify the non-violent portion of its interpretive frame in order to attract individuals
who are not terribly concerned with workers’ rights (though not against them), but are
deeply committed to non-violence. Frame Extension involves the widening of frame
boundaries in order to appeal to a broader constituency (ibid). An organization focusing
on stopping deforestation, for example, may choose to extend their frame to all issues of
environmental protection to appeal to a broader base. Lastly, Frame Transformation
involves a strict adherence to the organization’s original frame, rather than simply raise
awareness to attract like-minded individuals, the organization attempts to alter the frames
of disagreeing individuals to bring them in line with those of the organization (ibid). An
organization founded on Buddhist principles, for example, may seek to change its
adherents’ world-views to match those spiritual ideals. In all four processes, the goal is
increased membership. In regards to external strategy, according to this tradition, SMOs
will choose strategies based on an analysis of the necessity of further mobilization and
the potential constituencies available via these four processes. Strategy, therefore, is an
internal, rational calculation based on the need for membership and the application of
interpretive frames between organizations and potential members.
The literature on Frame Alignment processes relates both to the question of
resources and that of leaders and their respective effects on organizational strategy. First,
resources relate to Frame Alignment in that their availability to organizations shape
which of the above framing processes is utilized. Second, the need to mobilize resources,
primarily in the form of labor and membership, directly informs how the movement
implements these processes. Third, the experience of leaders is likely part of the process
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involved in determining political strategy in the early days of the organization.
CULTURAL & COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The emergence of the “New” social movement theories of the 1970s signaled a
shift from structural, causal models intended to determine the subjective and constructed
causes of collective behavior toward models that focus on the dynamics within
organizations and communities that shape activism and outcomes. A fundamental
concept to these “new” analyses is collective identity, or the cognitive or moral
connection with a broader community or institution involving a sense of tangible or
imagined shared statuses, expressed through symbols, myths, rituals, and modes of
communication (Polletta & Jasper 2001). Collective identity is conceptualized as
logically-prior to any of the organizational or tactical operations of an SMO. The identity
of a community informs and shapes the forthcoming organizational form, strategic
choices, ideology, internal dynamics, beliefs, and external engagement of an SMO
(Bernstein 1997; Taylor & Whittier 1994).
Concurrent with this focus on identity is the application of cultural sociology to
the study of collective behavior. Notably, the work of Ann Swidler and others develops
the notion of culture as a “toolkit” available to organizations and communities (Swidler
1986). The elements of a cultural toolkit – modes of communication, rituals, symbols,
organizational forms, and so on – provide organizers with models for the form of social
organizing, rather than determining an SMO’s content (Patillo-McCoy 1998). Toolkits
and collective identity represent internal SMO dynamics and pre-existing conditions
within the protest community that provide non-structural determinants of strategy. For
these traditions, strategy at the time of organizational emergence is a direct reflection of
29

the beliefs, values, norms, symbols, ideology, history, and various other shared cultural
and identity elements of the activist community. This literature informs the relationship
between leaders and organizational strategy explored in the present research.
POLITICAL CAPITAL & STRATEGIC CAPACITY
A final factor in the development of strategy involves the knowledge, talent, and
overall organizational capacity of the organization’s members themselves. SMOs often
emerge among a small handful of committed activists who are willing to take on the
responsibility and workload associated with creating a challenging group. The personal
biography, history, and political capital of these individuals will likely play a role in
shaping key elements of the organization. Leaders with experience in past SMOs apply
the lessons learned from that experience - both positive and negative - to the development
of the new organization. Equally, their political capital - the knowledge and skills
associated with operating within the current political context - will also influence the
strategies available.
Marshall Ganz’s research on the U.S. farm workers’ movements presents the
concept of “strategic capacity.” For Ganz, strategic capacity refers to a “leaders' access to
salient information about the environment, heuristic use they made of this information,
and their motivation” (Ganz 2000: p. 1005). This capacity is a function of both the
leadership (composed of leaders’ biographies, social networks or capital, and known and
utilized repertoires of action) and the organization (composed of its deliberative structure,
resource flows, and means of accountability). Strategic capacity in turn determines the
actual strategy employed based on the targets involved, tactics employed, and timing
engaged. These strategies then influence the overall outcome of the SMO, which then in
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conjunction with changes in the political and social environment reaffirm or cause
changes in the structure of the organization and nature of the leadership (Ganz 2000).
Strategy employed at emergence is thus a direct function of the objective nature of
the organization and the personal attributes and biographies of leaders; a focus for the
present research. This is in contrast to many prior examinations of strategy which
involved strict rational calculations of success, reliance on cultural or identity factors,
resources, context, or charisma. Rather, Ganz attempts to synthesize these various
elements into a model of strategic development (and subsequent re-development).
The Legacy of the 1960s
A common thread throughout much of the social movement literature highlights,
either consciously or unintentionally, the strategic repertoire that emerged and thrived
during the American protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s. This repertoire of action – sitins, mass demonstrations and marches, grassroots political organizing, mass symbolic
action, youth/student activism, etc. - has become the dominant and, in fact, typical
framework of social movement strategy. It is, in effect, the benchmark by which all other
repertoires and strategies are measured. One reason for this is the prevalence of
published research findings regarding these incredibly powerful and important cases
(e.g., Morris 1986; McAdam 1999; Taylor 1989). A vast number of articles and books
have explored the dynamics and effects of the various Civil Rights, Women's Rights, and
Anti-War/Vietnam organizations. While this is for good reason, it has the unintended
consequence of creating a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical landscape that treats this
particular protest cycle as the norm across all cycles. However, by examining across
protest cycles, we see that the mass actions and organizing efforts of this period are more
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unique than typical (Tarrow 1994).
A more complete picture for studies of social movements requires examination of
strategies, outcomes, organizations, and all of the various dynamics of activism and
politics within the contemporary context. The repertoire of the 1960s, while compelling
and effective within that context, is not necessarily an effective strategic plan for the
present day. As such, to explore current dynamics through that lens is theoretically and
empirically anachronistic.
The present study builds from this theoretical issue by problematizing and
exploring the dynamics surrounding the development of SMO strategy in two
contemporary movements. Rather than assume that what is always needed in order to
implement social change is mass protest and comprehensive organizing, this analysis
explores the relationships between (a) the resources available to the organizations and
founders in the early days of its existence, and (b) the various non-resource/non-financial
processes and relationships between leaders and the organizational context: diffusion,
networks, political culture, symbolic resonance, and various other factors on the strategy
of SMOs.
Two Options: Innovation or Adoption
Up to now, two sets of factors – inter-organizational and intra-organizational
characteristics and processes – have been presented through the literature as potentially
causal in the determination of external political strategies by social movement
organizations. The next key distinction among organizations regarding strategy is
whether they develop new and innovative strategies relative to their social context or
whether they adopt repertoires of action employed by other SMOs.
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The conceptualization of innovation employed for the current study and utilized
in the qualitative case analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 refers to the implementation of an
external political strategy that has previously been absent across the universe of SMOs.
Innovation is thus a potentially rare phenomenon. Emergent organizations will often
coalesce around familiar and known strategic repertoires given their prevalence, success,
and so on.
First, the Resource Mobilization literature suggests that new SMOs that develop
within a crowded social movement sector are prone to uniqueness in some way
(McCarthy & Zald 1975). These new organizations, like a new automobile manufacturer
in the US, are entering an already crowded market. In such a market, the new
organization/firm has to offer the potential consumer/constituent something that the
existing – and thus likely more legitimate, successful, and trusted – players do not. This
offering could take various forms, including but not limited to: new/different specific
goals, organizational forms, mobilizing tactics, targets of action, methods of
communication/advertising, selective incentives to membership, or external strategy.
For example, within the context of a growing social movement environment
pursuing Civil Rights in the 1960s, new organizations faced the decision of either (a)
adopting the prevalent and increasingly-legitimate repertoire of non-violent civil
disobedience employed by the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), etc. or
(b) presenting a unique strategic alternative in order to attract potential constituents to
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their nascent movement. Many opted for the former in order to piggyback on the
successes of those organizations and as to be part of a wider non-violent movement that
was making increasing inroads into public opinion and policy regarding Civil Rights,
Women's Rights, and ending the war in Viet Nam. Other emerging organizations, most
notably the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in Oakland, California, chose to offer a
strategic alternative oriented toward providing community resources not offered by
institutional actors (in the form of school lunch programs, etc.) and expressing
willingness to engage in violent confrontations with police and other authority figures
when faced with perceived or actual threats to the communities.
For Resource Mobilization, this was a rational decision by the Party in order to
attract members within a crowded market of existing non-violent organizations. Were
they to emerge as yet another non-violent disobedient group, potential
constituents/members would be faced with the decision to join (a) a large, existing,
relatively-successful organization using this tactic or (b) a new, untested, unknown, and
thus more fragile organization offering exactly the same repertoire (McCarthy & Zald
1975). In the eyes of these theorists, to join the new organization in that situation would
be irrational and thus the new organization would fail to mobilize and either have a quick
shelf-life or never emerge at all.
A corollary to the Resource Mobilization market-based analogy would be a case
of a new organization that was entering a relatively or completely empty social
movement context. In this situation, the new organization would be without competitors,
enemies, or allies. In such circumstances, the organization would be able to do whatever
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it would like to related to strategy, organizational form, membership, and so on. To
extend the market analogy, this new organization would have a monopoly over the
potential constituents in this context. Like a corporate monopoly, the organization then
would not have its hand played or affected by the other players in the market. In this
situation, the new organization would be able to choose to employ a strategy seen in other
social movement sectors or contexts. However, because there was not an established
population of other organizations employing any particular repertoire, their chosen
strategy could either emerge as (a) borrowed from another sector or context in order to
piggyback its legitimacy or success or (b) developed something unique due to a lack of
competition (and thus lacking the possible negative consequences of novelty – namely,
that the organization appeared radical in the face of existing and legitimate competitors).
An organization may find compelling reasons to develop innovative strategies if
the existing organizations fighting for or against the same or similar causes have been
demonstrably unsuccessful in their efforts. In this case, a new organization may emerge
expressly because it offers a novel alternative to what has been viewed as a failed
strategic repertoire. Many Animal Rights/Protection organizations have emerged with
new strategies due to a perception that their previous counterparts were unable to achieve
the necessary change in order to protect this population. For example, the Animal
Liberation Front (ALF) emerged with a strategic approach involving violent and
destructive raids on laboratories that used animals to test various commercial and medical
products. Members would break into the facilities, destroy equipment, vandalize and
“tag” walls with their name, logo, and statements, and free the animals held within. This
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tactic emerged within animal rights groups because it was believed that more legitimate
and routine political and social efforts to stop the laboratory testing of animals – through
legislation, boycotts and other forms of public pressure – had not worked (ALF “Mission
Statement”).
Political repression toward activists may be another factor contributing to the
development of innovative strategies. In a stifling and repressive political context, where
the threat of physical violence, imprisonment, exile, or worse is a very real possibility for
those who speak out, activists and organizations may be forced to develop strategies that
have not yet been employed. To be successful activists in these contexts need to employ
creative methods of mobilizing resources, members, and pursuing their stated goals. Out
of necessity, they develop strategies that will avoid – or at least delay – the attention of
and repercussions from state authorities. This often takes the form of utilizing tactics to
disseminate information that may not appear to be activist in nature – via music or art, for
example.
Another component in the development of innovative political strategies is the
emergence of new technologies for use by the SMO population. The forms of technology
available to activists greatly shape the potential strategies they could employ. In the past
twenty years, the emergence of the internet and social media has greatly transformed
activism where it is readily available. Most notably, the mass demonstrations against the
regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran were largely organized through social
networking sites. Because of the stifling media control by the state in Iran, much of the
information disseminated by activists about their efforts and the repression they faced
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from the state emerged via Twitter (Grossman 2009). Many of the “Arab Spring”
uprisings of 2011 were similarly organized through Facebook, mass text messaging, and
Twitter (Parvaz 2011). In earlier incarnations, activists used “older” communicative
internet processes such as mass email lists, message boards, news feeds, and chat rooms
to aid in organizing the diverse and actions against the World Trade Organization in
Seattle in 1999 (Smith 2001).
Figure 1-1: Factors Toward Strategic Innovation

The leadership of newly emerging SMOs may also determine that adopting a
strategy used by other allied or countermovement organizations is the preferred course of
action. As discussed before, developing an entirely novel or innovative strategy is a
relatively rare phenomenon. Organizations often adopt an existing strategy that, for a
variety of reasons, has shown to be effective.
One determinant for the adoption of pre-existing strategic repertoires is success.
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If an emerging organizations observes a particular strategy as effective in terms of
various fundamental processes – such as mobilization, survival, and goal-attainment –
then the new organization is likely to adopt a similar strategy.
Figure 1-2: Factors Toward Strategic Adoption

Organizations tend to utilize pre-existing resources, tools, and structures when
both available and proven. McAdam identifies various resources that new organizations
employ from what he calls “indigenous organizations” including strategy, methods of
communication, solidarity incentives, leadership structures, legitimacy, and tangible
resources such as meeting places and technology (McAdam 1999). By this logic, an
organization entering a crowded field may be less likely to innovate in terms of strategy –
as suggested by McCarthy and Zald (1975) – because the leadership and decision-makers
observe the activities in the field and choose instead to adopt the best-practices of the
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most-effective players. This is the “tactical diffusion” process discussed by Andrews &
Biggs in which activists viewed the success of SMOs via various media outlets and direct
interaction and thus employed similar strategies (Andrews & Biggs 2006).
Another process of adoption involves the importing of strategies from other social
movement sectors, locations, or times. The newly-emerging organization does not look
to its fellow organizations or antagonists, but rather to organizations that have had a high
degree of success in an entirely different struggle. This could occur as the result of
various internal or external factors. New organizations may include vanguard members
who were involved in successful efforts in other social arenas. These members would
bring with them their experiences with those successful strategies and suggest their
application in this new fight. Organizers may choose to apply successful repertoires from
other arenas based on their own observation, academic study, or media exposure of other
successful SMOs. For example, student protestors against the war in Viet Nam employed
the “sit-in” as a direct action against university administrators who were viewed as
complicit in what were perceived to be illegitimate government actions. The “sit-in” was
previously employed to great effect by Civil Rights protestors at lunch counters in the
American South. Media coverage of these Southern efforts and the diffusion of activists
from the South to universities in the rest of the country allowed for the spread of this
successful strategy to other struggles. Occupying the dean's office and occupying the
lunch counter at Woolworth's demonstrate the adoption of successful strategies in a new
milieu (Andrews & Biggs 2006).
A third factor that may lead the vanguard of a new organization to adopt prevalent
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strategic repertoires rather than develop novel strategies is the quest for public acceptance
and legitimacy. Social movements, like all organizations, require members. Membership
in activist organizations is generally considered to be at least a mildly risky vocation.
According to Mancur Olsen (1965), involvement in organized efforts to obtain public
goods – such as rights, clean water, environmental protection, etc. - is an irrational act
(M. Olson 1965). The spoils of such efforts are indivisible and cannot be parceled out to
only those directly involved in their procurement. As such, all members of the
community benefit. In this case, if your benefit does not change regardless of your level
of involvement in the struggle, your most-rational position would be to opt out and hope
for the best: to “free ride.” Olsen suggests that the only way to overcome this “Free
Rider Dilemma” is to either coerce members through the application or threat of negative
sanctions or to offer selective incentives to members (such as titles, social prestige,
wages, etc). Another way to lower the costs associated with social activism is to create
an environment in which the activism is not viewed as a threat to the individual's social
position or status (ibid). In other words, if the organization is viewed as socially
legitimate, then involvement in it is not viewed as a deviant or otherwise threatening
action. A new organization, then, may choose to adopt a repertoire that is viewed as
legitimate by the general public and by institutional actors in order to attract members.
By employing a widely-accepted strategy, the organization is less likely to face repression
from the police, the state, and other formal agents of social control.
Hypotheses of SMO Strategy at Emergence
The preceding discussion summarizes findings and insights within the literature
regarding how and why newly-emerging SMOs choose their strategy. From these
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findings and insights, I develop the following hypotheses that are the focus of the current
research.
Hypothesis #1 emerges from the Resource Mobilization literature and the work of
Marshall Ganz (2000) regarding strategic capacity:

Hypothesis #1: The resources available to an organization and the source of those
resources (members, grants, sponsors, etc.) influence the strategies deployed at
the time of emergence. (1a): Strategies considered to be more costly will be
unavailable to organizations with limited resources. (1b): Organizations whose
revenue is generated primarily by active members will have greater flexibility in
choosing strategies than organizations beholden to single, large donors.
Hypothesis #2 explores the relationships of context to strategic development
described in the Organizational Ecology and Organizational Diffusion literatures.
Hypothesis #2: The inter-organizational, political, and cultural context
surrounding the issues and goals of the emerging movement organization
influences the strategies deployed in the following ways: (2a) New SMOs
determine their political strategy based on a process of “market specialization.”
If the social movement sector is crowded, they will innovate by developing a new
strategy or adopting a strategy thus far unseen in the sector, in order to attract
members away from existing/established organizations; (2b) the failure or success
of strategies within political and organizational sectors will influence the new
SMO to use or reject existing tactical repertoires.
Hypotheses #3 and #4 explore the relationship between the histories, biographies,
identities/philosophies, and skills of leaders on the development of political strategy by
emerging SMOs. These dynamics are described in the Organizational Diffusion,
Resource Mobilization, and “New” Social Movements/Collective Identity Literatures.
Hypothesis 3: (a) The unique experiences (both within other SMOs and in other
contexts) of SMO founders influence the choice of strategy at emergence.
Founders will employ strategies they have used in the past or those that they view
as the most efficient strategy for goal-attainment. (b) The particular skills
(organizational, professional, etc.) and education of SMO founders influence the
choice of strategy at emergence.
41

Hypothesis #4: The individual and/or collective identity, and the philosophical/
ideological understandings of the founders relating to the issues involved in
their SMO will influence the strategies chosen at founding. Those strategies
viewed as consistent with these identities or ideologies will be implemented
regardless of other factors (perceived effectiveness, cost, etc).
Understanding the variety of factors and inputs involved in intra-organizational
decisions among leaders and founders will allow empirical studies of social movements
to better capture the complexity surrounding these decisions. An approach that
incorporates and refines the conceptual foundations of the field and employs multiple
methods of data collection and analysis will improve the sociological understanding of
early movement organization processes. This study represents an initial attempt at such
an approach.
The following chapter develops an expanded typology of external political
strategies for social movement organizations. This conceptualization builds upon these
theoretical traditions and a review of the data under analysis to expand the range of
strategies available to social movement organizers. This in turn expands the range of
organizations and strategies under review in the study of social movements.
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CHAPTER 3 - EXTERNAL POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
This chapter begins by reviewing prior efforts to conceptualize and categorize
social movement political strategy within the literature. The remainder of the discussion
develops a new and more exhaustive categorization of strategy based on an inductive
review of the sampled cases of LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection
organizations used in the subsequent analyses. This categorization expands the scope of
prior understandings to include organizations often excluded from review. These
organizations are engaged in activities that further the stated goals and issues associated
with the two general movements. This categorization is used in the quantitative and
qualitative analysis as the coding scheme on the dependent variable (strategy) for all
organizations in the study.
Prior Categorizations of Social Movement Strategy
The decision-making surrounding strategy for SMOs is a fluid process.
Organizations respond and react to changes in their political, social, cultural, and
economic climate. They also face persistent changes including: challenges from countermovements or competing organizations, resource availability, increases or decreases in
members, successes and failures in campaigns, encounters with repression and social
control, and alterations in the salience of interpretive frames, identities, and messages visa-vis the public. Therefore, strategy is often viewed as either (a) an input related to the
success or failure of a movement organization or (b) a constantly evolving process
involving the interplay of internal and external dynamics. These two conceptualizations
in the literature are useful and important, but have left the question of why movements
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adopt or develop a particular strategy at emergence largely unanswered. The
categorization of the strategies available to and used by movement organizations varies
across studies and is often too general to have substantive significance. Or, it is outdated
and not reflective of the current strategic repertoires available. The following sections
discuss these issues as they relate to my research questions regarding resources and
leaders, and present a conceptualization and categorization of social movement strategy
based on an inductive review of the cases in the contemporary arena.
One early and useful explication of social movement strategy was provided by
Ralph Turner in his 1970 chapter “Determinants of Social Movement Strategy.” Strategy
is conceived as those actions that a social movement organization engages in with the
express purpose of furthering its cause and maximizing goal attainment (Turner 1970: p.
147). This definition is consistent with the present research's definition of external
political strategy, and thus Turner's work is a useful starting point for understanding the
dynamics of movement tactics. Here, Turner offers a conceptualization with three
potential categories within which all repertoires of political and social action fall. First,
activist organizations can engage in Coercive Action, defined as:
The manipulation of the target group's situation in such fashion that the pursuit of
any course of action other than that sought by the movement will be met by some
considerable cost (Turner 1970: p. 148).
This coercion can take either violent or non-violent forms. Violent Coercive Action
involves the use of terror, kidnapping, assault, sabotage, and other physical or propertybased threats or actions of harm. Non-violent Coercive Action involves intimidation,
negative image manipulation, harm to social status, economic harm, boycotts, non-violent
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direct protest, and other non-violent actions (ibid). The second category of strategy is
Persuasive Action, defined as “the use of strictly symbolic manipulation, without
substantial rewards or punishments under the control of the movement” (ibid – p. 149).
These strategies include actions involving normative or cultural elements of the
movement's context and target group in order to influence outcomes rather than directing
direct action toward the agents responsible. Public shaming, media events, undercover
investigations or exposés, and public relations or information campaigns are all examples
of Persuasive Action. Persuasion is not a matter of threat or harm to the target, but is
instead an effort by the SMO to raise awareness and to rally public support for their
cause. It often takes the form of public information campaigns in which organizations
make known the potential consequences of not attaining their stated goals or policy
agenda. The movement itself has no real control over these consequences – as they are
not directly engaging the target in a coercive way – and therefore only exerts their
influence through processes of mobilization and consciousness-raising (ibid).
The third SMO strategy available is Bargaining. This occurs when the
challenging group has something of value that the target agent desires, and the group is
willing to provide some or all of it in exchange for meeting their demands. Bargaining
often occurs in the political sphere by promising votes or public support for candidates in
exchange for an advancement of their preferred policy goals. The organization will
“deliver” its members at the ballot in exchange for the party or candidate following
through (or at least, promising to follow through) with a legislative agenda consistent
with the SMO’s goals. Bargaining also takes the form of coalition-building among
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organizations with similar policy aims (ibid).
This strategy most reflects what is generally referred to as “routine politics” in the
United States. The quid pro quo of constituencies and candidates or parties is
commonplace in our political world. On both sides of the political aisle, powerful
examples of organizational bargaining as a strategy are evident. The modern Democratic
Party has relied on the support of trade and labor unions at the ballot and has, in turn,
generally advocated for workers' rights and protections for the middle and working
classes. In recent decades, the powerful organizations of the Christian Conservative
movement have channeled their energies into supporting the Republican Party and in
many ways have profoundly shaped its political ideology and legislative agenda. The
renewed focus on “culture war” or “social conservative” policy battles – restrictions on
abortion rights, “Defense of Marriage Acts” federally and at the state level, etc. - has
largely been driven by the massive and powerful constituency mobilized by the (mostly
Evangelical) Christian Right.
Turner's three categories of movement strategy are a useful starting-point for
exploring the dynamics behind the development of movement tactics. However, these
categories are too broad and do not adequately reflect the actions presently and
prominently engaged in by today's SMOs. By considering only Bargaining, Coercion,
and Persuasion as the legitimate forms of social movement strategy, Turner is also
constructing a limited conceptualization of what types of organizations can be classified
as SMOs. This reflects a classical definition of the social movement: an overtly political
organization directly engaged in social conflict (or compromise) with institutional and
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public actors regarding an issue of political, social, or economic salience (Blumer: 1969).
This conceptualization is not wrong, but it excludes some elements of the contemporary
social movement sector and some of the more prominent strategies employed in the
present repertoire. As I discuss below, an inductive categorization of SMOs based on an
examination of contemporary cases provides a more complete and complex view of
strategy.
In their article “The Environmental Movement and the Modes of Political
Action,” Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider (2003) analyze the activities of
environmental advocacy organizations and find that those actions can be categorized in
four distinct categories: networking, conventional politics, mobilizing, and protest
(Dalton, et. al. 2003). These four are often all employed in different ways by these
organizations, with protest being the least common. The authors find that the primary
determinant of movement strategy is mobilized resources (most notably, the number of
full-time employees of the organization), and that ideology tends be a significant
predictor for organizations engaging in direct protest, networking, or mobilization, but
not for those organizations engaging in conventional political action (ibid). These
strategies refer both to ongoing movement processes (mobilizing and networking) and
external movement strategies (conventional politics and protest). As such, for the present
research we are left with only two strategic possibilities, which do not adequately
represent the empirical variation among contemporary rights-based SMOs.
In her 2002 article, Debra Minkoff analyzes US women's and racial and ethnic
minority organizations since 1955 to explore the development and deployment of three
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strategic forms: advocacy, service provision, and a hybrid of the two. In this
categorization, social movement groups are seen as having available only two strategic
repertoires: They can engage either in advocacy, direct efforts to affect the political
institutions and laws of the land, or service provision - “offering divisible benefits, or
private goods, that may be provided without actual changes in policy or institutional
structures” (quoted from Jenkins 1987, in Minkoff 2002: p. 378). This categorization is
useful in that it prominently includes service provision as a social movement strategy,
which is uncommon in the literature. However, the category of advocacy is too broad to
be empirically and analytically useful. If all other strategies that are not the provision of
private goods and services are considered “advocacy,” then we are left with a single
conceptual category that includes the bombing of federal buildings, kidnapping, sabotage,
and writing letters to members of Congress and proposing legislation.
The categories of SMO strategy developed for the present research are the result
of an inductive conceptualization based on a broad review SMOs working toward issues
of Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights in the contemporary United States. This
categorization is an improvement on those of Turner, Minkoff, and Dalton, et. al, in that
it is a direct reflection of the population of cases today. Organizations working toward
broad movement goals employ a wide variety of strategy, some rarely considered part of
the activist paradigm. Nevertheless, these organizations and their members engage in
political action, both routine and outside of the institutional political arena, cultural and
expressive actions aimed at changing values, behaviors, and attitudes regarding the rights
of their constituents, legal strategies designed to influence precedence and legislative and
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normative changes, organizational and philanthropic funding, and the provision of goods
and services to their populations as a means of facilitating the most basic of constituents'
rights: the right to live.
Social Movement Strategy: An Inductive Categorization
NON-ROUTINE POLITICS
The image of the SMO most commonly portrayed in the media and academia is
the mass protest movement. It is a picture of hundreds or thousands of people taking to
the streets to march, occupy buildings in sit-ins and other disruptive actions, throw
bottles, and dodge tear gas and rubber bullets. This image of non-routine political action
has been both glorified and vilified at various stages and via various agents and media.
Non-routine politics refers to political action beyond or outside of the normative and
legitimate institutions of a given social and political context. These strategic actions can
be categorized as either violent or non-violent in nature. Historically, the primary
correlate to the implementation of either violent or non-violent strategies was the nature
of the goals of the organization. Herbert Blumer proposed that “reform” movements –
those seeking slow, incremental, or compartmentalized change in the social, economic,
and/or political arena – are likely to engage in non-violent strategies (Blumer 1969).
These non-violent strategies are not uniquely non-routine in Blumer's proposed theory.
“Radical” or “revolutionary” movements – those seeking widespread, revolutionary,
rapid social change – are more likely to employ violent strategies (ibid). Behind this
distinction is the fundamental belief that violence in politics is an illegitimate strategy
(della Porta 1995).
Violent political tactics used by SMOs and other outside actors are often viewed
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as the politics of last resort: When all else fails, resort to violence. As previously
discussed, this is often not the case, as movements utilize violence in their repertoire
when it correlates with a radical or revolutionary set of goals or rhetoric. However, in
many cases, violence is the strategy employed only after legitimate forms of political
action have been exhausted or are unavailable. In multiple empirical analyses of the
Political Process/Opportunity theory, researchers have focused on SMO actions when
faced with politically-repressive or closed political contexts (Kurzman 1996; Opp 1993).
The general presumption is that, in a political arena where contestation is normative and
legitimate, organizations have a legitimate action repertoire at their disposal and a means
for effective redress of grievances vis-a-vis the state. However, in a repressive political
climate, those outside of the polity are unable to do so and are often met with social
control and/or violence, or even when attempting to organize in the first place. In such
contexts, violent and disruptive tactics may be viewed by SMO leaders as the only
available repertoire.
The use of violence often has negative consequences for the SMO, both internally
and externally. First, violence is generally viewed as illegitimate in the wider political
and cultural contexts of most societies in which democracy has been institutionalized, as
in the present case. Therefore, the SMO loses that public legitimacy in the eyes of
broader culture the moment it deploys violent tactics. This then has myriad effects on the
internal workings of the organization. It will affect its ability to mobilize members,
resources, and public support. It often criminalizes an organization's membership and
leadership, leaving them vulnerable to arrest. This in turn forces members to “go
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underground” to avoid capture. Violent movements invite clashes with formal agents of
social control which is individually and organizationally costly and risky. A
radicalization of rhetoric and goals often follows, which further marginalizes their efforts
from broader social and political contexts.
The protest cycle of the 1960s produced what is widely considered the dominant
and normative strategic repertoire of the social movement sector in the West: nonviolence and disruptive (rather than violent) politics. Non-violent strategies include
disruptive politics, such as boycotts, sit-ins, and other forms of non-violent occupations
of public or private space. This repertoire includes protest and marches, and any other
form of non-institutional non-violent political action. Non-violent organizations find
themselves in a less precarious position relative to the public at large, potential
constituents, targets, political and social institutions, and agents of social control than do
their violent counterparts. These organizations are better able to appeal to a broad public
and often find themselves with a legitimate public image. Political elites and institutions
are generally more responsive to the demands or grievances of a non-violent challenger.
The threat of facing social control from both formal and informal agents is considerably
less due to the lower threat presented by a non-violent movement organization (Blumer
1969). While these organizations are explicitly operating outside of the political
mainstream and its institutional channels for redressing grievances, they may be more
likely to still mobilize members and resources due to their relative legitimacy. In the end,
non-violence – thanks in large part to the ubiquity and relative success of the 1960s mass
protest movements – is a more legitimate form of political challenge in Western societies
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than violence.
ROUTINE POLITICS
Early models of social movement activity made a clear distinction between
collective and individual actors with institutional polity access and those who are beyond
the polity (McAdam 1999). Because of this distinction, social movement strategies were
viewed as conceptually different from institutional politics: Parties and elites engage in
institutional or routine politics, and activists engaged in non-routine politics. It is a false
distinction to claim that SMOs do not utilize the various avenues available to them within
the formal institutions of politics to further their goals. As the analysis to follow shows,
many organizations involve themselves only in the strategic repertoire of
institutional/routine politics without any engagement with the protest politics so closely
associated with activism. By its very nature, this strategic repertoire is the most
politically- and socially-legitimate: It is working within the normative and institutional
channels to pursue mainstream policy agendas and goals. The public will perhaps respect
the actions and organization regardless of whether they sympathize with the goals
pursued. Routine political organizations do not share most of the potential issues or
pitfalls associated with non-routine political organizations. However, the trade-off of
routine political action over the non-routine strategic repertoire is that ideological purity
and complete flexibility for innovation in movement strategies and form are sacrificed in
order to increase public legitimacy and access to the formal institutions of power in
society (Blumer 1969).
The tactics involved in the Routine Political strategic repertoire include: lobbying
political elites, drafting legislation and lobbying on its behalf, contributing resources
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(money, labor) to the campaigns of candidates and parties, letter-writing campaigns and
petitions to political elites, and the various forms of public awareness campaigns through
the media to influence legislative action at all levels of political institutions. Some SMOs
begin in the realm of non-routine politics and then are subsumed under the banner of
routine political institutions and take on that tactical repertoire. The literature of cooptation is limited, but it is presumed that many of the reform SMOs of the 1960s protest
wave became co-opted by political elites and parties as they became larger and more
mainstream. The reform Civil Rights, Women's, and Anti-War movements of the 1960s
were viewed to have been co-opted by the Democratic Party in a process where leaders
were taken into institutional roles and the agendas and rhetoric of the movements were
subsumed within the agendas of the party platform (Taylor 1999; Nelson 1971; Andrews
1997).
CULTURE/EXPRESSIVE ACTION
For many years, a distinction was made within the literature on social movements
between “strategic” and “identity” movements (Touraine 1992). The implication is that
an SMO could be involved in either the strategic pursuit of collective goals or the
development and empowerment of identity, but not both. These two categories were
considered mutually-exclusive. This leads to a distinction between movements that are
externally-focused – those seeking political, social, and/or economic change in their
given context – and those internally-focused – those seeking to create a sense of self,
history, identity, and/or solidarity within a given community. Recently (Bernstein 1997),
this dichotomy has been problematized and re-interpreted to explore the interaction of
strategy and identity. More importantly, some scholars have developed theoretical and
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empirical discussions of identity and culture as strategies themselves, rather than just
determinants or outcomes of other processes.
In a 1997 article, Mary Bernstein proposes that identity is involved in three
distinct phases of social movement development and action. First, “Identity for
Empowerment” involves the creation of a collective identity and the sense that political
action is not only desirable or necessary, but also feasible. A collective identity is seen as
a necessary component for any and all other mobilization and activist processes: We must
know who “we” are before “we” can mobilize and act (Bernstein 1997). Second,
“Identity as Goal” involves the challenge of stigmatization, pursuit of cultural
recognition, and a deconstruction of the restrictions placed on marginalized groups in
society (ibid). Lastly, “Identity Deployment” or “Identity as Strategy” involves an
expression of collective identity in which the arena of conflict becomes social status and
identity itself (ibid). With this, individuals engage in and form organizations in order to
challenge accepted values, practices, categories, and behaviors associated with wider
culture and their own marginalization. This strategic use of identity takes one of two
forms: “Identity for Critique” or “Identity for Education.” The use of “Identity for
Critique involves a confrontation with the values of the dominant culture. It is a
condemnation of the essentializing of the marginalized group's identity, ignorance of their
perils, and to the ways in which they are perceived and treated by wider society.
Dominant norms and values are wrong, and thus need to be challenged and changed. In
“Identity for Education,” the movement confronts wider culture with the intent of
demonstrating that its perceptions of the marginalized group are not wholly wrong, but
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rather that the marginalized group is “just like you” and should be accepted within
broader society (ibid).
SMOs directly engaging institutional targets, seeking inclusive membership, and
pursuing routine political goals tend to deploy “Identity as Education.” Those
organizations whose targets/opposition are counter-movements and who lack access to
political elites and are more exclusive in membership tend to deploy “Identity for
Critique” (Bernstein 1997). These strategies specifically involve efforts toward public
recognition of the social status of marginalized groups in society, awareness campaigns
surrounding discrimination, violence, or other forms of social and political repression, or
the attempts to establish new norms and values surrounding the issues, behaviors, and
identities of groups.
The concept of “frame alignment” was discussed previously in the elaboration of
the potential determinants of strategy in the social movement literature. With regard to
cultural or identity-based strategies, this variant in the literature provides a specific
element which movements may deploy in an effort to change hearts and minds among the
population. Frame Transformation, as elaborated by Snow, et. al., involves the overt
attempt by members of an organization to alter the interpretive frames of individuals with
incongruent interpretations regarding the issues, values, norms, and identities of the
group in question (Snow, et. al. 1986). Organizations may attempt to completely alter an
individual's interpretive frame - “global transformation” - or just seek to change the
individual's mind regarding a particular issue - “domain-specific transformation” (ibid).
In both cases, the strategy involves direct engagement with targets on a cultural
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level. It is not explicitly an effort to change policy, though that may be an indirect
consequence of the action – particularly if those targeted are political elites. Frame
Transformation specifically often involves awareness campaigns in which organizations
seek to mobilize adherents and/or constituents by convincing non-members that the
conditions they seek to change are inexcusable, unjust, or immoral. One highlysuccessful campaign of Frame Transformation involved the efforts of Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD). MADD, through various public-relations and media campaigns
and direct engagement with political elites, was able to transform an unfortunate situation
– the loss of a loved one due to a drunk-driving accident, which was previously seen as
an unlucky accident – into an inexcusable tragedy and a social problem worthy of public
attention and shifts in policy.
Alain Touraine (1992), a key proponent of the “new social movements” variant of
contemporary theory discusses movements as engaging in a relevant process he calls
“historicity.” Historicity refers to the strategies, organizational forms, and movement
processes directed toward the goal of reclaiming a population's control over its own
history and identity from dominant political, economic, and cultural elites. For Touraine,
these new movements are not directly engaging in what would traditionally be called
political action, but instead are fighting cultural battles for identity-space, the writing of
their own history, and the right to cultural self-determination (Touraine 1992).
LEGAL STRATEGIES
With greater frequency, activists are no longer solely protestors fighting their
battles for social and political change in the streets against the police and other agents of
social control (Ashar 2007). They are also sharply-dressed attorneys and litigants
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pursuing their agendas in the courts. For some scholars, this shift in strategy is seen as a
necessary result of either lack of access to institutional political channels for claimsmaking, or the failure of routine or non-routine political tactical repertoires (O'Connor
1980; S. Olson 1990; Burstein 1998). These “Political Disadvantage” theorists propose
that legal strategies are a last resort, or at best a Plan B for activists whose claims to the
legislative arena have fallen on deaf ears.

Others have found that activists deploy a

legal repertoire due to a variety of intra-organizational factors. Positive correlates of
legal activism include: longevity, the availability of full-time staff and attorneys, a clearly
defined and sharply focused issue-based goal, capability with technical data, the ability to
generate publicity, close coordination with affiliates and allies, the ability to persuade
members of the Justice Department or the Solicitor General to enter into action on the
organization's side, and a general measure of organizational capacity and coalitionbuilding (Scheppele & Walker 1991).
Movements are also more likely to enter the courts if their particular agenda
matches the characteristics of the legal system as a unique institution: There must be a
clear legal complaint to be filed on someone's behalf. Therefore, a specific harm to
individuals must be clearly demonstrable for such a case to exist. Accordingly, SMOs are
assumed to enter the courts in a rational way. Because legal strategies are both timeconsuming and expensive, they are often only engaged in when success is considered
likely. Activists judge this potential for success on such factors as: clarity of opponent,
intensity of conflict, ability to show demonstrable losses based on changes in political or
social climate, whether there are insiders on the court, and whether the court has clear
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jurisdiction on the area (ibid).
Movements are likely to engage in legal activism when their specific goals relate
to rights claims on behalf of disenfranchised or marginalized groups in society. Rights
claims in the United States are based in arguments of Constitutionality and often fall
within discussions of the “Equal Protection Clause” of the 14th Amendment. The clause
of the Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The “Equal Protection Clause” has been successfully used in rights-claims by
legal activists in many of the United States' most famous Civil Rights decisions including
Brown vs. The Board of Education (which established that segregation was
unconstitutional) and Milliken vs. Bradley (one of many desegregation busing decrees).
Recently, advocates for same-sex marriage rights and LGBTQ rights in general have
employed arguments to claim that so-called “Defense of Marriage Acts” violate the Equal
Protection Clause and thus are unconstitutional (Hull 2001, Albright & Goodman 2006).
Court challenges represent a significant arena of political contestation for SMOs due to
the centrality of rights to their various causes and goals. There have also been changes
within the opportunities available to such claims within the legal structure, influenced
directly by the gains of the Civil Rights movements of earlier decades. "Civil Rights" is
among the most salient and often-used identity frames in American politics and social
movement activity (Albright & Goodman 2006; Snow & Benford 1992). This focus on
rights makes the courts – and particularly national court challenges on the basis of
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constitutionality and discrimination – a potentially fruitful avenue for movement activity.
All legal strategies have both direct and indirect consequences for the SMOs.
Directly, the legal repertoire has the potential to clearly modify or affect far-reaching
change of the movement goals by altering existing law. However, direct change is often
difficult or unlikely because of a lack of resources to mount an effective challenge.
Movements often encounter a lack of sympathy within the courts for their cause.
Notably, in the early challenges on behalf of same-sex couples seeking legal marriages,
appellate court judges included moral and religious language in their decisions to justify
excluding gay and lesbian couples from the legal rights and protections of marriage
(Albright & Goodman 2006). Courts also are often overloaded, which delays hearings
and increases costs; and they often deliver symbolic rather than substantive decisions,
particularly if the legislative arena is not receptive to following-up the legal decision with
new law (Barkan 1980).
Indirectly, legal challenges – particularly when successful - serve to increase
public awareness and legitimacy of movement goals and actions, increase the public
attention to the particular discontent of the litigants and affiliated organizations, increase
the expectations among movement insiders and sympathizers, increase the identity and
movement capacity of members, increase morale, and aid in mobilizing new adherents
and constituents to the cause (ibid). Successful legal challenges increase the social
legitimacy of SMO claims by placing their issues squarely within the context of
institutional politics, and as consistent with the political ideology built into the
Constitution.
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A focus in the courts, however, can also have potentially negative consequences
for SMOs. An unsuccessful legal challenge can signify a substantial roadblock in the
routine and institutional political sphere. Courts are also generally viewed as elite
institutions, protected by powerful interests, and not necessarily predisposed to changes
in the existing social order. Therefore, challenges from marginalized groups are often
initially-unsuccessful and challengers must then appeal further up the line through
appellate and possibly Supreme courts – again, a costly endeavor. Focusing on litigation
can cause the SMO to become dominated by lawyers and legal experts, rather than
activists and mobilizers. This can have the effect of compromising initial movement
goals and demobilizing the organization due to a lack of attention paid to grassroots
efforts. Legal strategies generally de-radicalize movements, as a focus in the courts
implies a pursuit of legitimacy within existing conditions, rather than an overt, radical,
revolutionary challenge to those conditions (Bernstein, et al 2009).
For SMOs seeking redress through the legal system, the time and resources
necessary for successful challenges may be a deterrent. However, multiple avenues exist
for activists within the courts to advance their particular agenda. In general, three
strategies exist for SMOs within the courts. First, they involve their staff and attorneys in
filing suits on behalf of those who have claims to direct harm based on unfair or
discriminatory laws. This tactic is the most resource-dependent, as it requires direct and
constant action on the part of organizational staff. Therefore, the organizations that we
would expect to be most likely to engage in this approach would be well-funded and
likely well-established. It is unlikely that newly-emerging SMOs – unless they are elite-
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driven or sponsored – would employ this strategy at inception.
A second strategy sees the SMO participating in class-action suits along with
other organizations, public-interest groups, and litigants of various types. This strategy is
less resource-dependent, as the organization is not the only force behind the legal
challenge, and thus may not focus massive amounts of time, energy, staff, and money
toward the effort. In these challenges, the organization is seen as part of a coalition of
litigants challenging existing laws. This strategy therefore involves the ability of the
organization to build coalitions with potentially-disparate and competing interests in
society in order to advance their agenda. Organizations with radical, publicly-deviant or
illegitimate goals are unlikely to become involved in such cases. These challenges are
often successful because of the appearance of broad-based support, especially if litigants
are also able to mobilize support among political and elite insiders to further apply
pressure to the courts.
Both of the above strategies often involve the action of “cause lawyers.” The
cause lawyer has received considerable attention in the recent literature regarding the
legal strategies of interest groups in America. Cause lawyers are seen as engaging in
“zealous advocacy on behalf of the movement” and “seek a social impact beyond the
case” (Barclay & Marshall 2005: p. 176). Cause lawyers may or may not be movement
insiders, but they are attorneys who become involved in legal proceedings with the goal
of not just winning the case on behalf of the litigants, but also of advancing a social
agenda consistent with SMOs on the issue at hand (ibid).
The third strategy within the legal system involves the filing of amicus curiae
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briefs on behalf of litigants. The amicus curiae – or “friend of the court” - was originally
intended and implemented as a means for outside parties to provide information to the
court that could aid in enlightening facts or relevance of the decision that might impact
the outcome. It has come to be used as a mechanism by which organizations not directly
involved in the case or the specific litigants can become involved in legal challenges.
The courts retain the authority as to whether to accept an amicus brief filed in a particular
case, and thus can regulate what is and what is not allowed to enter into deliberation. The
briefs are used by organizations as means to pursue their own goals through legal
channels without the resource-heavy direct involvement of attorneys and lengthy, often
drawn-out litigation. Briefs are often filed when an organization becomes dissatisfied
with the manner in which litigants are pursuing their case, or when their participation,
aid, and influence have been requested by a litigant (Barclay & Marshall 2005).
Often, these are sought when the litigant or legal representative feels that the
participation of a particular interest group or organization would strengthen their case
directly or through a perceived higher sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the court. The
amicus brief is also a means to introduce non-legal data into the court proceedings in a
low-cost way: Because it is provided by an outside group and not a direct litigant, if the
judge views it as unnecessary or ineffective, it should not negatively impact the case.
The amicus brief is seen to be most useful when a loose coalition of similarly-minded
organizations all file on behalf of the same litigant. This demonstrates to the court broadbased support within the public arena for their claims (O'Connor 1980).
Caldeira and Wright (1990) explore the relationships between intra-organizational
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factors and the use of amicus curiae briefs (in terms of timing and frequency) filed before
the United States Supreme Court. Their findings demonstrate that roughly 40% of all
amicus filings were made by private individuals or advocacy groups, and not just
lobbyists, corporations, or influential business or institutional agents (Caldeira & Wright
1990). This suggests that the amicus brief is not just a tool of the elite. They also find
that courts are more receptive to competing briefs at the initial stages of legal challenges
– the “on the merits” stage – because they are interested in gathering as much information
as possible regarding the importance and significance of cases (ibid). The competing
nature of amicus briefs from organizations and their counter-organizations is strong at
this stage. They did not find that organizations tend to build coalitions within the filing
of briefs. Rather, they all file separately, but perhaps (though impossible to conclude from
these data) with cooperation and coordination (ibid).
Most studies of SMOs and the use of amici curiae involve the pursuit of
movement goals through their filings (O'Connor 1980, Walker 1991). Others use the
filing of amici curiae to represent movement dynamics relating to symbolic framing and
the connection of movements to one another and to the salient Civil Rights “master
frame” (Albright & Goodman 2006). This growing literature surrounding the use of the
courts for American social movements reflects the legal challenges among rights-based
organizations in an era of diminishing mass protest and the declining effectiveness (and
capability) of non-routine political mobilization. This argument suggests an increase in
the development of legal strategies among SMOs.
SERVICE PROVISION
Social movements exist to challenge those in positions of authority or the general
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public to either make changes to the social, political, or economic environment or to
resist those changes. Organizations using the above strategies are all rather overtly
engaged directly with a target, with a constituency behind their efforts. However,
organizations that directly provide services to a constituency in need are also engaged in
these efforts toward change, even though they do so in a less overtly-activist way. The
inclusion of service provision as a recognized strategy of SMOs is not without
controversy. The conceptualization of activism is generally developed around the notion
of overt political action directed at the institutions of power in order to create or resist
social change. The efforts of service providers are not so explicitly activist according to
this definition. However, the role of service providers within the movement organization
population is to provide directly for the potential beneficiaries of the overall movement's
goals, and to maintain and increase the non-activist solidarity and connections within
civil society; I thus include it among the strategic alternatives from which organizations
choose.
J. Craig Jenkins (1989) differentiated service providers from other forms of
activist organizations by focusing on their ability to distribute “private goods” to
individuals. This conceptualization draws a distinction from the idea of “public goods”
advanced by Mancur Olson in his work The Logic of Collective Action (1965). For
Olson, a public good is one that is indivisible and cannot be distributed only to those who
have incurred the cost associated with its procurement. For example, if there is a
successful movement for clean water or representative democracy, the organization
cannot only provide that water or voting rights to those who worked toward the cause and
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withhold it from all others in the community. Thus, in Olson's formulation, it becomes an
irrational act for an individual to engage in time and resource-consuming actions if the
potential benefits are public goods. Individuals will only rationally engage in such
behavior if provided selective incentives (payment, titles, social status) or if coerced (M.
Olson 1965).
The private goods provided by service organizations to individuals may suggest
why recipients are involved, but the logic of Olson still applies to non-recipient activists
(or “conscience constituents,” in Resource Mobilization terminology). Nonetheless, the
social movement sector is heavily populated by service providers directly engaged with
their community to provide much needed assistance where formal institutions are either
negligent, unavailable due to geography or other circumstances, or non-existent. These
organizations also should be included in this present and in other future research because
of their prominence within the universe of cases. The quantitative component of this
research examines the influence of resources and leaders on strategy in ways that both
include and exclude those cases involved in service provision.
ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDING & PHILANTHROPY
Not every organization must directly engage in the traditional forms of social
movement strategy to be an active and effective agent in the pursuit of social change.
Many organizations in the social movement sector serve as constituents to those SMOs
directly engaged in the other strategies discussed above. Some organizations provide
funding either directly to other organizations through philanthropic donations or through
a process of grant application, review, and provision to organizations engaged in other
strategies. While not directly engaged, these organizations provide a vital element to the
65

causal chain of social change through much-needed resources to advocacy and service
organizations.
While most foundations and philanthropic organizations tend to shy away from
controversial issues, those referred to as “social change philanthropists” actively seek out
organizations engaging in causes working for social change. In some cases, these
foundations are general and non-movement specific. The United Way, for example,
provides resources to thousands of organizations across the country under the banner of
“mobilizing the caring power of communities...to benefit the greater good” (United Way
Online). Other philanthropic organizations direct their resources within the confines of a
general or specific social movement sector. These generally fall within the following
typology, developed by Alan Rabinowitz: wealthy individual funders, community
foundations, and corporate foundations (Rabinowitz 1990). The recipients are
intermediate organizations devoted to providing research and/or training, funding
organizations, or community activist organizations (ibid). The funders either directly
donate resources without applications from recipients, or funders require recipients to
submit grant proposals to receive resources for specific strategic or organizational
purposes. Within organizations engaged in these strategies, there are at least two variants
of organizational trajectories involved. First, there are those organizations that explicitly
have set out to engage in such “social change philanthropy” as a means to provide
resources as part of an infrastructure for other social movement organizations. Second,
are organizations that began with a different tactical focus, but who have transitioned into
philanthropic tactics either by choice or because they have found themselves capable of
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mobilizing resources but less efficient in engaging in other strategies. For the present
research, there is no clear way to determine which of these processes has taken place, and
no distinction has been made among the organizations that fall within this strategic
category.
Summary
In this chapter, I develop six categories of SMO strategy based on a review of the
literature and an inductive examination of the cases for this analysis: non-routine politics,
routine politics, cultural/expressive strategies, legal strategies, service provision, and
organizational funding/philanthropy. These categories refine the conceptualization and
organizes the universe of cases in a more empirically-valid and exhaustive fashion.
I use this categorization of strategies in the analyses to follow in Chapters 5-7.
Understanding the possible variation on the dependent variable under review provides the
groundwork for the quantitative and qualitative analyses to follow. In the next chapter, I
review the issues and efforts of the various organizations operating within the general
movements of Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights in order to further
characterize the nature of these movements and their constituent organizations.
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CHAPTER 4 - GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE MOVEMENTS:
ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION & LGBTQ RIGHTS IN THE US
This chapter consists of overviews of the issues and goals of the Animal
Rights/Protection movement (Part 1) and the LGBTQ Rights movement (Part 2) in the
US. The purpose of this review is to provide context regarding the various goals and
issues upon which all of the organizations in the quantitative and qualitative analyses are
founded and pursue through various strategies.
PART 1: THE ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION MOVEMENT IN THE US
The fundamental philosophical issue confronting organizations working to
promote the rights of animals in society is the contrasting conceptions of animals as
property versus animals as “non-human persons.” In this respect, animal rights
organizations face a rather cumbersome challenge: Advocating for rights is generally
viewed as a human issue. Their constituency is viewed outside of any definition of
“human.” Thus, how does one advocate for animal rights? This challenge often
manifests in a distinction made between advocacy for animal “rights” versus animal
“protection.” The latter places animals in a position of inferiority to humans, and as
something worthy of protection, but incapable of it on their own. The Animal Welfare
Act, first passed by the US Congress in 1966 (and amended as recently as 2008) codifies
the definition of animals as property within federal law. The act exists in order to:
Insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition
purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment; to assure the
humane treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and to protect
the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the sale or use
of animals which have been stolen (USC Title 7, Ch. 54, 2009 Version).
Furthermore, “animals” are defined solely as:
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Any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig,
hamster, rabbit or other such warm-blooded animal...; but such term excludes (1)
birds, rats..., mice... (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm
animals, such as, but not limited to, livestock or poultry, used or intended for use
as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving
animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency (ibid).
Therefore, any animal that falls outside of this limited definition receives no federal
protection whatsoever. The limited protections provided to those that do fit the definition
fall in terms of their place within economic activities, or as private property.
Advocates for rights where animals are formally considered property face
obstacles from the economic sector. Many animals are used as inputs in the modern
industrial production of food, clothing, and a variety of other commodities. As such, the
“rights” of animals represents a direct threat to public and private economic interests,
which creates both a cultural resistance and a mobilized countermovement of agricultural
and business interests. The final key philosophical issue facing advocates of animal
rights is a simple, yet profound concern: Their constituency lacks the ability to advocate
for themselves, or to “bear witness.” In many struggles for rights, the testimonial of the
repressed individual is among the most powerful and effective means of transforming
interpretations of the population and mobilizing. Animals clearly lack this ability. Many
animal rights advocates attempt to create a proxy for this testimonial through filmed
footage of animals in what they perceive as cruel practices – slaughterhouses, cockfights
and dogfights, fur mills, laboratory testing facilities, and so on. However, the ability to
empathize largely depends on the previously-discussed conception of property versus
beings: Those who see animals as property are less likely to empathize with such
“testimonials,” regardless of the persuasiveness of the presentation of such practices as
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“barbaric.”
In the following sections, I discuss each of the current specific issues and goals
with which contemporary Animal Rights/Protection SMOs are presently working.
Vivisection/Laboratory Testing
An issue of primary concern to animal advocates is the use of live animals for
testing purposes in scientific, medical, and business-related facilities. Vivisection – the
term more commonly used in scientific and European contexts – is defined as the use of
surgery for experimental purposes on a living organism, most commonly non-human
animals (NEAVS.org). This includes laboratory testing of commercial products (such as
cosmetics), the use of animals in testing procedures for pharmaceuticals, and the use of
animals both living and deceased in classroom practices (such as the common practice of
dissecting frogs in high school biology classes). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
does not require, or even necessarily suggest, the use of animals as test subjects prior to
the distribution of new products to the public. Companies are urged to perform whatever
safety tests are deemed appropriate to ensure the safety of their products, which is often
interpreted as giving a “green light” for animal testing.
Pharmaceutical companies employ laboratory testing on animals based on various
physiological similarities between animal and human biology. Thus, animals are often
given chronic or acute conditions, injuries, or diseases in order to test the effectiveness of
the various products on healing, symptom management, and eradication. The dissection
of animals in science classes is considered a scientific necessity in the development of
students. According to the Humane Society of the United States, roughly ten to twelve
million frogs are harvested for use in classroom dissection projects every year in the
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United States. Opponents of dissection argue that given the sophistication and
availability of accurate 3D modeling software – such as various “Virtual Frog”
applications - the use of actual live or deceased animals in educational settings is
unnecessary.
In total, an estimated 25 million vertebrate animals are used in various forms of
invasive and non-invasive animal testing in the United States every year (Change.org).
Nearly all of those animals – including various primates, dogs, cats, rodents, and birds –
that survive the initial testing are then euthanized in order to perform a necropsy to
determine the full effects of the products tested. Various organizations have emerged to
specifically target the practices associated with animal testing and vivisection, including,
the National Anti-Vivisection Society, the American Anti-Vivisection Society, the
National Anti-Vivisection Alliance, the Primate Freedom Project, and the Center for
Alternatives to Animal Testing. Most broad and national Animal Rights/Protection
organizations have dedicated campaigns toward ending animal testing, including: People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), and the Humane Society of America.
Dog fighting & Cockfighting/Circuses/Anti-Fur
The high-profile case of NFL Quarterback Michael Vick and his extensive
involvement in dog fighting brought to national attention the abusive and inhumane
practices involved in the use of animals for “sport” (Naqi 2007). Even though all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting the practice of dog fighting and
the possession of dogs trained for fighting (and all but Montana have laws against being
present as a spectator at dog fights), it remains practiced in the US. Laws also exist in all
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states and the District of Columbia prohibiting the practice of cockfighting, though many
(12) do not prohibit the possession of fighting birds, being present as a spectator (8), or
the possession of “fighting implements” (foot spurs, etc – 36). The criminal penalties
associated with these laws vary tremendously from Third Degree Felonies to Petty
Misdemeanors (Humane Society 2011). Historically, both dog fighting and cockfighting
have been legal in many states, and the criminal monitoring and prosecuting only
revolved around the illegality of the gambling associated with the contests.
Both dog fighting and cockfighting are often defended as cultural practices of
various ethnic or regional populations (Geertz 1973; Bosworth 2010; Peterson 2007). In
the American Southeast, and in particular in predominantly Black subcultures, dog
fighting has a long history as a spectator sport and as both a hobby and business venture:
The breeding and the fights themselves can both be relatively lucrative endeavors in
otherwise impoverished communities. Cockfighting has long been associated with
Hispanic cultures in the American Southwest. Despite these claims, the “cultural”
designation argument has lost out to the criminalization of these activities in recent
decades.
A related topic is the use of animals in other entertainment practices. The primary
target of these efforts is the use of animals in circuses and private wild animal displays.
Efforts specifically target the abusive practices employed to train animals to perform and
restrain them from attacking spectators or visitors. Attention has also been focused on
the captivity of animals in zoos and wildlife refuges, though the attitudes toward these
institutions are decidedly mixed: Some organizations see these as necessary and useful
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forms of protecting threatened species and educating the public about their situation and
beauty, while others view them as another form of forced captivity and abuse. Animals in
circuses are often subjected to various forms of physical abuse to prepare them to engage
in unnatural activities – balancing acts, riding tricycles, jumping through hoops, and so
on. Trainers and animal handlers in circuses often employ physically-injurious
implements including whips, choke collars, electrified prods, hooks, and other devices.
The animals' confinement is often restrictive, solitary, lacking in ventilation, and
extensive in duration due to the constant travel associated with road show circuses
(PETA.org “Issues: Circuses”).
Other organizations target the use of animals in the world of fashion. For
centuries, the wearing of animal furs and hides has been at times utilitarian (the use of
animal pelts by hunter-gatherer or nomadic cultures for warmth and clothing) and a
signifier of affluence or high social status (the conspicuous consumption of certain hides
and furs as associated with nobility or wealth). The fur trade, however, has come under
increased scrutiny since the late 20th Century due to the practices associated with
harvesting furs. Animals are often raised solely for their furs and are often killed in the
cheapest/least-sophisticated ways possible (suffocation, poisoning, etc.). These furfarmed animals are often subjected to difficult living conditions up to their deaths, and
are not “used” in any way after their skins or furs have been removed; they are generally
simply disposed of.
The most prominent campaigns and tactics in the anti-fur movements are both
commonly associated with PETA: the “blood bath” and the “I'd rather...” efforts.
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Activists associated with that and other organizations have targeted patrons, sellers,
designers, and others associated with the fur trade with buckets of red paint to symbolize
the blood spilled during the production of their products. PETA also uses a series of
advertisements featuring celebrities, actors, athletes, and other culturally-relevant
spokespeople in their “I'd rather...” campaigns and billboards. These involve the use of
media – generally advertisements in magazines or on billboards – featuring naked or
highly-exposed individuals proclaiming that they would “rather go naked” than “wear
fur”/“wear leather.” These also involve similar photos and advertisements featuring
heavily-tattooed celebrities proclaiming their preference for “Ink, Not Mink.” The use of
sexually-suggestive imagery and celebrity status has proven to be a very effective tactic
for PETA and other organizations in these campaigns to raise awareness of their efforts
(Simonson 2001).
Vegetarian/Vegan
Perhaps the most culturally-embedded and normative use of animals in Western
and American society is the idea that animals can and should be used as food. The
normativity and even necessity of the consumption of animals for a healthy human diet is
reinforced through scientific and state institutions such as the Food & Drug
Administration (FDA), the US Dairy Association (USDA), and the US Department of
Health and Human Services.
A Vegetarian diet is one that does not involve the consumption of meat, but is
often conceptualized as allowing the consumption of “animal-related products” such as
eggs, dairy, honey, gelatin, and so on. These diets are often defined by prefixes, such as:
“lacto-ovo-vegetarians” who consume eggs and dairy (there are even those who consume
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fish, but still consider themselves vegetarian – aka, the “pescetarian”). Veganism refers
to a diet that is completely devoid of any animal or animal-related consumption.
Vegetarianism and Veganism, while long-standing movements within the West and
common in many parts of the world are becoming more popular in the United States with
the growing obesity problem (Iacobbo 2004).
For many Vegetarians and Vegans, these are more than diets: They are moral
statements or even movements regarding their beliefs and opinions about the treatment of
animals. Vegans generally also refrain from using or wearing any animal product for any
purpose: They eschew wearing leather, wool, feathers, or furs, and ensure that the other
products they use – such as cosmetics and cleaning products – neither contain animal byproducts nor have been tested on animals in any way. Therefore, these diets often
represent more than an approach to personal health; they are also an effort to protect
animals from harm in any way.
Resources and organizations advocating for Vegetarian and Vegan lifestyles have
proliferated recently, along with many publications dedicated specifically to these diets
and associated lifestyles. One of the more successful campaigns involves the PETAproduced film, “Meet Your Meat,” narrated by Alec Baldwin and available for free
viewing on their website and various other sources. The film shows, in stark detail, the
processes involved in the American meat-producing industries involving cattle slaughter,
the treatment and confinement of chickens and turkeys prior to their “processing,” and so
on. The graphic nature of this film is such that PETA and other animal-rights advocates
suggest showing it to those considering making the transition to a Vegetarian or Vegan
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lifestyle.
Sheltering/Rescuing
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the direct provision of services has not
always been considered a social movement strategy. However, the most common and
prominent movement-related activity among Animal Rights/Protection activists is the
rescuing and sheltering of neglected, unwanted, abused, or otherwise vulnerable animals.
Numerous shelters exist in most towns, and can be categorized in various ways. Shelters
are either public or private: Many municipal governments operate animal control
departments, including in some cases a rescue and shelter operation with fostering and
adoption programs. Many shelters and rescues are animal or breed-specific, and their
scale represents tremendous variation from those operating out of private households to
larger city or state-wide programs.
The common ground among the various forms of rescues and shelter
organizations lies in their commitment to protect and find temporary and/or permanent
homes for animals that have been surrendered, abandoned, abused, or otherwise
neglected. The shelters and rescues are viewed as a “middle-man” operation between
these animals and future adoptive owners. In many cases, the organizations provide
health care and immunization, therapy through human and peer-animal socialization, and
obedience training to the animals prior to their availability for adoption. They are formed
either out of necessity (as is often the case with municipal or public sheltering and
adoption agencies) or love for the animals or specific breeds.
A final way of categorizing shelters and rescues is found in the “no-kill”
designation. A “no-kill” shelter is one where, regardless of the circumstances, rescued
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animals are not to be euthanized while under the care of the organization. Due to scale
and overcrowding, many municipal animal control shelters are unable to operate as “nokill” and are forced to euthanize to control the population. The vast network of Humane
Society affiliated rescues and shelters all operate as “no-kill” programs in the United
States, as do countless breed and animal-specific groups nationally. The No-Kill Network
maintains a database of all registered “no-kill” shelters in each of the 50 states, with
thousands or organizations listed (NoKillNetwork.org).
A related concern often associated with shelters and rescues is the effort to control
the overpopulation of dogs and cats due to a lack of reproductive control.
Popularized by his famous sign-off on the long-running daytime game show “The Price is
Right,” host Bob Barker reminded pet owners to “help control the pet population – have
your pets spayed or neutered” at the end of every episode. His own organization, The
DJ&T Foundation, provides grants and funds to organizations and clinics offering lowcost spaying and neutering services (DJ&T.org). The organization works with SNAP –
the Spay/Neuter Assistance Program – to offer funds underwriting the SNAP Voucher
Program which subsidizes spay and neuter procedures for individuals who cannot afford
the cost (SNAPUS.org). SNAP operates chapters in nearly every major US metropolitan
area to offer such assistance and to reduce the burden on shelters and rescues –
particularly to eliminate the need for euthanizing unwanted, neglected, or abandoned
animals. This issue within the general Animal Rights/Protection movement views
animals less in the “non-human persons” light, but rather as a vulnerable population to
protect. Spaying and neutering is seen as a means to minimize the unwanted members of
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the population, and not viewed in a “forced sterilization” way by those involved.
PART 2: THE LGBTQ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE US
The history of the movement for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and
Queer/Questioning (LGBTQ) Rights is often presumed to have begun with the police raid
and subsequent riots at the Stonewall Inn on Christopher Street in New York City on June
28, 1969 (Armstrong & Crage 2006). A subterranean movement existed for generations
in the United States prior to the organizing surrounding the Stonewall moment, during a
considerably more repressive political and cultural climate. The importance of Stonewall
should not, however, be underestimated regarding its impact on the modern-American
movement for LGBTQ rights.
Only three years removed from the riots at the Stonewall Inn, the notion that
homosexuals in American society deserved equal protection, citizenship status, and civil
rights was far from a popular position to hold. Overt discrimination in the workplace,
housing, education, commerce, and other social contexts was not only commonplace, but
legally- and institutionally-protected as a “matter of taste.” Prior to 1962, every state in
the US counted “consensual adult sodomy” as a felony crime (ACLU 2003). As of the
early 1970s, the overwhelming majority of states still had anti-sodomy laws on the books
and enforced them routinely.1 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not offer protections
against discrimination on the basis of sexuality or sexual identity, but only on the basis of
“race, color, religion, or national origin” (42 USC 2000A 1964). In the early 1970s,
being LGBTQ in America meant you were a sexual-deviant/criminal and open to overt
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Only Illinois had removed their anti-sodomy law by 1970. By 1975, that list included: CO, CT, DE, HI,
NH, NM, ND, OH, OR. The 2003 Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas ruled that all anti-sodomy
laws were violations of the 14th Amendment (Equal Protection Clause) of the US Constitution.
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and legal discrimination.
The cultural and social context surrounding the LGBTQ community and their
rights was not much more forgiving or accepting, broadly-speaking, than the formal
political context. Despite various changes in attitudes and emerging norms from the
“sexual revolution” of the 1960s, homosexuality remained largely outside of public
discourse and a cultural and social taboo. Popular entertainment did not feature gaypositive roles or characters in television or film, and very few actors, musicians, or other
entertainers were publicly “out,” for fear of losing their jobs or their audiences. In 1972,
ABC aired a made-for-TV movie, That Certain Summer, in which Hal Holbrook and
Martin Sheen played lovers, but no other national, positive depiction of an LGBTQ
lifestyle could be found (USC SOIN Online).
The 1980s marked significant changes for the LGBTQ Rights movement, as
attention shifted from various political concerns to dealing with the growing HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the community. By the 1990s, with the disease under greater control,
organizations returned attention to political and social issues. Culturally, space opened
for increases in acceptance of LGBTQ identities and lives. Media depictions were more
frequent and positive. By the turn of the 21st Century, LGBTQ Americans were in
positions of political authority, mass media, and various other social roles long restricted.
In the following overview, I review the key issues of focus for the various
organizations working within the LGBTQ Rights movement.
Marriage Equality
At the center of many political debates and electoral contests in the past two
decades has been the question of whether gays and lesbians should be given the same
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legal rights to marriage as their heterosexual counterparts. The debate surrounding
marriage equality (or same-sex marriage rights) has surfaced as a bedrock of the socialconservative platform of the modern American Republican Party. Not a single
mainstream Republican candidate for President since 2000 has publicly endorsed the
rights of LGBTQ Americans to marry their partners freely and legally under any
circumstances. Democratic counterparts have not always openly advocated for marriage
equality either: At the time of their campaigns, Al Gore, John Kerry, and Barack Obama
all failed to advance marriage equality as part of their platform, choosing instead to
generally cite a personal conflict based in religious traditions surrounding the issue.
The Conservative movement began advocating the denial of or limiting the
marriage rights of LGBTQ Americans in the late 1990s. Various state-level initiatives and
constitutional amendments have been proposed (and many states have been passed)
defining marriage as a “heterosexuals-only” legal contract (Soule 2004). Twenty-seven2
states have proposed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriages in their
states, primarily by legally-defining marriage as “a union between one man and one
woman.”

In most of these cases, the amendments passed by resounding majorities

(60+% and above) of the state's electorate (DOMAWatch.org “Marriage Amendment
Summary).
As of February 2012, seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that
mandate the states to both (a) issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and (b)

2

Including: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Wisconsin, Virginia (Human Rights Campaign).
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recognize as legally-binding such marriages entered into in other states. Of those, four of
them (DC, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) enacted such laws via
legislative routes, while the remainder (Connecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts) did so as a
result of state Supreme Court rulings on the illegality of denying same-sex couples the
license and legal-recognition of their marriages. Two states recognize, but do not
perform, same-sex marriages (Maryland and Rhode Island). Eight states (California,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) provide an
“equivalent institution,” generally under the title of “civil union” or “domestic
partnership,” to same-sex couples. In three states (Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin),
laws exist to grant some legal rights to same-sex couples (Human Rights Campaign
“Maps of State Laws and Policies”). Despite these state laws, the passing of the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, US-HR 3396) in 1996 institutionalizes a federal
definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman” and does not
require that any state recognize as legal any marriage performed in any other state.
As of 2012, activists spanning organizations such as the Human Rights
Campaign, Marriage Equality USA, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, and various other entities continue to push for
expanded marriage rights for same-sex couples. In 2011, President Barack Obama
publicly backed the effort to repeal the Federal DOMA. At the time, this effort was in the
form of the “Respect for Marriage Act” introduced by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Patrick
Leahy, and Kirsten Gillenbrand (Democrats from California, Vermont, and New York
respectively). This act would repeal the federal definition of marriage as a “union of one
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man and one woman,” but would not remove the state-level recognition clause of the
original DOMA. The new clause titled “Marriage Recognition” states:
(a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital status is a factor, an
individual shall be considered married if that individual's marriage is valid in the
State where the marriage was entered into or, in the case of a marriage entered
into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in the place where entered into and
the marriage could have been entered into in a State. (HR-1116, 112th Congress)
In other words, states are still not required to recognize any marriage performed in any
other state.
Non-Discrimination/Adoption/Family Rights
Members of each house of the United States Congress have introduced federal
non-discrimination acts related to the LGBTQ community since 1974. The first of these,
called the Equality Act, was introduced by Representatives Bella Azbug and Ed Koch,
Democrats from New York. The Equality Act of 1974 sought to ban discrimination
against lesbians, gay men, unmarried persons, and women in employment, housing and
public accommodations (amended the next year to include “affectional or sexual
preference” to all existing Civil Rights statutes so as to separate marital status and
sexuality) (NGLTF). While the Equality Act failed in Congress, efforts have continued to
add such language to federal anti-discrimination protections. Since 1994, a version of the
Employee Non-Discrimination Act (or ENDA) has been advanced in Congress, primarily
by members of the Democratic Party. The most recent version in the 112th Congress was
introduced by Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) and 148 co-sponsors (the mirroring bill in the
Senate was introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley D-OR and 41 co-sponsors), and would
prohibit employers from discriminating in any way on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity. It maintains an exemption for religious institutions and includes a
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section regarding the “non-application” of the statute for members or veterans of the
branches of the US Military (presumably to separate the ENDA from the policies of
“Don't Ask, Don't Tell” to be reviewed below).
Since the first introduction of the Equality Act in 1974, organizations such as the
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force and the Human Rights Campaign have worked handin-hand with legislators to attempt to pass such regulations or to amend the existing Civil
Rights statutes to include gender identity and sexuality as protected statuses. As of
February 2012, the House and Senate versions of ENDA have been referred to
committee, where they will likely “die” due to the lack of bipartisan support. For
advocates, these measures and federal protections are necessary because it is legal in 29
states for employers to openly discriminate against job applicants and employees on the
basis of their sexuality3 and/or gender identity.4
In 1993, with the support of then-President Bill Clinton, Congress passed the
controversial bill known as “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” (DADT). The President supported a
repeal of an existing ban on service by gay and lesbian Americans, but compromised on
this policy by allowing them to serve, only so long as they are not “open” about their
sexuality (“Don't Tell”). Their superiors or other service-members are also not to inquire
in any way about their sexuality (“Don't Ask”). This compromise was reached after
many military leaders successfully argued that overturning the ban and allowing openlygay and lesbian servicemen and women in the military would potentially undermine
3

4

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming
The following states specifically protect on the basis of gender identity: California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Washington (ACLU)
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morale. Debate surrounding DADT continued throughout the administration of President
George W. Bush, who was an ardent supporter.
During the first term of President Barack Obama, public and military opinion on
the effectiveness or necessity of DADT reflected a broader shift in attitudes regarding
sexuality in the United States. Top military officials no longer viewed the service of
openly-gay and lesbian citizens as a threat to morale or combat-readiness. In 2010,
Robert Gates, then Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress that it was time for the controversial policy to
end.

Stated Admiral Mullen:
No matter how I look at the issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that
we have in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who
they are in order to defend their fellow citizens [...] Allowing gays and lesbians to
serve openly would be the right thing to do (JCS.mil 2010).
Despite continued resistance from Republicans in both the US House and Senate,

the Obama administration pushed publicly for the policy's repeal. With a Democratic
majority in both houses of Congress, the repeal moved forward in a legislative back and
forth culminating in a stand-alone measure to repeal the policy passed by the House in
December 2010. Three days later, the Senate approved the measure with a vote of 65-31,
which the President signed on December 22, 2010.
During the eighteen years of “Don't Ask, Don't Tell,” an estimated 14,000+
servicemen and women were discharged on the basis solely of their sexuality, including
at least 250 discharged in 2010 and 2011 as the policy was in the repeal process (Dwyer
2011). Many movement organizations, most Servicemembers United (the self-proclaimed
“America's Gay Military Organization”), Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Association, and
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all prominent LGBTQ national advocacy organizations worked on behalf of those
discharged, those active servicemen and women living “closeted” lives within the
branches of the military, and in persuading both public and governmental opinion on the
policy.
The rights of same-sex partners to adopt children jointly as a couple, or to
become the adoptive parent of one or the other's biological child, continues to be an area
of concern for activists in the LGBTQ community. In most states, single LGBTQ
individuals have the same rights to adopt children as their heterosexual unmarried
counterparts (with the exception of Arkansas and Florida, which expressly prohibit
adoption by single or partnered LGBTQ individuals). Nine states currently permit samesex couples to jointly adopt children. In the case of separation, if only one parent is the
legal parent of any children the couple had previously raised together, the other parent
has no legal recourse to custody, child-support, or the other rights of parenthood.
Symbolically, the lack of legal recognition as dual parents of children in same-sex
partnerships stigmatizes these families as non-normative in relation to their heterosexual,
monogamous counterparts.
In the first session of the 112th Congress, Representative Pete Stark (D-CA)
introduced the “Every Child Deserves a Family” Act. This bill would federally “prohibit
discrimination in adoption or foster care placements based on the sexual orientation,
gender identity, or marital status of any prospective adoptive or foster parent, or the
sexual orientation or gender identity of the child involved” (HR 1681, p. 1; mirrored in
Senate Bill 1770, sponsored by Senator Kirsten Gillenbrand, D-NY). This bill would
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supersede the state policies regarding adoption rights and would require private and
public agencies to no longer reject otherwise-qualified applicants based solely on their
sexuality or gender identity.
The second clause of the bill seeks to redress the problems of LGBTQ youth in
foster or adoptive households from discrimination. The bill states that research has found
that up to 60% of LGBTQ youth in foster and adoptive care are abused physically or
emotionally, harassed, bullied, or otherwise discriminated against because of their
identity (HR 1681). As of February 2012, the bill resides in the House Committee on
Ways and Means, but is unlikely to see a floor vote under the current Congress.
“Pride”
Every June, across cities in the United States and now throughout the world,
LGBTQ communities and organizations come together in a celebration (often with the
accompanying pageantry and parades) of their identities, movements, successes, and
solidarity in what has come to be known simply as “Pride.” The celebrations occur on or
around the date of the original Stonewall Riots of 1969. For some, this is a collaborative
effort across various organizations and entities. In other cases, a single organization
specializes on the task of organizing the annual parade and related festivities. The
process involves arranging facilities (often both publicly and privately owned), obtaining
the necessary permits for the parade from local government agencies, procuring sponsors
to cover the costs of such an event, and public relations and advertising. In most major
and minor metropolitan, a simple internet search will yield the web presence of the “____
Pride Association/Organization/Etc.” (e.g., ABQPride.org; NYCPride.org; etc.).
Pride Parades and celebrations represent an important normative and cultural
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movement action for the LGBTQ community. It is an opportunity to engage the broader
public in dialogue regarding their issues, identity, and lives. It is an opportunity for the
members of the LGBTQ community themselves to interact with one another across their
various identities, and to increase their own social bonds and solidarity within the
movement. It represents an overt, public expression of demands, goals, identities, and
lives to the rest of their surrounding communities. For many members of the LGBTQ
community, it is a time to openly express themselves and their identities without
reservation or fear of public retribution in the face of a still (to varying degrees,
depending on the locale) hostile world. It is, in many ways, the ultimate symbolic
expression – through dress, music, art, parade floats, direct movement actions, and
solidarity – of the oft-repeated rallying cry and public statement: “We're here, we're
queer, get used to it!”
Hate Crime Protection/Anti-Bullying Campaigns
In 2009, Congress passed (and President Obama signed into law) the Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act. This federal statute authorizes
the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes motivated by the offender's bias with
regard to actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability.
These protections are added to the previously-protected statuses of race, color, religion,
and national origin, as codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It authorizes the federal
government to intervene where it considers state law to be insufficient in guaranteeing
these protections (Lews 2009). The 2009 Act is named in memory of two recent highprofile victims of hate crimes. Matthew Shepard was severely and savagely beaten by
two area men in Laramie, Wyoming, in 1996. Following the assault – which was
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motivated by their anti-gay attitudes – Shepard was tied to a fencepost and left to die.
James Byrd, Jr., was beaten and then chained to and dragged to his death by a truck
driven by white, racially-biased men in Texas. The expansion of hate crime provisions
to other constituencies represents a successful movement outcome within the research on
social movements and their effects on public policy (McVeigh, et al 2003; Jenness &
Broad 1997).
A review of state-level hate crime statutes demonstrates the need for federal
protection of sexual and gender identity (FBI Crime Report). As of February 2012,
twenty-eight states provide protections in hate crime statutes for offenses motivated by
bias toward sexual orientation or identity. However, only eleven offer protections based
on perceived or actual gender identity, and twenty-two offer no protections for either (and
in some cases, do not have a state-level hate crime statute relating to any statuses or
identities). Despite these state and federal protections, the LGBTQ population remains at
risk for hate crime victimization. According to FBI statistics for 2010, roughly 20% of
all hate crime victimization is due to sexuality or gender identity biases (a total of 1,528
reported instances of single-motivation hate crimes). This number shows an increase
from 2009 of nearly 100 incidents. Of those, more than half were due to an offender's
anti-male-homosexuality bias (FBI 2011).
Many national advocacy organizations engage in campaigns tied to ending hate
crime victimization in the LGBTQ community, including GLAAD (the Gay & Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation), the HRC, and Lambda Legal. The Matthew Shepard
Foundation, founded and spearheaded by his mother Judy, was instrumental in passing
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the Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2009 and continuing advocacy on behalf of LGBTQ
victims.
In recent years, numerous highly-publicized cases of teen and youth suicides (due
in large part to years of bullying and social pressures because of their sexual identity)
have caused the emergence of new campaigns and efforts. These organizations and
campaigns have two primary focuses. First, they advocate for anti-bullying legislation
federally and at the state level, and laws to mandate that schools implement effective and
inclusive anti-bullying measures. These include effective methods for the punishment of
those who bully, and creating safe environments for students and youths to report
bullying incidents. In March of 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-MN, along with 34 cosponsors) introduced the “Student Non-Discrimination Act” which seeks to “end
discrimination based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public
schools” (S.555). As of February 2012, it is currently sitting in the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions. Forty-six states have adopted anti-bullying laws of
some sort (only Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, and South Dakota have not, as of February
2012). Of those, thirty-six have specific provisions regarding cyber-bullying. These are
general statutes, and some states have moved to introduce provisions specific to LGBTQ
youth in response to recent high profile suicides. In Tennessee, proposed changes to the
bullying provisions for public schools include an exemption for those expressing
“unpopular religious, philosophical, or political views” (Ford 2012).
Secondly, organizations and campaigns have recently emerged that work directly
to provide emotional support for LGBTQ youths who may be experiencing harassment or
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bullying because of their identity and sexuality. The highest-profile of these is the “It
Gets Better” project, launched in 2010 by author and radio host Dan Savage. The project
involves commentary and the posting of videos to various websites (including YouTube)
in which adult members of the LGBTQ community and its allies tell their stories and
provide hope, support, and inspiration to their teen and youth counterparts. The idea is in
its name: That, while the harassment and bullying has created a terrible atmosphere and a
difficult time for LGBTQ youth, it does get better, and the taking of one's life is not the
only option. The project has raised over $100,000 to date, which has been used to benefit
other related organizations including The Trevor Project – a suicide and crisis-prevention
network for LGBTQ youth – and GLSEN (the Gay/Lesbian/Straight Education Network),
which works to end bullying in public and private schools for all students.
HIV/AIDS Services
In the 1980s, the movement for LGBTQ Rights made a temporary shift away
from the pursuit of social, political, and economic equality in order to deal with a
growing crisis: the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and the rising death toll it created within the
community. While exact numbers are difficult to determine, it is safe to posit that
thousands of members of the LGBTQ community succumbed to the disease and its
related effects in the 1980s alone, and many more in the decades since5. In the 1980s,
what became known as AIDS was heavily stigmatized as a “gay disease,” and often even
viewed by religious conservatives as retribution for a sinful lifestyle. While many
organizations worked on the advocacy side of the AIDS epidemic, other activists and
5

While the number of deaths in the United States has been estimated at 40,000 and reported cases overall
in the US at 155,000 in the 1980s, the number of those that self-identify as LGBTQ is difficult to
estimate. One prominent assessment in 1989 (Winklestein & Padian) estimated that, by 1992, the
cumulative death toll from HIV/AIDS among gay men was likely to reach 100,000.
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organizations emerged and transitioned toward a focus on providing health care services,
emotional support, convalescent care, meal delivery, and the various other resources and
services required. At the time, the nature of how the disease was contracted and spread
was still largely unknown. As a result, many traditional health clinics and support
options were not available to AIDS patients. Even many health care professionals were
unaware of how to treat this growing population, and were unsure whether in doing so,
they would accidentally be contributing to a growing epidemic.
The most high profile event surrounding the growing AIDS epidemic in the
United States was the construction and assembly of the “AIDS Quilt” (now part of the
Names Project) on October 11, 1987, on the National Mall in Washington DC. The quilt
was a patchwork of 1,920 panels dedicated to those whose lives had been lost to the
disease. It was such a landmark and emotionally-powerful symbolic display that the quilt
was taken on a national tour, which in turn raised over $500,000 dollars for various AIDS
organizations and projects. In 1996 (the last time that the quilt was fully displayed
publicly) it contained enough panels to cover the entirety of the National Mall, an
estimated 146 acres. To date the effort has raised in excess of $3 million dollars for
research, treatment, outreach, and advocacy (AIDSQuilt.org). As of February 2012,
many organizations continue to provide support, education – including outreach aimed at
increasing awareness and testing for all sexually-active individuals, and access to
treatment, medication, and health care for those diagnosed with HIV/AIDS within (and
beyond) the LGBTQ community.
Summary
This discussion of the various issues and efforts within the Animal
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Rights/Protection and the LGBTQ Rights movements is an effort to frame the current
state of activism on these fronts, and highlight how the various strategies discussed in
Chapter 3 are presently deployed by SMOs. The following chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and
7) empirically explore the relationships proposed in the hypotheses of Chapter 2 by
employing a large-N quantitative analysis of the organizations in the movements (Chapter
5), and a small-N qualitative approach to the origin stories of four specific organizations
(Chapters 6 and 7). The quantitative analysis explores the potential relationships between
resources and strategic determination. The qualitative analysis explores the specific
processes involving leaders, organizational/political context, and how those directly and
indirectly influence the external political strategy of organizations.
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CHAPTER 5 - QUANTITATIVE DATA & ANALYSIS:
RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
In the quantitative analysis that follows, I explore the overall social movement
sectors for Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements in the United States.
The data available for this study contain limitations regarding the types of conclusions
drawn and the potential generalizability of findings. These data provide a means for
classifying the organizational landscape and an initial exploration of the hypothesized
relationships between movement resources and strategies, as previously noted in
Hypothesis #1 (Chapter 2). This hypothesis proposes that organizational strategy is in
part a function of the resources available to the organization, and the source of those
resources, relative to the cost of the potential movement strategies. Resources are
typically conceptualized as any of the necessary inputs involved in movement-related
activities: money, labor, time, meeting space, and the like (McCarthy & Zald 1975). For
the purposes of the following statistical analysis, resources are only measured through a
series of financial variables, discussed in detail below. This does not imply that resources
are the only factor involved in the development of strategy. The dynamics related to
context and leadership will be addressed in the qualitative analyses in Chapters 6 and 7,
and the omission of those variables from the statistical analysis is discussed below.
Unit of Analysis
In both the quantitative and qualitative components of the research, the unit of
analysis is the Social Movement Organization (or SMO). The SMO emerged as a
primary unit of analysis with the publication in 1975 of John McCarthy & Mayer Zald’s
article, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” The SMO is
defined as:
A complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences
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of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those
goals (McCarthy & Zald 1975: p. 1218).
The SMO consists of resources (including funding, staff/participants, and tangible
resources such as communication technology, meeting space, and the like), organizational
structure, and strategic plan for maximizing goal attainment and organizational survival
(ibid).
For this study, the SMO is the appropriate unit of analysis because it remains the
primary form by which citizens collectively pursue social, political, and economic goals.
Despite the emergence of the “Occupy” protests originating in New York City and
germinating throughout the world – a loosely or unorganized protest lacking clear leaders
or specific goals – and the impact it has had on economic public opinion, the primary
means of affecting institutional and political change remains the SMO. Scholars have
questioned the validity of the SMO as the unit of analysis by noting the importance of the
informal, loose affiliates of activists known as social movement communities (Buechler
1993). While these communities are important in mass-mobilization movement efforts,
they are necessarily amorphous and present challenges to the present study. With such an
informal organizational arrangement, understanding inputs, the inhabitants of leadership
roles, and relationships with other organizations or communities is difficult if not
impossible to observe in a large-N quantitative analysis.
Data Collection
The data set from which I derived the data for the quantitative analysis were
compiled and distributed by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The
original data set is comprised of information supplied to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) in 2005 by all US organizations with 501(c)3 or 501(c)4 designations. The 501(c)3
designation refers to charitable organizations that do not use a substantial portion of their
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activities in attempting to influence legislation or participate directly in campaigning for
or against political candidates in elections (IRS Online). 501(c)4 organizations are
referred to as “social welfare organizations,” and have greater flexibility in lobbying and
political campaigning, as long as their efforts are determined to be directed toward
improving “general social welfare” and not for profit-based purposes (IRS Online). The
data are compiled from 990 IRS forms, which include a variety of types of organizational
financial information.
I coded the original data in order to filter cases for SMOs representing to the two
general movements of LGBTQ Rights or Animal Rights/Protection. I first searched the
474,435 organizations for a variety of search terms associated with these movements and
filtered out cases that did not match. I then examined the resulting set of cases to remove
those that matched the search terms but were not actually affiliated with either movement
(“false positives”). I coded the remaining cases as either SMOs (as defined above) or
not, and within which of the two movements the organizations operate. Following this
coding, the final data set included 3,948 cases for further coding and analysis, to be
discussed below.
One key limitation regarding the population of cases is that, because of the nature
of the data source, some of the overall SMO population is excluded. Those organizations
that operate on or beyond the fringes of legality, those that operate covertly, or those that
operate for-profit, are not included. The data are compiled by the Internal Revenue
Service, and thus any organization that is operating outside of the law would likely not
submit financial data to the Federal Government for fear of location, repression, arrest,
and various other forms of social control. Also, organizations operating for-profit would
not receive the 501(c)3 or 501(c)4 designation and thus are excluded from the sample.
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While this limits the ability to draw conclusions about all SMOs, I assert that the
cases included represent a substantial slice of the overall SMO population despite this
selection bias. It may also, perhaps, explain why so few organizations in the data utilize
the Non-Routine Politics repertoire, as those strategies are associated with non-normative
or potentially threatening organizations. Organizations within these two movements are
unlikely to operate on a for-profit basis, and therefore (unless specifically attempting to
avoid identification by the IRS or other government agencies) would likely pursue tax
exempt status and be included in the sample. Organizations pursuing LGBTQ Rights or
Animal Rights/Protection goals (as discussed in Chapter 3) would likely fit the criteria of
operating for the “general social welfare” even if overtly engaged in political action, and
thus would qualify for 501(c)4 status and inclusion in the sample.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for the present study is the external strategy of the SMO.
External strategy is defined as the primary tactical repertoire directed outside of the
organization that is employed in pursuit of explicitly-stated organizational goals.
Organizational strategy is a conceptually-fluid concept, and one that could change
throughout the life-cycle of an organization. For the present study, I coded this external
strategy according to that deployed at the time of emergence. As will be seen in the
qualitative study to follow, for those cases strategy tends to be relatively constant from
emergence throughout the lifespan of an organization.
I then coded each case contained in the final sample according to its determined
external political strategy by using multiple sources (public media, organizational
websites, etc.). I began this process began by locating the organizations' websites and
attempting to identify their strategy from “Mission Statements” or “About Us” pages. If
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that source was either unavailable or did not provide sufficient information, I searched for
the organizations in the Online Encyclopedia of Associations to identify the same
information. If neither proved useful, I searched for the organization within the NCCS
Online database, examined the entry for that organization, and if necessary explored in
detail their IRS 990 form to attempt to shed light on their strategy. Where no record of
the organization could be located – which was very rare (less than 5% of cases) given that
all of the organizations were operating in 2005, and thus would likely have had some web
presence or available IRS 990 – I used the name and organizational information
contained in the NCCS data to presume the organizational strategy employed.
Some social movement organizations are involved in more than one strategic
effort. Often, SMOs – particularly larger ones – have teams of volunteers or activists
working on various efforts toward their stated goals. Despite this, using the coding
procedure I attempt to identify the primary explicit political strategy of each organization
through a thorough examination of the organizations' own web presences and
promotional materials. I then coded each organization according to one of the following
categories, elaborated in the previous theoretical and empirical discussion of movement
strategies: Routine Politics, Non-Routine Politics, Cultural/Expressive Action, Service
Provision, Legal Action, and Organizational Funding. For those organizations that could
not be determined to have a single identifiable primary strategy at emergence (for
example, engaged seemingly equally in two or more), I coded the strategy which has
proven the most consistent strategic approach throughout the life of the organization (as
represented in current promotional materials). For example, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund lists both “Legal Advocacy” and “Educational Outreach” as strategies.
However, by examining their history, organizational documentation, landmark
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achievements, and allocation of resources, it became clear that their primary focus has
consistently been on their work in the courts.
Independent Variables
The explanatory variables used in the quantitative exploration of social movement
strategies are financial measures collected by the IRS for each organization. This
quantitative portion of the analysis focuses primarily on the relationship between external
political strategy and measures of the financial welfare of the organization. For all of the
below financial measures, the data correspond to the information provided for the fiscal
year 2005.
The percentage of an organization's total annual revenue derived from public
contributions (referred to as “Contribution Funding Base” hereafter) measures the
organizations' ability to mobilize resources from individuals versus resources mobilized
through other means – large private grants or the selling of merchandise, for example.
Measuring this as just a net total, however, hides the massive variability in scale across
organizations and distorts its effect on the categories of strategy. By creating a relative
measure vis-a-vis the organization’s revenue, the analysis can demonstrate the importance
of fundraising and mobilizing resources, regardless of scale, on an organization's strategy.
This variable conceptually measures an organization's capacity to mobilize resources
from the public by understanding how much of their financial inputs are received via
direct contributions relative to the total financial resources that can be raised in a given
fiscal year.
This distinction is important to SMOs in terms of the effect it may have on
strategic flexibility and capacity. According to Marshall Ganz, organizations that receive
a large percentage of their resources from a few or a single external source have limited
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strategic autonomy or flexibility: They can only engage in strategies that will ensure the
stable flow of resources from that single/few donor(s) (Ganz 2000). On the other hand,
organizations for which resources flow from a variety of internal (members) and external
sources have considerably greater strategic autonomy or flexibility, as they are not
restricted to maintaining a positive relationship with a single donor (ibid). Thus, their
strategy at emergence is less constrained. For this analysis, organizations with a higher
percentage of their total annual revenue derived from contributions of individuals would
be expected to exhibit greater variation in terms of strategies. Those organizations with a
lower percentage of annual revenue derived from contributions may be expected to be
clustered in more “normative” strategic categories – Routine Politics, Legal Strategies,
Service Provision, and Organizational Funding. This reflects, perhaps, a desire by the
SMO to not alienate single donors by using strategies that are not considered potentially
confrontational or socially- or politically-deviant.
The second percentage (total expenses for the year / overall foundation balance:
referred to as “Fiscal Instability” hereafter) can be seen as assessing the overall financial
stability of the SMO. An organization for which this ratio falls close to 1 has only one
year of guaranteed existence: If it brings in no new money, it will use its entire fiscal
balance in the coming year. An organization for which this ratio falls, for example, at 0.10
expects to spend only 10% of its balance on operations in the coming year, and thus is
more financially stable. Arguably, this may give the latter organization greater strategic
flexibility
The overall financial balance of the organization is measured using the net
balance for the fiscal year 2005 in a variable referred to as Fund Balance. This is the net
of overall assets and expenses that the organization has at its disposal, calculated as:
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Balance from the Previous Fiscal Year + Total Revenue for the Current Fiscal Year –
Total Expenses for the Current Fiscal Year. The general financial balance of an
organization is an important variable for movement activities in that it represents the full
sum of available finances available for various internal and external activities. An
organization with a greater Fund Balance would presumably have a greater degree of
flexibility in terms of strategic choice, as those options considered to be more financiallycostly would not be beyond their capacity. On the contrary, an organization with limited
or even negative resources could potentially find financially-costly strategies to not be
available in pursuit of their goals.
The Net Income for the fiscal year 2005 is included to reflect the organizations'
financial status for the year. This measures each organization’s ability to mobilize
financial resources, net of its operating costs for that year. It represents whether or not
they have been able to secure sufficient funds relative to their operations or are running at
a deficit in order to fulfill obligations. The relationship between Net Income and strategy
can be considered in various ways: A relatively-healthy organization (one that operates
annually with a surplus of funds to expenses) is one that is (a) efficient strategically and
thus does not expend more than is necessary, (b) capable of mobilizing stable resource
flows, whether internal or external, (c) chooses relatively less-expensive strategic actions,
or (d) is resonant – perhaps in terms of goals or in terms of strategy – with individuals or
other funding sources in the current political and social context. For this analysis and
data, the relationship between Net Income and strategy attempts to capture the overall
annual viability of organizations, which could comprise any or all of the above potential
dynamics. However, these particular mechanisms between income and strategy cannot
be determined through these statistical analyses. Whereas Foundation Balance is a
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picture of the overall financial health of the organization, Net Income represents its
current effectiveness and viability relative to expenses and resources mobilized.
In the following models, these two variables have been logged in order to reflect
the differential effect of an increase of a thousand dollars to organizations of varying size.
Logging these variables captures the difference between an organization with, for
example, an income of $1000 increasing its budget by another $1000, versus an
organization with a balance of $1 million increasing its budget by $1000: The former
represents a substantially more important increase for operations of that organization than
for the latter.
Lastly, a dummy measure for region of the United States6 is included as an
admittedly crude test for any possible geographic effects.
Method of Analysis: Multinomial Logistic Regression
I explore the hypothesis related to the organizational resources variables and
external political strategy through statistical models employing Multinomial Logistic
(MNL) Regression. MNL Regression analyses are appropriate when testing relationships
between continuous or categorical independent variables and a categorical, un-ordered
dependent variable with three or more possible categories. MNL Regression models
consist of a series of Binary Logistic regression models – the latter are used when only
two categories are possible on the dependent variable. Each Logistic comparison
between a reference and another category results in regression coefficients of odds-ratios:
In other words, an increase in one unit for a given independent variable results in a
change in the odds that a case will be in either the reference or compared category.
Initially, the models produce a coefficient that is logged, and must be computed in order
6

Northeast: CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; Southeast: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA,
MS, NC, PR, SC, TN, VA, VI, WV; Midwest: IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI;
West: AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OK, OR, TX, UT, WA, WZ
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to interpret and draw inferences regarding the substantive effects. The results tables
presented below have made these computations and demonstrate the relationship for all
of the comparisons between categories on the dependent variable.
Samples of Recently-Emerging SMOs: Founding Years 2003-2005 & 2000-2005
The fiscal data for FY2005 on all organizations was the last full set compiled by
the NCCS at the time of the present research. Given the research question of the study,
compiling fiscal data for this late of a period – seemingly the furthest removed from the
origins of all of the organizations involved in the sample – is not logical or intuitive: To
examine the relationship between resources and organizational strategy, even in just an
exploratory or correlational way, the fiscal data analyzed should be as close to the time of
origin as possible. However, by choosing a period further in the past, every year would
likely mean losing some of the cases included in the sample (since a significant number
of the SMOs were founded in years immediately preceding 2005). Given the temporal
spread of the year of founding across the nearly 4,000 organizations, any year chosen to
compile the fiscal data would ultimately be arbitrary and less than ideal. Following the
choice to use FY2005 fiscal data, another concern arose: For SMOs founded long before
that year, it would be difficult to argue plausibly that the FY2005 fiscal situation would
bear any meaningful relationship to strategy at emergence. By choosing initially to
analyze SMOs founded closest to the 2005 date of the financial data, I construct the
analysis in order to most plausibly see any relationship between financial resources and
initial movement strategy.
In an attempt to mitigate these major concerns while maintaining a substantial
sample of cases to analyze, I utilize two samples consisting of the most-recently
emerging SMOs from the full sample. The first model focuses on those organizations
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founded between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005, and the second on those
founded between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2005. The exact date or year of
founding for the organizations cannot be determined across such a varied set of cases. To
approximate the year of founding, I use the Ruling Date provided by the IRS for each
organization. The Ruling Date is not a perfect measure for the exact date or year of
organizational emergence. This date corresponds to the date for which the organization
received its recognition of exemption (as 501(c)3 or 510(c)4) from the IRS.
Organizations clearly must exist prior to filing paperwork for exemption, and thus prior to
the date of recognition of exemption. With the available data, there is no way to know
for certain the length of time between actual emergence and Ruling Date. However, it is
a feasible proxy for founding as likely, for most organizations, there was neither (a) a
significant number of years between founding and Ruling Date, or (b) a significant
change in the resources available to the organization (though, again, this is not
information that can be known from these data, so it is possible that the resources may
have changed dramatically in those years: For the purposes of these analyses, this cannot
be determined or remedied).
These samples remain imperfect, however, as there is no feasible way to collect
reliable and valid data for the resources available to founders at or prior to the exact date
of emergence in a large-N sample. These samples approximate these unavailable data as
best as possible, using data from within two or five years of approximate founding,
respectively. The availability, reliability, and feasibility of collecting data relating to the
financial resources of the various organizations at the time of their founding also
significantly limit these samples. Those cases that would likely have sufficient and
reliable data on resources would be those that fit one or more of the following criteria:
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organizations large in size, historically-successful, very new, or media/web savvy. Those
organizations fitting these criteria would be the most likely to have a useful web presence
or the existence of external reviews of their financial resources and actions from the time
of their founding to the present. However, those organizations that are not as large,
successful, or savvy, would likely be lost from the sample, limiting the review by
omitting small, potentially unsuccessful organizations. This would probably have caused
a loss of a key component of the sample: most of the Service Provision organizations.
These constitute the majority of organizations in the sample and are typically small
operations which likely do not have extensive web presences or publicly-accessible
financial information available from the past.
Testing the hypotheses relating to the other factors involved in the development of
strategy at emergence – the dynamics of leaders and founders, organizational and
political context - would not be feasible in a quantitative way for samples of this size and
variation. It would not be feasible to obtain much information of theoretical or analytical
utility for most, if not all, of the organizations in the samples in a quantifiable way. The
dynamics related to leaders and founders surround their particular biographical
experiences and skills that may contribute to the strategic direction of their respective
organizations. This information is likely only available for the largest, most successful,
or most extensively-covered (by media and other outlets) organizations in the sample, as
a source of secondary data. Otherwise, for small SMOs especially, these data would need
to be gathered through interviews, which is not feasible for such a large sample. Thus, in
subsequent chapters I use founders' interviews to further explore these dynamics.
With regard to the organizational and political context factors, it would be
possible to construct a very crude measure for “political opportunity” - as theorized by
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Doug McAdam (1999) and others - for each organization if it could be determined (a)
when and where the organization was founded, and (b) they could be coded based on
some scale built on a “normative or political favorability” measure. I do not believe this
is an analytically useful or appropriate way to measure or understand the dynamics
associated with political and organizational context. Rather, this is best understood
analytically by using a case-history approach in small-N samples to explore the
relationship between the origins of the movement organization, its strategic development,
and various levels, agents, institutions, and dynamics of political and organizational
context.
Given these limitations, the analyses of recently-emerging SMOs in the LGBTQ
and Animal Rights/Protection movements nonetheless suggest some inference regarding
the relationship of financial resources and the political strategy of SMOs at emergence.
Samples of Recently-Emerging SMOs: Analyses & Results
The following analyses involve two subsets of organizations extracted from the
full sample of SMOs: those organizations with a Ruling Date (as proxy for year of
founding) between 2000 and 2005 and those between 2003 and 20057. In both models,
the organizations are only considered as a single sample, rather than separately analyzing
the Animal Rights/Protection organizations from the LGBTQ Rights organizations.
Likewise, the full model is only used for both sets of cases, rather than analyzing them
with Service Provision included and omitted (both will be done in the full sample
exploratory analysis to follow). I made these decisions because to separate the cases in
such ways would lead to small samples that likely would not yield much of statistical
significance or substantive interest from the analyses.

7

Raw STATA Output tables for all models are included in Appendix A.
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Tables 1 and 2 present one initial finding related to the inclusion of strategies
beyond those typically explored in SMO research: Service Provision is the dominant
strategy employed by SMOs in the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights
movements. For the 2000-2005 sample, Service Provision accounts for 90% of the
distribution, and nearly 92% for the 2003-2005 sample. The frequencies also
demonstrate the emergence of Organizational Funding as a prominent strategy compared
to the other non-Service strategies. Funding organizations represent more than twice the
number of newly-emerging Routine Politics organizations. This growth of
Organizational Funding suggests multiple possible interpretations. First, it could be that
this particular strategy is becoming relatively more dominant, perhaps following the
successful example of organizations such as the United Way. It could also, however,
suggest that the Organizational Funding strategy is a less-stable strategy, and that the
increased-proportion of new SMOs adopting this strategy is a function of volatility: More
funding organizations emerge and die in a given span of time than other more-stable
strategies. In this analysis, either of these are plausible explanations.
Contrary to the theoretical suggestions in Chapters 2 and 3, it does not appear that
rights-based movement organizations are increasingly moving toward the use of Legal
strategies: only two organizations from 2000-2005, and just one from 2003-2005. This
could, however, be due to dominance in this strategic repertoire of older, established
organizations – such as Lambda Legal. It is possible that the founders of new
organizations do not believe that they have any space to operate with legal strategies
because such organizations have “cornered the market,” so to speak. This is impossible
to determine from this analysis, but could potentially explain this theoretically-contrary
finding.
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Table 5-1: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements Ruling Date 2003-2005 (N = 561)
External Political Strategy

Frequency

Service Provision

514

Non-Routine Politics

3

Routine Politics

11

Cultural/Expressive Actions

15

Legal Strategies

1

Organizational Funding

17

Table 5-2: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements Ruling Date 2000-2005 (N = 1,177)
External Political Strategy

Frequency

Service Provision

1064

Non-Routine Politics

4

Routine Politics

22

Cultural/Expressive Actions

35

Legal Strategies

2

Organizational Funding

50

Non-routine politics continues to represent the smallest minority of organizations
in the samples. This could perhaps be explained either by a lack of perceived viability or
because such organizations often operate outside of the 501(c)3 & 501(c)4 designations
and thus are not part of this sample. Cultural/Expressive strategic organizations are wellrepresented. The dynamics and potential explanations for those organizations are perhaps
similar to those discussed for the Funding groups above.
GOODNESS-OF-FIT FOR MNL REGRESSION MODELS: 2003-2005, 2000-2005
The first step in the quantitative analysis involves determining the “goodness-offit” test for each of the independent variables in the models. Table 3 presents the X2 test
of significance found when each variable's contribution to the model is considered
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independently. The coefficient is calculated from -2 x the difference of the LogLikelihoods of each model (the model including all variables, and the model omitting the
variable of interest). Statistical significance is then determined via a X2 Table and the
appropriate degrees of freedom.8
In this test, it appears that the only variables that are statistically-significant
contributions to the model in the 2000-2005 sample are the logged variables of Net
Income and Fund Balance. In the 2003-2005 sample, none of the independent variables
appear to be statistically-significant additions to the model. Despite this, all of the
variables will be included to determine their specific effects on the various comparisons
of strategic categories for both samples. The strongest argument that a causal link
between financial resources and strategies for these organizations can be made for the
2003-2005 set, or the sample of the most recently founded organizations.
Table 5-3 : X2 for -2(Difference of Log-Likelihoods) for Nested Models:
2000-2005 & 2003-2005 “Ruling Date” Samples (DV = Strategy)
2000 - 2005

2003 - 2005

Region

20.698

16.234

Contribution Funding Base

0.909

0.979

Fiscal Instability

0.000

1.287

Net Income (Logged)

17.154 ***

6.798

Fund Balance (Logged)

24.621 ****

5.655

P < .1*

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

MNL REGRESSION MODELS & DISCUSSION: 2003-2005 & 2000-2005
In both samples, the financial measures have limited statistical and substantive
significance in their effects on the organizational strategy employed at the time of (or
8

15 Degrees of Freedom (df) for Region w/ All Strategies; 12 df for Region omitting Service; 5 df for all
other variables w/ All Strategies; 4 df for all other variables omitting Service.
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close to the time of) emergence, summarized as:
a) No effect of Contribution Funding Base or Fiscal Instability
b) A 10% increase in net income corresponds to roughly a 5-6% increase in the
odds of deploying Routine strategies versus Service strategies
c) A 10% increase in fund balance corresponds to roughly a 4-5% increase in the
odds of developing Organizational Funding strategies versus Service
Provision
d) Due to limited number of Legal organizations, no substantive effects can be
determined.
Neither of the ratio measures – Contribution Funding Base or Fiscal Instability
have any statistically-significant effects on the comparisons of strategic categories for
either sample. This is important relative to the discussion regarding strategic capacity
developed by Marshall Ganz. Ganz suggests that those organizations that derive a greater
proportion of their resources from members as opposed to those whose resources come
from a single elite contributor have greater strategic flexibility, due to their lack of
constraint in pleasing a single donor (Ganz 2000). However, in this analysis, it does not
appear that proportion has any effect on the strategic flexibility of the organizations in
these samples.
Where financial resources do seem to have the most effect are on the comparisons
between Routine Politics and Service Provision and Organizational Funding and Service
Provision. For both samples, a 10% increase in an organization's net income corresponds
to roughly a 5-6% increase in the odds of deploying Routine strategies versus Service
strategies. If we increase the scale of that relationship, a 100% increase in net income (or
a doubling of it) leads to roughly a 50-60% increase in the odds of developing Routine
strategies versus Service. This suggests that perhaps the actions associated with Routine
politics are considered more costly than Service strategies, and thus those with greater
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income are able to employ them. It is possible that the direction of causation could flow
in the other direction: An organization that chooses to use Routine politics places a
greater emphasis on the mobilization of resources than do those providing services
directly.
Table 5-4: MNL Regression: Both Movements, All Strategies - Ruling Date 2003-2005
(Odds Ratios) +
Non-Routine v.
Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

NE v. W

--- +

7.546 *

1.021

0.000

1.710

SE v. W

1.484

7.636 *

0.553

0.000

0.854

1.927

1.298

0.000

1.000

REGION

MW v. W

---

+

Contribution
Funding Base

1.003

0.997

1.000

1.017

1.003

Fiscal Instability

0.998

1.000

1.000

0.999

1.000

Net Income
(Logged)

1.064

1.054 *

1.007

1.248

1.007

Fund Balance
(Logged)

0.99

0.971

1.019

0.861

1.038 *

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N=561
+ Coefficients for NE v.W & MW v. W for Non-Routine v. Service are unreasonable
(3,140,083.66 & 1,402,854.995 respectively) due to distribution of cases, and do not meet
statistical significance, so are omitted from tables.
In both samples, an increase of 10% in the overall fund balance of the
organization increases the odds of developing Organizational Funding strategies relative
to Service Provision by 3.8% (2003-2005) and 5.1% (2000-2005). This suggests, similar
to the dynamics with Routine politics, that perhaps founders view this strategy as more
costly and thus only those with greater resources are able to choose it. Another
interpretation of this relationship is that organizations that engage in this type of funding
would have more money on hand or at their disposal than organizations using other
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strategies, which may spend their annual budgets more freely on a wide variety of
activities. Lastly, there is a statistically-significant effect of an increase in the net income
on the odds of adopting Legal strategies compared to Service Provision in the 2000-2005
sample. However, given that there are only two Legal organizations in this sample, any
conclusions drawn from this relationship are speculative at best.

Table 5-5: MNL Regression: Both Movements, All Strategies - Ruling Date 2000-2005
(Odds-Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

NE v. W

3.407

2.556 *

1.253

0.000

1.000

SE v. W

0.000

2.033

0.331 *

0.000

0.549

MW v. W

1.768

0.708

1.210

0.000

0.982

Contribution
Funding Base

1.000

0.999

0.997

1.005

1.000

Fiscal
Instability

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

Net Income
(Logged)

1.052

1.060 **

1.013

1.189 *

0.990

Fund Balance
(Logged)

0.960

0.974

0.996

0.911

1.051 ***

REGION

N=1177
P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

Of secondary importance are the regional effects found in both of the samples of
recently-emerging organizations. They can be summarized as follows: Routine political
strategies are more common than Service Provision in the Northeast in both samples and
Southeast compared to the West in the 2003-2005 sample; Cultural/Expressive strategies
have lower odds of occurring compared to Service Provision in the Southeast compared
to the West in the 2000-2005 sample. The region dummy is a crude measure of
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geographic effects on strategy, and no mechanism for such effects can be drawn from this
analysis. Speculatively, it is possible that the increased odds of Routine strategies in the
Northeast could be due to proximity to the institutions of the federal government.
However, this presumes that those organizations are focused on national rather than state
or local policy goals, which cannot be known from this analysis. Also, it is possible that
the decreased odds of Cultural/Expressive strategies in the Southeast could be due to a
lack of resonance of either those strategic repertoires or the goals and issues of the
organizations within that unique cultural context. Again, these are speculative assertions
as no such dynamic can be determined from the MNL Regression analysis.
There does not appear to be much change in the overall distribution of cases in
terms of strategy from the full sample to the newly-emerging samples, or between the
2000-2005 and 2003-2005 samples. This suggests that the continuity of strategy over
time – both within a population of cases and for individual organizations – may be more
consistent that previously considered. This dynamic will be explored further in the
qualitative analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, as not much can be said from this statistical
analysis beyond this speculation as to the possible mechanisms.
The following models use the full sample of all organizations with full variation
on the Ruling Date. These models do not presume any causal relationship between the
financial variables and the various categories of SMO strategy. Roughly 75% of the full
sample involves SMOs with Ruling Dates prior to 2000: Some of those date back decades
and potentially even further to their time of founding (the Humane Society of America,
for example, was founded in the late 19th Century). Given this, the resources measured in
2005 clearly cannot be said to have any causal or explanatory relationship on the strategic
repertoires developed at organizational emergence. These models are included in the
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present research to serve solely as an exploratory or classificatory examination of the full
range of variation in the population of SMOs working within these two movements.
Also, the core findings of the models of recently-emerging organizations above are not
significantly distinct from those found for the full sample below (there are some
differences in variable-effects, which will be discussed following the analysis below).
Full Sample: Exploratory Analysis
The models and analysis from the full sample, noting the limitations and
compromises made to maintain a substantial number of cases with considerable variation,
must forego any causal claims between resources and strategy at emergence. This
analysis does, instead, contribute to future research on SMOs where such data at
emergence is feasibly available by providing an analytic framework for such research.
For the exploratory analysis of the full sample of SMOs, a series of separate
nested models represents the most effective method for exploring the provisional
relationships between resources and strategy.
Table 5-6: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements
(All Cases; N=3,948)
External Political Strategy

Frequency

Service Provision

3453

Non-Routine Politics

15

Routine Politics

76

Cultural/Normative Action

216

Legal Strategies

19

Organizational Funding

169
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Table 5-7: Frequency of Strategy for LGBTQ Rights (N=628)
External Political Strategy

Frequency

Service Provision

318

Non-Routine Politics

3

Routine Politics

51

Cultural/Normative Action

157

Legal Strategies

13

Organizational Funding

86

Table 5-8: Frequency of Strategy for Animal Rights (N=3,320)
External Political Strategy

Frequency

Service Provision

3135

Non-Routine Politics

11

Routine Politics

25

Cultural/Normative Action

59

Legal Strategies

6

Organizational Funding

83

As Tables 6-8 demonstrate, the overall frequencies of organizations with regard to
strategy is heavily-skewed in favor of service provision organizations. The majority of
those Service Providers are shelters and rescues within the Animal Rights/Protection
Movement. Contrary to the conventional understanding of modern SMOs, this suggests
that the most prominent strategy for both Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights
organizations is providing necessary services – medical care, shelter, support, and so on –
directly to those of greatest concern and need to the movements. However, with such a
skewed distribution, it is reasonable to assume that the findings of the analyses may be
overly-weighted and obscure the processes occurring for the other five potential
categories on the dependent variable. To account for this, the following models involve
those that both include and omit the service provision organizations from the sample.
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The exploratory MNL models for the full sample that follow will first examine the
Animal Rights/Protection organizations, both including and omitting the Service
Provision organizations as discussed above. The second set of models will explore the
LGBTQ Rights organizations, both including and omitting the Service Provision
organizations. The final set of models combines both movements into one population,
both including and omitting the Service Providers.
As was the case with the samples of recently-emerging SMOs, the overall and
movement-specific frequencies within the full sample reflect the importance and dramatic
presence of Service Provision among SMOs on these two terrains. This suggests that
more attention should be paid to those strategic repertoires that fall outside of the mass
mobilization and protest tactics that are so often conflated with all social movement
action in the literature.
GOODNESS-OF-FIT FOR MNL REGRESSION MODELS: FULL SAMPLE
As above with the recently-emerging samples, Table 9 presents the “goodness-offit” test for each of the independent variables in the models testing their relationships to
classification with particular political strategies. For the Animal Rights models, Fiscal
Instability and the logged effect of Net Income are significant additions to both the model
including cases of all strategies and the model excluding the Service Providers. The
Region dummy is a significant addition for the full model, but not when Service is
omitted. In the model that omits service providers, the Contribution Funding Base is a
significant addition.
For the LGBTQ Rights models, all variables are strongly-significant for both the
full model and the model with service provision omitted. In the model omitting Service,
all variables retain significance but only the logged effect of Net Income continues at the
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p < .001 level, while the remainder decrease in statistical significance.
Table 5-9: X2 (re: 2 X Difference of Log-Likelihoods) for Nested Models:
Full Sample (DV = Strategy)
Animal Rights

Region
Contribution Funding
Base
Fiscal Instability
Net Income (Logged)
Fund Balance (Logged)

LGBTQ Rights

Both Movements

All
Strategies

No
Service

All
Strategies

No
Service

All
Strategies

No
Service

30.74***

11.68

30.63***

20.08*

58.73****

14.56

1.01

9.50**

31.50****

14.46***

2.92

10.46**

28.21**** 15.38*** 35.91****

10.88**

14.39**

9.41*

11.99**

9.95**

3.23

2.19

P < .1*

P < .05 **

28.21**** 22.79**** 34.65****

12.25**

51.86****

11.10**

P < .01 ***

13.17**

40.02****

P < .001 ****

In the models analyzing the full population (organizations from both general
movements), all of the variables excluding the expression of Contribution Funding Base
are significant additions to the model. In the model that excludes Service organizations
for both movements, Region is no longer a significant addition to the model, but the
Contribution Funding Base gains significance for the model. For the analyses and
models to follow, I will present the analysis from each model first, and summarize the
substantive findings and implications at the end of the section regarding these exploratory
models of the full sample of SMOs.
Full Sample Analysis: Animal Rights/Protection Organizations
The following tables of models present the exploratory analysis of the
relationships of these independent variables on the comparisons across strategic
categories for SMOs. Table 10 presents the analysis regarding Animal Rights
organizations including the massive portion of the population dedicated to Service
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Provision – namely, shelters and rescues. Findings are summarized as:
a) A 1% increase in Fiscal Instability corresponds to a 0.3% decrease in odds of
Organizational Funding versus Service Provision
b) A 10% increase in Net Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine
politics by 3.9%, and increases the odds by 1.8% of Cultural Strategies, both
compared to Service Provision.

Table 5-10: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Animal Rights/Protection,
All Strategies (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine
v. Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

NE v W

0.815

1.518

0.994

0.319

0.725

SE v W

0.517

0.495

0.158***

0.000

0.635

MW v W

0.277

0.659

0.595

0.318

0.588

Contribution
Funding Base

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.997

Fiscal Instability

0.999

0.999

1.000

0.995

0.997***

0.961***

1.021

1.018*

0.972

1.004

0.997

0.992

0.993

0.990

0.987

REGION

Net Income
(Logged)
Fund Balance
(Logged)

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 3,320
Fiscal Instability for the year is a significant addition to the model, and for a 1%
increase in that proportion, the odds that an Animal Rights organization employs
Organizational Funding strategies rather than Service Provision decrease by 0.3%.
The odds-ratios for the variables whose effects are best understood in logged-terms – Net
Income and Overall Fund Balance of the organization (as discussed previously) – are
calculated in terms of the effect of a 10% increase on the strategy employed. The Net
Income of the organizations for that fiscal year is a significant contribution to the model,
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and provides two statistically-significant effects on strategy. First, a 10% increase in Net
Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine politics by 3.9% compared to Service
Provision. Second, that same 10% increase is associated with a 1.8% increase in the odds
of using Cultural Strategies as opposed to Service Provision. The dummy variable for
Region is a significant addition to this model as shown in Table 9, but only contributed
one significant relationship across the various Regional and Strategic comparisons.
Animal Rights organizations in the Southeastern region appear to have considerably
lower odds of having Cultural strategies as opposed to being direct Service Providers
(84.2% lower odds).
Table 11 presents the analysis of the Animal Rights organizations, omitting the
large proportion of those classified as Service Providers. This is done to examine
whether the effects of these variables are significantly different when that large
percentage – which is potentially driving many of the effects seen in Table 10 – is
excluded. Findings are summarized as:
a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base corresponds to a 2% increase in
the odds of Non-Routine, and 58.6% increase in the odds of Legal strategies,
both compared to Organizational Funding
b) A 1% increase in Fiscal Instability increases the odds of using Non-Routine
Political, Routine Political, and Cultural strategies by 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.3%
respectively, relative to Organizational Funding
c) A 10% increase in Net Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine
Politics and Legal Strategies by 4.5% and 6% respectively, relative to
Organizational Funding
d) Fund Balance has no effect on any strategic comparison
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Table 5-11: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Animal Rights/Protection,
Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Funding

Routine v.
Funding

Cultural v.
Funding

Legal v.
Funding

NE v W

1.237

1.889

1.211

0.568

SE v W

0.600

0.768

0.253**

0.000

MW v W

0.490

1.160

1.150

0.871

Contribution Funding
Base

1.022*

1.007

1.001

1.586*

Fiscal Instability

1.003*

1.002*

1.003***

0.997

Net Income (Logged)

0.955**

1.000

0.998

0.940**

1.003

1.017

1.018

1.036

REGION

Fund Balance (Logged)
P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 185
The Contribution Funding Base shows statistically-significant effects on the
likelihood of both Non-Routine and Legal strategies as compared to Organizational
Funding. This second relationship (a 58.6% increase) is surprising, but may be due to the
small number (only 6) of organizations employing legal strategies within the Animal
Right/Protection movement. This could represent either the expensiveness of legal
strategies, or a reflection of insights from Ganz: That a diverse funding base allows
greater leeway of strategic choice.
Fiscal Instability is a significant addition to this model, and seems to have an
overall statistically-significant effect on strategic choices for non-Service Animal Rights
groups. A 1% increase in this proportion increases the odds of using Non-Routine
Political, Routine Political, and Cultural strategies by 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.3% respectively,
relative to Organizational Funding. These do not represent a major substantive effect of
the ratio financial variables on strategy. Additionally, a 10% increase in the
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organizations' Net Income for the year is associated with a 4.5% decrease in the odds of
having Non-Routine Political strategies, and a 6% decrease in the odds of using Legal
strategies, as opposed to Organizational Funding.
Despite Region not appearing to be an overall significant addition to this model,
one relationship does appear to have a significant effect: Southeastern Animal Rights
organizations have much lower odds (74.7%) of employing Cultural strategies as opposed
to Organization Funding tactics as compared to their Western counterparts when Service
organizations are omitted.
The ratio financial and resource-based variables appear to have different
substantively-significant effects on strategic choice for Animal Rights organizations. The
effect of Fiscal Instability is very small in all the significant relationships. However, as
noted above, the effect of Contribution Funding Base seemingly has a large effect on the
odds of using Legal strategies compared to Organizational Funding. This may suggest
that organizations whose revenue is largely derived from individual contributions are
more likely to use Legal strategies, but the limitations of the data, analysis, and the
distribution of cases make any such finding somewhat speculative and in need of
confirmation via other data.
The logged effect of Net Income does appear to have a substantive relationship to
strategy, particularly when thought of in terms of greater increases. For example, if an
organization doubles their net income for the year (a 100% increase), the odds that the
organization deploys Non-Routine political strategies decreases by 39% and the odds of
Cultural/Expressive strategies increases by 18%, both relative to Service Provision.
When the Service organizations are removed from the model, a doubling of net income
decreases the odds of employing Non-routine political strategies by 45% and Legal
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strategies by 60% compared to Organizational Funding activities. While caution must be
shown for all findings with this full sample, these relationships suggest that the ability to
engage in Organizational Funding activities may require (or produce) a greater amount of
financial resources on hand than do the Non-Routine and Legal repertoires.
The overall analysis of the Animal Rights Organizations in this study conclude
that there appears to be a limited geographic effect on strategy, but only when comparing
Southeastern organizations to their Western counterparts in regards to Cultural or
Normative tactics. This Cultural repertoire appears uncommon in the Southeast (much
lower odds in both models), suggesting perhaps a lack of resonance or political salience
of such overt attempts to alter normative attitudes and behaviors regarding Animal Rights
in that region of the United States. This is possibly a function of the traditional
“Southern” values of the region being distinct and potentially at odds with what are
considered “Coastal” attitudes towards animals: That they aren't food, entertainment, or
there for the production of clothing. This certainly cannot be shown through this
quantitative analysis, but is potentially a mechanism for this distinction.
Full Sample Analysis: LGBTQ Organizations
The following models present the effects of the same set of variables presented
above on the subset of cases focused on the various issues surrounding rights and the
LGBTQ community in the United States for the multi-decade sample of SMOs. As
presented in Table 9, all of the independent variables for the study are significant
additions to the model for LGBTQ Rights organizations when including the subset of the
population engaged in Service Provision (overall N = 628; Service N = 318). Table 12
presents the results for the variable effects on odds-ratios for this sample, summarized as:
a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base is associated with a 1.6%
decrease in odds for Cultural strategies relative to Service Provision
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b) No substantive effect of Fiscal Instability on any strategic comparison
c) A 10% increase in Net Income corresponds to increases in the odds of using
Routine Politics and Organizational Funding by 4.1% and 3.2% respectively,
relative to Service Provision
d) A 10% increase in Fund Balance corresponds to decreases in the odds of using
Routine Politics and Organizational Funding by 5.8% and 3.2% respectively,
relative to Service Provision

Table 5-12: Multinomial Logistic Regression: LGBTQ Rights
All Strategies (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

1.601

0.611 *

2.212

0.855

REGION
+

NE v W

---

SE v W

0.099

0.828

0.406 ***

0.533

0.458**

MW v W

0.271

1.338

1.172

1.744

1.201

Contribution
Funding Base

1.075

0.997

0.984 ****

0.989

0.998

Fiscal Instability

0.996

1.000

1.000 ****

0.999

1.000

Net Income
(Logged)

1.140

1.041***

0.989

1.025

1.032***

Fund Balance
(Logged)

0.859*

0.942****

0.964****

0.966

0.968****

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 628
+

Coefficient is unreasonable (1,956,895.8) due to distribution of cases & standard error;
does not meet statistical significance, so is removed from the table for interpretive purposes.

Contribution Funding Base has a statistically significant effect on the odds of
using Cultural/Expressive strategies compared to Service Provision. However, this effect
is substantively small: A 1% increase in that proportion is associated with a 1.6%
decrease in odds for Cultural strategies. One comparison – Cultural Strategies versus
Service Provision – results in a statistically significant effect of Fiscal Instability.
122

However, the odds-ratio shows that there is substantively no effect (odds-ratio of 1 = no
change in odds).
For the Regional comparisons, a significant effect is shown for multiple regional
and strategic comparisons. First, Northeastern organizations have lower odds (33.4%
lower) of using Cultural strategies, as opposed to direct Service Provision, than their
Western counterparts. Second, Southeastern organizations have 59.6% lower odds of
having Cultural tactics and 54.2% lower odds of employing Organizational Funding
strategies, as compared to Service Provision, than Western organizations.
The model for LGBQ Rights organizations that omits the Service Provision
organizations (Table 13) also shows that all of the independent variables are significant
contributions to the overall analysis (see Table 9). The findings are summarized as:
a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base corresponds to increases of
odds of 8.6%, 12.4%, and 1.2% respectively, for Non-Routine, Routine,
and Organizational Funding strategies compared to Cultural/Expressive
strategies
b) Fiscal Instability has no effect on the strategic comparisons
c) A 10% increase in Net Income increases the odds by 6.2% and 4.5%
respectively, of using Non-Routine Politics and Organizational Funding,
compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies.
d) A 10% increase in Fund Balance corresponds to a 3.9% decrease in
Routine Politics compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies
In this model, Fiscal Instability has no effect. This suggests that perhaps the
processes shaping strategic choice are driven less by measures of relative financial health
and mobilizing capacity than often suggested. The effects of Contribution Funding Base
signal a possible relationship between the source of an organization's resources and the
strategies employed. Again, caution must be show in attributing any weight to these
findings given the data limitations of the full sample. Regionally, Northeastern
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organizations have dramatically (3.5x) greater odds of being associated with Routine
Political action than Cultural Action, compared to Western LGBTQ organizations,
perhaps for reasons discussed below.
Table 5-13: Multinomial Logistic Regression: LGBTQ Rights
Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Cultural

Routine v.
Cultural

Legal v.
Cultural

Funding v.
Cultural

NE v W

--- +

3.556***

3.164

1.481

SE v W

0.068

2.385

1.294

1.287

MW v W

0.157

1.213

1.330

0.935

%Contributions /
Total Revenue

1.086*

1.124**

1.002

1.012***

%Expenses /
Fund Balance

0.997

1.000**

1.000

1.000**

Net Income (Logged)

1.144

1.062****

1.032

1.045****

Fund Balance (Logged)

0.874

0.961**

1.004

0.995

REGION

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 310
+

Coefficient is unreasonable (4,717,407.7) due to distribution of cases & standard error;
does not meet statistical significance, so is removed from the table for interpretive
purposes.

The relative relationships of the logged financial variables reflect a similar
dynamic of scale as was the case in the Animal Rights models. Namely, if the
relationships are examined in larger terms (a doubling of the income or balance rather
than a 10% increase), the substantive effect can be seen more clearly. In both the full
model and that with Service organizations omitted, the effect of a doubling (or 100%
increase) of the organization's net income leads to increases of 41% and 62% of the odds
of using Routine Politics relative to Service Provision or Expressive Strategies
respectively. A doubling of the overall organizational financial balance leads to decreases
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in the odds of using Routine Politics, Expressive/Cultural strategies, and Organizational
funding compared to Service Provision in the full model; the same increase leads to a
decrease of 31% in the odds of using Routine Politics versus Cultural tactics in the model
where Service providers are removed. These findings suggest that the use of NonService strategies is possibly affected positively by a greater capacity to generate income
in that year, while the relationship flips negative when discussing the overall financial
balance of the organization. For LGBTQ Rights groups, it is potentially the case that
Service Provision is more a function of overall resources, and the other “activist” tactics
are a reflection of yearly income – or, mobilization of resources versus overall
organizational capacity for expenditure.
The regional relationships in these two models suggest that Cultural/Expressive
strategies are less likely in both the Northeast and Southeast, relative to the West, when
compared to either Routine or Service strategies. Organizational funding seems to have
lower odds than Service Provision in the Southeast compared to the West This may be an
effect of the proximity to Washington D.C., for Northeastern organizations, and thus
more of a compulsion to engage and interact with the formal institutions of law and
governance than organizations on the West Coast. The history of the LGBTQ Rights
movement involves massive Cultural and Expressive actions in the West, particularly
among organizations in San Francisco, California (including the first “Pride” celebrations
and Stonewall Riot commemorations to regularly occur outside of New York City).
Full Sample Analysis: Animal Rights and LGBTQ Rights Organizations
Lastly, the full population of cases combining organizations on both the Animal
Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements examines the possible relationships
between regional location and financial resources across a sizable subset of the overall
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Rights-based social movement sector in the United States (Tables 14 and 15). The full
discussion of the findings in these models is found in Appendix B.
Table 5-14: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements
All Strategies (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

NE v W

1.539

1.836**

0.931

1.387

0.901

SE v W

0.511

0.661

0.322****

0.187

0.540***

MW v W

0.274

0.687

0.696*

0.593

0.624**

Contribution Funding
Base

1.000

1.000

0.997

1.000

1.000

Fiscal Instability

0.999

1.000

1.000**

1.000

1.000

Net Income (Logged)

0.976

1.043****

1.005

1.004

1.021****

Fund Balance
(Logged)

0.992

0.965****

0.982****

0.993

0.991*

REGION

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 3,948

The exploratory findings of the analyses of the full sample differ from the samples
of recently-emerging SMOs in a few, but notable ways. First, the ratio financial variables
have no statistical significance in the samples of SMOs founded shortly before 2005,
compared to limited significance in the full sample (though little to no substantive
significance could be attributed in the full sample). The regional effects are not much
different, and thus expectations are that while region may have some effects on the
strategies developed by organizations, there is little that can be said on the specific
mechanisms involved in either the full or newly-emerging samples. With regard to the
measures of Net Income and overall Fund Balance, the relationships for SMOs founded
shortly before 2005 are not much different from the full sample, but do allow greater

126

analytic interpretation given the improvements to the timing of the organizations'
founding to the data collection. Increases in both net income and fund balance are both
associated with likely increases in the use of Routine Politics and Organizational Funding
relative to Service Provision.

Table 5-15: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements
Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Cultural

Routine v.
Cultural

Legal v.
Cultural

Funding v.
Cultural

NE v W

1.679

2.063**

1.477

0.948

SE v W

0.935

2.215*

0.554

1.812*

MW v W

0.386

1.048

0.874

0.938

Contribution Funding
Base

1.026**

1.006

1.010

1.004

Fiscal Instability

0.999

1.000*

1.000

1.000*

Net Income (Logged)

0.973*

1.028**

0.994

1.013

Fund Balance (Logged)

1.008

0.990

1.019

1.016**

REGION

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 495

Implications of Statistical Analysis
The above analyses of SMOs in the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights
movements suggest that assumptions related to the importance of resources and the
sources of resources on strategic development should be questioned and further
examined. With the recently-emerging samples of cases, resources are only found to
significantly affect the implementation of Routine politics and Funding compared to
Service Provision. However, this difference (the models omitting Service Provision) was
not done for the recently-emerging samples due to the drastic reduction in sample-size
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and the subsequent effect that has on statistical utility9. This suggests that the dominance
of the Resource Mobilization perspective in the literature on social movements may not
accurately reflect the importance of resources on various intra-movement dynamics.
However, for this statistical analysis, resources are only considered as finances, excluding
other resources such as labor, time, members, space, etc. These other forms of resources
may play important roles in determining strategy, but are beyond the scope of this
analysis.
The findings in the exploratory analyses of the full sample show that the inclusion
of Service Provision – a controversial inclusion, perhaps, into the conceptualization of
activism as noted previously – does have some effect on the relationship of resources to
those strategies. This suggests that theoretical and empirical studies of SMOs should not
narrowly focus on only those groups using disruptive or routine political strategies.
Doing so involves selection bias and excludes (potentially) the majority of possible
applicable cases. Future research should expand categorizations of movement strategy to
include such groups, or explicitly define their analyses as only applicable to that
particular subset of strategic organizations.
The following chapters explore some of these and other internal processes and
factors involved in the formation or adoption of external political strategies by Animal
Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights organizations. The core analytic design is to use
the qualitative data (organizational archives, public documentation, personal biographies,
movement publications, and elite interviews) to explore the relationships of resources,
leaders, and the political/organizational context on the origins and strategic decisions
9

The MNL Regression failed to run in STATA for samples excluding Service Provision; an error when
calculating the Log-Likelihood for the models caused an infinite loop (due to “non-concave” LogLikelihood). Thus, those models are not included.
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made for these four organizations.
I have chosen not to explore the Non-Routine Politics category based on the
extremely-low proportion these organizations comprise of the full population (only .3%
of the full population) and the fact that such organizations comprise the bulk of the cases
explored throughout decades of sociological inquiry into social movement dynamics.
The Organizational Funding category will not be explored due to the lack of available
comparative case research and available data.
The analysis focuses on four organizations representing the remaining strategic
categories, operating on either national or local/state levels. From the LGBTQ Rights
movement, Chapter 6 will examine the origins and strategic decisions for Lambda Legal
(Legal Strategies) and Equality New Mexico (Routine Politics). From the Animal Rights
movement, Chapter 7 focuses on the same dynamics for People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA – Cultural/Expressive Tactics) and Animal Humane of New Mexico
(Service Provision).
These four organizations represent variation on the outcome category and
variation in scope of focus – two national organizations, two state-level/local
organizations. I did not choose these cases at random, but based on their recognition
within the movements as archetypes and as successful in engaging the social and political
context toward their chosen goals. While there is selection bias inherent in these choices,
the availability of information and the prominence of these organizations in their
respective contexts make them useful choices for further review.
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CHAPTER 6 - LGBTQ RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I use various forms of archival and qualitative data – including
movement histories, organizational newsletters and meeting minutes, web resources,
publicly-available financial information, leader biographies, and interview data – to
assess the influence of organizational and political context, the personal histories and
skills of leaders, and resources on the development of political strategy by two LGBTQ
(EQNM) Rights organizations: Lambda Legal Defense and Education , and Equality New
Mexico. These two organizations represent two of the categories of strategy
conceptualized in Chapter 3: Legal Strategies (Lambda Legal) and Routine Politics
(EQNM). These organizations are involved in actions directed toward a number of the
movement issues discussed in Chapter 4 including marriage equality, non-discrimination
and family rights, and hate crime prevention and anti-bullying.
In the following discussion, I first present a brief general overview of the two
organizations. Drawing on the various forms of data discussed above, which together
provide insight into the three key explanatory factors for the present research for each
movement: context, leaders, and resources. Second, I analyze these data using qualitative
methods to elaborate the nature of how each factor influences the development of the
strategy employed at organizational emergence. Third, I examine the strategic continuity
of the organizations by exploring their early, important or landmark, and current (as of
February 2012) strategic actions. This analysis of continuity relates to the theoretical
discussion (Chapter 2) regarding the fluidity of strategy over time. Lastly, I discuss the
qualitative analysis in relation to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 and the findings
of the exploratory statistical analyses of Chapter 5.
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Brief Organizational Overviews: Lambda Legal and EQNM
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (henceforth: Lambda Legal) is the
oldest and largest legal organization working specifically on behalf of the LGBTQ
community in the United States. Founded in 1973 and still headquartered in New York
City (with regional offices throughout the country), the organization employs various
full-time staff, interns, and many legal professionals working directly on cases pertinent
to the issues of the community. Lambda Legal states that they currently engage in both
explicit legal action, and education and outreach surrounding the following issues:
workplace fairness, family protections including marriage and adoption rights,
transgender rights, youth protections, HIV/AIDS concerns, health care fairness, seniors
issues, and government misconduct (LambdaLegal.org “Issues”). The organization states
that it pursues strategies of “impact litigation,” or those cases that are viewed as having
precedence-setting possibilities that will advance their overall goals for the community
beyond the litigants involved in the cases (LambdaLegal.org “About Us”). The
organization's current open docket includes sixty-plus cases, active at various levels of
state and federal courts. Lambda Legal is also presently engaged in public-education and
outreach campaigns designed to empower and educate the LGBTQ community (ibid).
As of 2010, the organization operated (according to the latest financial statements
from the fiscal year 2010) with revenue of more than $17 million (Lambda Legal 2010).
Most of the revenue for the organization came via individual contributions and
membership fees (25%), external grants and corporate sponsorships (11%), in-kind
service donations (33% - mostly in the form of free legal work), and revenue from special
fundraising events (17%) (ibid). Organizational expenses (roughly $14 million in 2010)
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are primarily used for the legal activities (56%) and education program (25%), with the
remainder split across support services (including administrative costs) and fundraising
expenses (ibid).
Equality New Mexico (EQNM) is one of the oldest and largest political
organizations advocating on behalf of the LGBTQ community in New Mexico. Founded
in 2003 and operating as a 501c(4) political organization and 501(c)3 charitable
foundation (the EQNM-Foundation), the organization operates both in advocacy and
outreach and specifically targeting lawmaking at the state and local level. As of February
2012, the two arms of the organization are jointly headed by an Executive Director, but
with separate Boards of Directors, some members of which overlap (EQNM.org “About
Us”). All employees work for both organizations, but bill hours to one or the other
(EQNM or EQNM-F) in order to distinguish the expenses for tax purposes (McElroy
2012). Current actions include advancing anti-bullying measures, advocating against the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) introduced in the Legislature, working toward electing
allied candidates, and toward increasing equality and protection in health care and
insurance coverage, specifically as related to concerns of HIV/AIDS (EQNM
Newsletters: 2012).
The finances of the organization in 2010 were separated, for tax purposes,
between the 501(c)3 and 501(c)4. EQNM (c)4 reported total revenue of $27,212 and
assets of $7,589 (EQNM 990 2011). All of the revenue was reported as “contributions,
gifts, and grants.” Expenses totaled nearly $20,000, split between salaries and wages,
professional fees, rent, and various other expenses (ibid). This profit of roughly $7,000
for 2010, however, is in light of a budget deficit of nearly $37,000 from the previous
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year. The EQNM Foundation(c)3 raised roughly $67,000 in revenue, again mostly from
contributions and gifts (EQNM Foundation 990: 2011), with expenses totaling nearly
$59,000 and a prior-year deficit of just over $1,000 (ibid).
Organizational and Political Context at Emergence
In this section, I detail the various institutional, cultural, and inter-organizational
dynamics surrounding LGBTQ Rights at the times of emergence for Lambda Legal and
EQNM. I discuss the influence of these outside actors and cultural context on the
emergence of the organizations and the strategies their founders chose to employ. In the
analysis at the end of this chapter, I discuss the influence between organizational and
political context on the formation of political strategy as shown by the origin stories of
Lambda Legal and EQNM.
LAMBDA LEGAL: CONTEXT
William Thom founded Lambda Legal in New York City in 1973. In the early
1970s, the modern movement for the civil rights of the LGBTQ community remained in
its infancy in the United States. The SMO sector surrounding LGBTQ issues in the US
contained a number of new organizations emerging in the wake of the riots at the
Stonewall Inn in 1969, and a few organizations that pre-date that momentous event. The
most well-known of these pre-existing organizations was the Mattachine Society, founded
in Los Angeles in 1950. That SMO worked through a platform of unity, education,
social-consciousness, and activism against the repression faced by the LGBTQ
community. Other organizations, such as the Janus Society (Philadelphia, PA) and ONE,
Inc. (Los Angeles, CA) were active in the community in the two decades pre-Stonewall.
Closely following the riots, and formed in their ideological and activist wake, a number
of organizations emerged primarily in New York and surrounding areas, to work for the
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rights of LGBTQ people in American society. These included, among others, the Gay
Liberation Front (1969) formed by those both involved in and closely-following the
Stonewall riots, to bring together protests and marches to draw attention to and in
solidarity with the rioters. The Gay Activists Alliance (GAA) emerged in 1969 in New
York City by former members of the Gay Liberation Front (a short-lived organization)
who had grown tired of the prior group's lack of organization or activist-focus. The GAA
was founded on the goals of “securing basic human rights, dignity, and freedom for all
gay people” (GAA.org). The GAA primarily engaged in non-routine political action
involving direct (though generally peaceful) confrontations with political officials
regarding their policies and attitudes toward the LGBTQ population (ibid). In sum, the
organizational context surrounding LGBTQ Rights issues in the US at the time of
Lambda Legal's founding involved few organizations, but was an emerging and growing
sector. The organizations that did exist tended to employ either cultural and expressive
strategies or the non-routine politics synonymous with the 1960s protest cycle.
The civil rights, anti-war, and student uprisings of the previous decade heavily
influenced the organizational context in the 1970s broadly across all movements and
issues. The landscape included non-routine, routine, cultural/expressive, service
provision, and the newly-emerging legal organizations working on a variety of issues.
The legal defense fund, as an organizational type, had existed since the founding of the
NAACP-LDF (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People – Legal
Defense Fund) in 1940 by future US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. The
NAACP-LDF was conceived as the explicit legal department of the NAACP, which
would use the courts as a means to further the agenda of justice, equality, and due-process
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for African-Americans (NAACP-LDF “History”). By 1971, three other prominent
minority constituencies developed organizations devoted to the same legal strategies,
built directly from the foundation of the NAACP-LDF. In 1968, the Mexican-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) emerged thanks in large part to
assistance and training from the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and
the NAACP-LDF and a grant from the Ford Foundation (MALDEF.org). Two years later,
the National Organization for Women (NOW) incorporated their legal department, NOWLDF (currently known as Legal Momentum) to use the courts to further women's
concerns. In 1971, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF)
emerged directly on the model of the NAACP-LDF and MALDEF to provide legal
advocacy on behalf of the specific concerns of their community.
This emerging field of legal defense organizations on behalf of minority
constituencies played an influential part in the founding of Lambda Legal. William
Thom, a lawyer and former legal advisor to the Gay Activists Alliance, founded Lambda
Legal in 1973 upon the foundation built by those legal defense organizations of prior
decades. Thom used their original by-laws and documents of incorporation explicitly to
develop those for Lambda Legal. So much so, in fact, that the mission statement in those
documents is a verbatim copy of the mission statement of PRLDEF (Andersen 2006),
simply replacing the words “Puerto Rican” with “homosexual:”
Mission: To provide without charge legal services in those situations which give
rise to legal issues having a substantial effect on the legal rights of homosexuals;
to promote the availability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and
attracting homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to homosexuals
general information concerning their legal rights and obligation, and to render
technical assistance to any legal services corporation or agency in regard to legal
issues affecting homosexuals (Lambda Legal: 1973).
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Thus, the organizational landscape beyond the LGBTQ Rights movement in the
early 1970s involved many non-routine and routine political organizations still operating
in the post-1960s arena, alongside the emergence of legal strategies throughout minority
communities working toward issues of civil rights and justice. Given the clear
connection between the founding documentation of Lambda Legal and that of PRLDEF,
the organizational context played an important role in the development of strategy by the
emerging organization.
EQUALITY NEW MEXICO: CONTEXT
EQNM was founded (originally as Basic Rights New Mexico - BRNM) in April
2003 in direct relation to the passage of amendments to the Human Rights Act in New
Mexico (SB 28, Regular Session, 2003). The amendments extended the nondiscrimination law to include the categories of “sexual orientation and gender identity,”
where gender identity is defined as:
“A person's self-perception, or perception of that by person by another, of the
person's identity as male or female based upon the person's appearance, behavior,
or physical characteristics that are in accord with or opposed to the person's
physical anatomy, chromosomal sex, or sex at birth” (SB 28, 2003: Lines 20-24).
In the wake of the passage and gubernatorial signing into law (by Gov. Bill Richardson –
D) of these amendments, concern grew within the LGBTQ community in New Mexico
that opponents would begin gathering petition signatures in order to repeal these
amendments via ballot referendum in 2004. George Bach, a lawyer and activist at the
time of BRNM's founding stated:
The question became, after Richardson signed it, would it be subject to the repeal
mechanisms in the state constitution? [...] There was concern that they
[opponents] might get the signatures to try and get it on the ballot for it to be
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repealed. There was also a lot of concern that there was a real danger that, if they
did, because it was an election year, that it would be on the ballot. And so, the
turnout might hurt us and we could lose it (Bach 2012).
BRNM emerged as an extension of the pre-existing Coalition for Equality in New
Mexico (previously known as the Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in New Mexico),
originally founded in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 1993. The original founders of BRNM –
notably Todd McElroy – were involved in political campaigns and action surrounding
LGBTQ issues in New Mexico for a decade prior to 2003. BRNM emerged specifically,
to deal with the potential repeal mechanisms regarding the amendments to the Human
Rights Act.
Few other organizations existed in New Mexico in the 1990s and early 2000s
surrounding LGBTQ issues. The ACLU had worked on various issues on behalf of the
community. A group known as the Gay Lawyers had been active through the University
of New Mexico Law School (Bach 2012). The New Mexico Lesbian and Gay Political
Alliance (NMLGPA) was operating in Albuquerque at the time (McElroy 2012), along
with chapters of national organizations such as Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays
(PFLAG), and the Human Rights Alliance of Santa Fe (CGLRNM 1996). The first
“Pride” celebration in the state occurred in 1992 in Santa Fe, and was little more than a
candlelight vigil in the Plaza (McElroy 2012); Pride organizations began to appear
throughout the state in the years to follow. Nationally, many of the prominent
organizations working on behalf of LGBTQ Rights today had, by the early 1990s, begun
to operate and gain momentum. These organizations include, but are not limited to:
GLAAD, the Human Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal, and the National Gay & Lesbian
Task Force (NGLTF). The NGLTF, in particular, influenced the early strategic
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development of BRNM/EQNM. According to an interview with George Bach:
They [NGLTF] came in and basically put on a training for us about how to raise
money, and how to organize a campaign, it was here at the Law School
[University of New Mexico], and a bunch of us went to it from all over. They
actually had us do fundraising on the spot. We had to bring a list of ten people
that we know, friends, former roommates, family, whatever, that we would call
and hit up for money while we're there. [...] There were a couple of different
teams, but I was one of the ones that at least conducted some of the trainings for
folks that were going to then go out and canvass. [...] The training with Task
Force, that was really the kickoff event. 'Hey, we need to do this campaign, we
got to get a campaign together to make sure we defeat the ballot initiative, if they
get the signatures, so the Task Force is going to come in,' and that's what we did
(Bach 2012).
When asked whether the NGLTF had influence on EQNM/BRNM, Bach also noted:
Very much so at the time. They're the ones who came in, they taught us how to
run a campaign, and showed us how you would call and ask people for money,
how you would go door-to-door. [...] So very much so. I thought the Task Force
was the one, the reason that we had the campaign. [...] Something would have
happened. But the reason that we did it they was we did it was because of the
Task Force. [...] I wouldn't say that there would have been no organization, but
that way that it was was definitely because of the Task Force, in my opinion
(ibid).

In terms of the organizational context surrounding LGBTQ Rights and its effect
on the founding of EQNM (then BRNM), there are clear connections between preexisting organizations and the new. Various localized organizations operated within the
political arena in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and other communities. Nationally, the SMO
population grew in size and in prominence politically as various challenges and conflicts
emerged surrounding non-discrimination and marriage equality.
In the political arena, two national policies shaped the context and activism
surrounding LGBTQ Rights in the 1990s and 2000s, both enacted during the Clinton
administration. “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” and the federal Defense of Marriage Act

138

(DOMA) – both reviewed in detail in Chapter 4 – spurred both legal challenges and statelevel legislative battles surrounding LGBTQ Rights. Recall that the DOMA made
marriage a state-level determination. As a result, states throughout the country began, via
state constitutional amendments on the ballot during general elections, to define marriage
as a strictly heterosexual status or relationship. The following year, the marriage equality
issue thrust New Mexico into the national spotlight when sixty-four same-sex couples
filed for – and were granted by the County Clerk – marriage licenses in Sandoval County,
on February 20, 2004 (Advocate 2004). Those marriages were later ruled to be invalid,
but the battle over marriage rights had just begun – state-level DOMAs would be
introduced that year, and every subsequent year. While New Mexico had not – and as of
February 2012 has not – defined marriage legislatively or constitutionally, in the years
following the organization’s founding, the battle surrounding LGBTQ Rights focused
primarily on marriage issues, to which became a contentious interaction in the
institutional political arena.
The social context in New Mexico in the 1990s and 2000s surrounding LGBTQ
Rights issues was more open than that faced by Lambda Legal during its formative years.
According to prominent LGBTQ activist and BRNM founder Todd McElroy, there were
“a few shrill homophobic voices” but not an “organized opposition” surrounding the
HRA amendments and LGBTQ issues in general in the state (McElroy 2012). Nationally,
the attitudes and behaviors toward LGBTQ people were not as overtly-discriminatory as
they had been decades prior – many states had initiated non-discrimination laws similar
to New Mexico's. However, in the early 1990s, the social acceptance of LGBTQ people
was still not as open and prominent as it is today. McElroy states;
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There still was no 'Ellen'; there was no 'Will and Grace' [putting LGBTQ issues
to the forefront] was a very bold thing (McElroy 2012).
However, political, cultural, or social barriers to organizing around LGBTQ issues and
living an “out” lifestyle were not as overt or punitive as they were in the decades prior.
In summary, the organizational, political, and social context surrounding the
founding of BRNM – later EQNM – in New Mexico and nationally was a more
accessible than that faced by Lambda Legal decades before. Organizations operated with
a variety of strategies both locally and nationally, and while political barriers to marriage
equality began to emerge, non-discrimination was becoming normative and the cultural
and social context surrounding the lives and rights of LGBTQ people in America was
opening.
Biographies, Experience, and Skills of Organizational Founders
LAMBDA LEGAL: FOUNDERS
Lawyer and activist William Thom was the key figure in the founding of Lambda
Legal. He worked professionally as a lawyer in New York City after graduating from
Princeton and Yale Law School. He was not “out,” publicly or professionally at the time
(Andersen 2006). The organization, founded on the principles of the PRLDEF as a legal
defense fund for the LGBTQ community, began with two other lawyers listed on the
documents of incorporation (E. Carrington Boggan and Michael J. Lavery) (Lambda
Legal 1973). While data explicitly suggesting the following is not available for the
present research, it is possible that, given his experience in the Gay Activists Alliance and
his professional training and experience as a lawyer, these factors contributed directly the
Thom's decisions to employ legal strategies in forming the new Lambda Legal
organization. In interviews for her book, Ellen Ann Andersen quotes Thom as saying, in
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reference to the formation of a strictly legal organization on behalf of the LGBTQ
community: “The idea was in the air...even overdue” (Andersen 1996: p. 26).
Lambda's explicit legal strategy was elaborated in the first newsletter published
by the organization in 1976:
To date, Lambda's legal activities have been of two kinds: First, to act as counsel
or co-counsel for one of the parties in a case; second to submit briefs amicus
curiae (friend of the court) in cases in which we feel there is a need for a
perspective other than that provided by the parties (Lambda News 1976).
In the early days the organization consisted of few members (only five individuals were
present at the first official meeting of the organization) and an external advisory board
(Lambda Legal 1973). To engage in explicitly legal strategies requires a professional
background and training in law. Many activists lack these specific skills, which
potentially is an insurmountable barrier to developing organizations using this category
of strategy.
EQUALITY NEW MEXICO: FOUNDERS
The founders of EQNM/BRNM were all experienced activists, involved in
organizations working on issues related to the LGBTQ community and various other
movements. Interviews with two individuals heavily involved in the origins and initial
actions of the organization – George Bach and Todd McElroy – are the primary data
source for this section. As stated above, Todd McElroy was one of the original leaders
and founders of the organization, which had evolved out of a prior organization working
on issues of LGBTQ Rights, known as first the Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in
New Mexico, and subsequently the Coalition for Equality in New Mexico. The BRNM
was founded explicitly to fight the repeal of the inclusion of sexual orientation and
gender identity into the non-discrimination laws in New Mexico. In discussing his role
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as a leader of this organization, McElroy states:
I believe in action. I believe it's my responsibility to be involved. I've had the
best leadership training in the world. [...] I've always perceived myself to be a
leader. And so, when you're a leader, then you have responsibilities to your
community. So, I didn't make a conscious decision [to be involved], it was just,
this is what I'm supposed to do. [...] And because there had been so few leaders in
the New Mexico LGBT community; candidly, there have been very few people in
the community that have sacrificed more than I have. I think it's also problematic
because what happens is that people are like 'I don't want to do what he does.' So
it's hard to recruit other leaders. [...] I asserted myself. I have an opinion. I'm
highly opinionated, and very direct. [...] I asserted myself from the very
beginning (McElroy 2012).
On his experience and background in social and political activism prior to his
involvement with LGBTQ organizations in New Mexico, McElroy states:
As a young person I was highly recognized, encouraged, rewarded, lots of pats
on the head for being politically interested and then politically active. [...] In
1976, I was Jimmy Carter's [campaign] Chair [in his home county]: I was
fourteen. [...] When I went to college, I joined the Young Democrats and
campaigned every time there was an election. [...] During the 1980s, I was part of
the Witness for Peace movement. I worked with our Diocese in Dodge City,
Kansas, with the Peace and Justice Coordinator to coordinate civil disobedience
workshops. [...] I learned a lot about Saul Alinsky, the principles of non-violence,
and civil disobedience. [...] That taught me a whole lot about the necessity of, I
mean, somebody's got to be out front. Somebody's got to be openly gay
(McElroy 2012).
Fellow early member of EQNM/BRNM, George Bach, describes his early engagement in
political activism thusly:
I got connected in it when I was a student here [University of New Mexico Law
School]. I got active in the Lambda organization here – the Gay/Lesbian student
group here – and after I graduated I got into the Gay Lawyers and started doing
stuff with that group, became President of that group, so it was just sort of natural.
I was obviously interested in doing rights work, so I was doing that activism on
the side. I would on occasion do stuff with the ACLU, too. I eventually became a
Staff Attorney for the ACLU. [...] I did a year of law school at CUNY, 19961997. [...] I think, at that time, my activism was more what they called 'street
law,' with the International Lawyers Guild which was there, workers' rights stuff.
We'd go and do presentations to folks in the community about their rights as
workers. [...] When I came back here [Albuquerque/UNM Law School], certainly
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being here lit the fire, just in terms of, you're working with constitutional law –
which is fascinating. [...] So that's when I think the activism part of me actually
caught fire (Bach 2012).
The above excerpts illustrate that Bach and McElroy both were involved in a variety of
SMO and political actions in their pre-BRNM lives.
Prior to the founding of BRNM, through the Coalition for Equality, Bach (and
McElroy, and others) had been active in lobbying efforts on behalf of the amendments to
the HRA and other LGBTQ causes in the New Mexico state legislature. On this, Bach
recalls:
We went up to the Roundhouse and lobbied, on different days, when they were
[sic] looking at adding the Human Rights Act amendments that were adding
sexual orientation and gender identity to the anti-discrimination laws, so it just
sort of became a network of people that knew each other through that. [...] So
that's how we knew each other, and how we were all connected (ibid).
For the founders and early activists in EQNM/BRNM, their experiences working in
lobbying efforts surrounding LGBTQ issues in state government, their histories as
activists in other, non-LGBTQ movements, and their specific training – as leaders or as
lawyers – were influential factors in the shape of the organizational strategy developed.
Lambda Legal & Equality New Mexico: Initial Resources
In the exploratory statistical analyses presented in Chapter 5, I propose various
relationships between financial resources and the development of political strategy by
social movement organizations. The data for this section come from interviews with
EQNM founders and activists, official IRS documents, and organizational newsletters
and documentation. Lambda Legal's initial resources are not explicitly and publicly
available for the organization’s first years in operation. However, in its first newsletter in
1976, in reference to some of its current cases, the organization states:
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We regret that budget restrictions have forced us to refrain from participating in
actions we might otherwise have taken on. Lambda itself only takes on cases in
which we know we will have funds to cover necessary out-of-pocket costs.
Knowing that such costs would be very high in this case, we decided we could not
offer to make it a Lambda case. However, E. Carrington Boggan [initial member
at founding], Lambda's General Counsel, has agreed to represent Leonard
Matlovich on the appeal without cost, and Mr. Matlovich has said he will try to
shoulder out-of-pocket costs himself. I looks now, therefore, as if the case will
proceed. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in Honeycutt v. Malcolm could not shoulder
out-of-pocket expenses: They are indigent. [...] Because we were unable to locate
a source for funding what we feared would be considerable out-of-pocket
expenses, we reluctantly turned the case down. (Lambda News 1976).
From this excerpt, it is clear that resources were not at a level at which the organization
felt it could engage in every case which required its assistance. However, as shown in the
discussion of pro-Bono work by Lambda's General Counsel, the lack of resources was
not always prohibitive to pursuing its strategies: It took on cases even when its resources
did not allow it to cover the costs. As of March 13, 1974, the bank account in the
organization's name had a balance of $5.00, which increased to $720 by May (Lambda
Legal 1974). A list of contributors, published in 1974, contained the names of 43
individual donors (Lambda Legal 1974). Early meetings were housed in the offices of
founders (Lambda Legal 1973). Resources for Lambda, therefore, were scarce in the
organization's earliest days. Thus, in keeping with the analysis in Chapter 5, financial
resources have no clear affect on the use of legal strategies.
For EQNM/BRNM, information regarding resources is found in the interview
data and the IRS 990 forms filed for both the 501(c)3 and 501(c)4 arms of the
organization for 2002 and 2004, respectively. The official IRS 990 data for EQNM (the
c4 organization) in 2004 cites total revenue of $126,897, and total expenses of $206,341
(a deficit of $79,444), and net assets from the prior year of $85,089 (an overall fund
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balance of $5,645 at the end of the year) (IRS 990, EQNM 2004). The 2002 IRS 990 for
the EQNM-Foundation (then still known as the Coalition for Equality in New Mexico,
the 501(c)3) cites $160,731 in total revenue, $144,878 in total expenses (a net excess of
$15,853), combined with assets from the previous year of $37,596, for an overall fund
balance at the end of the year of $53,449 (IRS 990, EQNM-F 2002). Almost all of the
revenue is listed as coming from “Direct Public Support:” $156,157 of the $160,731.
Financially, at least, EQNM/BRNM appears to have had a fairly substantial
resource base compared to Lambda. According to interviews with George Bach and
Todd McElroy, the earliest meetings were held in the business offices of members, the
facilities at the UNM Law School, or private residences. Both noted that outside
organizations offered time, labor, training, and on occasion money, when it was
requested. For EQNM/BRNM, their resources were not considerably-limited, and came
from a variety of sources – both individuals and other organizations.
Qualitative Analysis: Processes of Strategic Development at Emergence
In the following analysis, I use the archival and organizational data presented
above to discuss the relationships proposed Chapter 2 – i.e., the hypotheses relating to the
influence of context and leaders on strategy. I do so in order to build upon the findings
related to resources of the statistical analysis of Chapter 5, and to explore the dynamics of
strategic continuity over time for these movement organizations.
I propose a relationship (Hypothesis #1) between the amount of resources
available to movement founders and the source of those resources as factors contributing
to the choice of political strategy at emergence for social movement organizations. For
Lambda Legal, the resources available – money and members - in the early days of the
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organization do not appear to have been substantial, as noted by the lamentations offered
regarding cases that could not be pursued in their first newsletter. However, this did not
seem to prevent the founders of the organization to choose a strategy as costly legal
action. This suggests that the lack of resources was potentially not a prohibitive factor in
the decisions regarding which strategy to employ. EQNM, on the other hand, had a fairly
substantial resource base, both in terms of money and members, from which to develop
its strategy. Routine politics is not a cheap political strategy: There are costs associated
with effective lobbying, transportation, canvassing, preparation of organizational
materials, training, and so on. It is possible that this substantial base of resources was
influential in the decision to employ institutional political/routine strategies by the
organization.
The findings in the statistical analysis regarding financial resources for SMOs
regarding the use of legal strategies are limited. In the causal analysis of organizations
founded between 2003 and 2005, none of the explanatory variables had any effect on
strategy. In the 2000 to 2005 sample, a 10% increase in the net income of the
organization increased the likelihood of using legal strategies as compared to service
provision. However, given the small number of legal organizations in the sample (only
two), any findings here are speculative at best. The findings from 2003-2005 and 20002005 samples, the same increase in net income increases the likelihood of adopting
routine political strategies versus service provision by 5% and 6% respectively. This
seems to be supported by the qualitative data for EQNM, but whether the available
income directly contributed to that decision is unclear. The dynamics of leaders and
organizations discussed below seem to be more likely significant factors in this
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determination.
EQNM was funded by a variety of sources, both individual and organizational.
Lambda Legal's initial resources came from a small number of individual contributors.
According to the processes of strategic flexibility noted from Marshall Ganz in Chapter 5,
this should suggest that the organizations had high levels of flexibility given the various
donors involved – as opposed to a single donor which would tie the organization to the
strategic preferences of a single outside entity (Ganz 2000). It is unclear from the data
whether Lambda Legal considered other strategies beyond the legal repertoire adopted.
The interviews with EQNM members, however, suggest that no other strategic options –
specifically Cultural/Expressive or Non-Routine politics – were ever considered: This
was a Routine political organization from the very start (Bach 2012; McElroy 2012).
In Hypothesis #2(a), I propose a “market specialization” dynamic with regard to
strategic development at emergence: That new organizations choose or create strategies
that do not already exist within their social movement context. In the case of Lambda
Legal, there was not another legal organization operating within the movement for
LGBTQ Rights at the time of its emergence. For EQNM, there were other organizations
working in Routine politics ways at the time of its emergence. In fact, some of the
founders came directly from other Routine strategic organizations. Whether this was
considered is unclear. The founders of EQNM, due to the immediate political context to
a potential ballot measure that would repeal the amendments to the Human Rights Act,
viewed Routine politics as the only strategic option.
In Hypothesis #2(b), I suggest that the failure or success of strategies within the
organizational context of the new SMO will affect the choice of strategy. For Lambda
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Legal, founder William Thom was not satisfied with the work of his prior organization,
the Gay Activist Alliance, when he left to found Lambda Legal (Anderson 2006). It is
unclear whether this was instrumental in his decision to craft the new organization with
explicitly legal strategies. In other minority-rights movements, such organizations existed
at the time (NAACP-LDF, MALDEF, and PRLDEF, e.g.). In fact, as shown above, the
example of these organizations served as the platform from which Lambda was founded:
borrowing the language used in other legal organizations' mission statements to craft their
own. These organizations had been successful to varying degrees – NAACP-LDF was
involved in the Brown v. Board of Education case, PRLDEF and MALDEF with various
victories for their respective communities. It is potentially the case (in a familiar
organizational process labeled ‘mimetic isomorphism’) (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) that
the founders of Lambda Legal observed these successes and viewed the implementation
of similar strategies as potentially successful in protecting and expanding the rights of the
LGBTQ community. As stated previously, EQNM did not really consider other strategic
options, and it is likely that the relative success or failure of other organizations using this
or other strategies contributed in its decision to start a new organization, but not in the
form or strategy that it would take. However, the influence of the NGLTF mentioned
previously does suggest a fundamental influence by another organization on the specific
forms of Routine political strategy employed in the early days.
I propose in Hypothesis #3(a) that the previous experiences of SMO founders, in
other organizations and elsewhere, shape the strategies they choose to implement at
emergence. In #3(b), I suggest a similar relationship between the specific skills or
education of the founders on strategy. The explicit training and experience of the
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founding members of Lambda Legal as lawyers and legal professionals very likely
influenced their decisions to start an organization using the courts with respect to
LGBTQ Rights. This is a strategic option that requires specialized training and
experience: Those that lack it are likely prohibited from adopting this strategy, and those
that possess it potentially view this avenue as an effective means of rights-based action.
As discussed in the interview excerpts above, the founders of the EQNM/BRNM were
experienced and trained in the ways of institutional politics. Todd McElroy, a founding
member, was also heavily involved in Democratic Party politics in New Mexico
(McElroy 2012). In response specifically to a question about the use of routine political
strategies, he states:
Our strategy has basically been the same always: for the legislative session itself,
it's visibility. [...] We'd have a Lobby Day in which we motivated folks from
around the state to come to Santa Fe to participate. In terms of preparedness for
the legislative committee hearings, then is establishing credible witnesses, finding
those people, preparing them for testimony. [...] We primarily knew we could get
[our bills] through the House; we knew we could get through the committee
system, maybe to the floor. I think one year we passed the floor sort of
miraculously, but then we failed in the Senate. [...] I'm a pragmatist. And my
political tenet has always been that, when I deal the cards, then I'll make the rules.
But until I make the rules, I have to play the hand that I've been dealt, as well as I
can. [...] Part of the strategy has been that we participated in Democratic Party
politics. We're a loud voice. There are other people that don't want any part of it.
And that's fine. The core leadership over the trajectory of the twenty years were
also Democratic Party activists and leaders. [...] Every year at the legislative
dinner, we buy at least one table. We're there. We have ads in the program books.
'We're here, we're not going away! You're a Democrat. We're Gay. We're
Democrats. We're all together in this!’ And I think it's produced results
(McElroy 2012).

This relationship to party politics and the activist training likely influenced the
determination to use institutional and routine political strategies to achieve EQNM's goals
for the LGBTQ community in New Mexico.
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In Hypothesis #4, I propose a relationship between the particular ideologies and
philosophies of the founders related to the issues surrounding their organization as
influential on strategy at emergence. No data is available for the present research
regarding the personal philosophy, sense of collective identity, or ideology of the
founders of Lambda Legal. For the founders of EQNM, their identification with the
Democratic Party as an effective ally and agent of change for their community likely
reflects a predisposition toward using Routine political strategies. Also, interview
responses suggest that members felt they had a responsibility to be involved in the cause,
and in making the changes in public policy regarding LGBTQ issues. Todd McElroy
states:
I had another conversation earlier this week [about fighting for one's own rights],
and we've always struggled with leadership, with people actively engaging in
New Mexico. I said to [redacted]: 'You know, you're also involved with [a
homeless advocacy organization], but you're not homeless. When you work for a
candidate, you're not that candidate. When you're a [disaster-relief organization]
volunteer, you're not suffering disaster. But when you're an LGBT activist you're
gay [emphasis his]. I mean, that's who you are, that's a very core essence of who
you are.' [...] We're asking people to recognize us as human beings. That's a lot
different than saying, 'I'm hungry,' or 'I need shelter.'
(McElroy 2012).
I've done this work, all my life [...] but I don't do this for me. I'm a white man
with privilege. I make money. I own a house in Santa Fe, New Mexico. I drive a
car. I get to do what I want, I travel, I eat well. But I do it because there is a little
transgendered Navajo on the reservation, and a little softball player in
Alamogordo, and a little faggot here in Albuquerque at [redacted] High School,
and they can't do it for themselves. Not now. Maybe they will be able to. But it's
my responsibility to do it for them. I don't pretend to have their voice. I don't
pretend to speak for them. But I do know that moving the ball forward helps
them (ibid).
On the same topic, George Bach states:
I feel what's missing in our community is the awareness that we actually are a
Civil Rights movement. I was aware of it. I know, I think the folks that were
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active were aware of it (Bach 2012).
In sum, it appears that the founders of EQNM felt a sense of political responsibility to
their community that led them to activism in general. Their experiences with Party
politics potentially influenced their decisions to adopt Routine political strategies.
Table 6-1: Early Cases & Actions Taken by Lambda Legal, 19731976
Amicus Curiae

Counsel (or Co-Counsel) Appearance on
Behalf of Litigant

Cases
Lambda Incorp. (1973)
GSO v. Bonner (1974)

X
X

Dudal v. Codd (1975)
Acafora v. Board of
Education (1973)

X
X

People v. Mehr (1976)

X

Thorstad v. Morgenthau
(?)

X

Burg, Naval Discharge
(?)

X

R. Cruz, INS (?)

X

C. Morales, INS (?)

X

H. Brown, Adoption (?)

X

Enslin v. N. Carolina
(1974)

X

Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, VA (1975)

X

DiStefano v. DiStefano
(1976)

X

People v. Hammel
(1976)

X

The final analysis regarding Lambda Legal and EQNM relates to the persistence
of political strategies by social movement organizations over time. As shown in
interview excerpts, the core strategy of EQNM has remained within the realm of Routine
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politics: proposing and lobbying for legislation, maintaining a visible and prominent
presence in the state legislature and Democratic Party of New Mexico, working on
campaigns for allied candidates, and fighting challengers on the other side of the aisle.
For Lambda Legal, Table 1 presents the initial actions in the earliest days of the
organization in which they were involved, and in what capacity.
According to the 2010 Annual Report, Lambda Legal was – at that time –
currently active as counsel or as providing amicus curiae for 58 cases, including two
cases before the US Supreme Court (Lambda Legal, Annual Report 2010). For the first,
Doe v. Reed, Lambda Legal filed an amicus brief – along with GLAD (Gay & Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders) and the National Center for Lesbian Rights refuting claims
that individuals and organizations supporting legislation aimed at restricting the rights of
LGBTQ persons had been subjected to intimidation by members and organizations of the
LGBTQ community (ibid). The second, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, involved
another amicus brief with GLAD in which the organizations stated that a public
organization requesting financial support from a public university could not discriminate
against potential members on the basis of their sexual behaviors or sexual identity (ibid).
From these two organizations, it appears that the political strategies developed at
emergence – Legal strategies for Lambda Legal and Routine politics for EQNM – have
remained consistently the primary strategies employed. This suggests that prior
presumptions regarding the fluidity of strategy throughout the life of an SMO should be
questioned and re-examined.
I argue that, in keeping with the fundamental finding from the quantitative
analysis that showed resources having at most a limited impact on strategy at emergence,
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the specific findings from the review of Lambda Legal and EQNM suggest that resources
are not clearly influential in determining strategy at emergence. Resources available to
founders are variable between the two SMOs. The archival and interview data do not
clearly suggest that either included resources in their deliberative process. Their
resources did not appear to influence the strategies chosen, or to limit the strategic
choices available to founders. I suggest that the organizational and political context have
limited influence on strategies. However, the key dynamic regarding both resources and
context is the interpretation of those factors by founders. For Lambda, the presence of
other legal SMOs for minority constituents was only influential because William Thom
and others recognized those SMOs in light of their own community and skills as legal
professionals. Without that interpretation, the movement and political context will likely
not matter to SMO founders. The personal skills and histories of SMO founders are the
most influential factors regarding the development of strategy at emergence. I suggest a
renewed focus on the individuals involved in the foundation of SMOs to understand the
various processes occurring at emergence.
Summary
Through the archival, contemporary, and interview data collected and explored in
this chapter, I suggest that the most influential factors in the determination of political
strategy for emerging social movement organizations are the histories and skills of
leaders, along with the relationships to and observations of other movement organizations
operating within the same or other movement contexts. To generalize findings from the
two cases of Lambda Legal and EQNM to all LGBTQ Rights groups or all SMOs is not
possible with such an analysis. However, these findings along with the only limited
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effect of financial resources on political strategy at emergence suggest further exploration
into the dynamics surrounding leaders and organizational diffusion effects on strategy
and other characteristics of SMOs at the time of emergence.
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CHAPTER 7 - ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION ORGANIZATIONS:
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In the following chapter, I use various forms of archival and qualitative data –
including movement histories, organizational literature and documentation, web
resources, publicly-available financial information, leader biographies, newspaper
reports, and secondary interview data – to assess the relationships of organizational and
political context, the personal histories and skills of leaders, and resources on the
development of political strategy by two Animal Rights/Protection organizations: People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Animal Humane of New Mexico
(AHNM). These organizations represent two of the categories of strategy conceptualized
in Chapter 3: Cultural/Expressive Strategies (PETA) and Service Provision (AHNM).
Each is involved in actions directed toward a number of the movement issues discussed
in Chapter 4, including: anti-vivisection/testing, anti-fur/animal fighting/animals for
entertainment, vegetarian/vegan, sheltering/rescue, and population control.
In the following discussion, I first present a brief general overview of the two
organizations. Using the various forms of data discussed above, I provide insight into the
three explanatory factors for each movement: context, leaders, and resources. Second, I
analyze these data using qualitative methods to elaborate the nature of how each factor
influences the development of the strategy employed at emergence. Third, I examine the
strategic continuity of the organizations exploring the early, important or landmark, and
current (as of February 2012) strategic actions of the organization. This analysis of
continuity relates to the theoretical discussion (Chapter 2) regarding the fluidity of
strategy over time. Lastly, I relate the qualitative analysis directly to the hypotheses
155

proposed in Chapter 2 and the findings of the statistical analyses of Chapter 5.
Brief Organizational Overviews: PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico
PETA is currently the largest Animal Rights/Protection organization in the world,
boasting membership of more than 3 million (PETA.org “About PETA”). The
organization consists of a small leadership Board with founder Ingrid Newkirk still at the
helm, both organizationally and symbolically as its most public figure and spokesperson.
PETA describes its efforts as focused on six issues: fighting Animals as Food, Animals as
Clothing, Animals for Experimentation, Animals as Entertainment, increasing pet
adoption and care for companion animals, and protecting wildlife (PETA.org “Issues”).
These are engaged strategically through four departments: the International Grassroots
Campaign develops expressive demonstrations against various targets and provides
media material; the Interactive Media department is responsible for the organization's
various web presences (including PETA.org, the youth-oriented PETA2.org, and the
vegetarian/vegan web resource GoVeg.com); the Major Gifts department which cultivates
individual and estate donations and corporate partnerships and sponsorships; and the
Cruelty Investigations Division, a sophisticated and clandestine operation engaging in
investigations of various targets – slaughterhouses and food production facilities,
cosmetic testing facilities, and scientific laboratories – to gather evidence of cruelty in
various forms (PETA.org “Departments”).
PETA states that it employs two strategies to achieve its goals: outreach and
investigation. Outreach involves the expressive and media strategies discussed above,
while investigation involves the undercover data collection of various facilities. PETA's
annual budget – sourced primarily via individual and corporate contributions,
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merchandise sales, and interest/dividends/royalties – was (for the fiscal year 2010) in
excess of $35 million (PETA “Annual Report 2011”). Its expenses were roughly equal to
their revenue, used in strategic programs, fundraising, and operating/management
expenses (ibid).
Animal Humane of New Mexico (AHNM) is the largest Animal Protection
organization in the state, and is one of the largest non-profit organizations of any kind in
New Mexico. The primary role of AHNM is to provide rescue, shelter, adoption, and
health care services to the abandoned/unwanted/abused pet population of Albuquerque
and the state. The organization presently engages in a variety of service-based programs
to meet these goals. It operates a broad adoption program through three facilities in
Albuquerque, which house hundreds of animals between them (AnimalHumaneNM.org).
All animals arriving at the facilities are housed and given necessary medical attention by
an in-house full service veterinary clinic (which also offers its services to the general
public, with specific attention given to low-income pet owners). The shelters are
designated as “no-kill,” having euthanized very few (less than 10%) of all animals
sheltered, and only in cases of extreme medical or behavioral issues. AHNM also
coordinates a network of clinics and veterinarians (through the SPAY-NM program) to
increase access to spay/neuter services.
Headquartered in Albuquerque since its founding, AHNM has a board of
rotational volunteers and an organizational staff of nearly 400 volunteers (and a few
professional positions). According to its financial statements from the 2011 fiscal year,
the gross revenue of the organization totaled nearly $8 million. Nearly 50% of that
amount came from general contributions, with the remaining half split between adoption
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and health care fees, planned gifts, merchandise sales from its thrift and pet shops, and
special events including the annual “Doggie Dash & Dawdle,” which raised nearly
$200,000 in 2011 (Animal Humane 2011). Two-thirds of the organization's expenses go
to the sheltering, adoption, and health care programs, with the remaining third split
between management expenses and fundraising (ibid).
Organizational and Political Context at Emergence
In this section, I detail the various institutional, cultural, and inter-organizational
dynamics surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the times of emergence for PETA and
AHNM. I discuss the relationships between these outside actors and cultural context on
the emergence of the organizations and the strategies their founders chose to employ. In
the analysis at the end of this chapter, I discuss the influence of organizational and
political context on the formation of political strategy shown by the origin stories of
PETA and AHNM.
PETA: CONTEXT
PETA, founded in Norfolk Virginia in 1980, emerged at a time when the
organizational landscape surrounding Animal Rights/Protection was not a crowded or
overtly activist sector. Most organizations involved in issues of the movement were
shelters or humane societies; the latter of which focused specifically on finding homes for
abandoned or mistreated pets with limited attention paid to cruelty-prevention (notably
by the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals – ASPCA). The largest
Animal Protection organization in operation was the Humane Society of the United
States, which coordinated shelters throughout the country. The first organization utilizing
Legal Strategies on behalf of animals, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, emerged in 1978
(Bekoff 1998). Otherwise, most organizations were small-scale shelters or public
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“Animal Control” departments funded by local and state governments.
The organizations focused explicitly on the rights of animals were operating on
another continent. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in the United Kingdom, which
was the most prominent of these, began operations in the late 1970s. The ALF was
notorious for using violent and criminal tactics to free animals from testing facilities and
to damage those facilities so that they could not engage in any further cruelty (as they
perceived it) (Newkirk 2000). Though never substantiated by the organizations or in any
formal criminal or other proceedings, there have long been rumors of a direct connection
between PETA and the ALF. Most of these propose that PETA operates as the legitimate
“front” organization for the ALF, and funnels money and other resources to them
(Friedan 2005).
In sum, the organizational landscape surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the
time of PETA's emergence in 1980 demonstrated limited variation in strategy: mainly
shelters and rescue operations, with very few Legal or Non-Routine political. In the
general social movement sector surrounding all issues, the organizational landscape was
far more diverse. The population of organizations included many still utilizing the
repertoires of the 1960s (mass mobilization, protest, sit-ins, etc.), routine political
organizations, various newly-emerging organizations employing legal strategies, and
those providing services (particularly in relation to the emerging epidemic and spread of
HIV/AIDS in the 1980s).
The concept of animal rights in the United States was on the normative and
cultural fringe in the 1970s and 1980s. The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 enshrined a
general theme of preventing cruelty in practices related to animals – specifically in the
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production of the food supply, in circuses, in laboratories, in transport, and in the
breeding and selling of pets. However, the US food supply was still heavily dependent
on animals and animal byproducts (dairy, eggs, etc.). Vegetarians represented an
extremely small portion of the population at that time. Frances Moore Lappé published
one of the first widely-distributed and resonant texts on the virtues of a plant-based (nonanimal based) diet, Diet for a Small Planet in 1971. Vegetarian Times, the longestrunning national publication on the issue, began circulating in 1974. Culturally, the
vegetarian diet and lifestyle remained closely-tied to an association with the “hippie” and
counter-cultural movements of the 1960s (Puskar-Pasewicz 2010). In institutional
politics, animals were generally considered under the purview of the US Department of
Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, or (in the case of wildlife) the
Department of the Interior. In sum, the organizations, cultural, and political context
surrounding issues of Animal Rights/Protection in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
geared toward concerns of humane treatment, rescue, and protecting animals from cruelty
within the various contexts of their position as property or food.
ANIMAL HUMANE OF NEW MEXICO: CONTEXT
Animal Humane of New Mexico was founded in Albuquerque in 1965. At this
time, the population of Animal Rights/Protection organizations in the state of New
Mexico was quite limited. Various municipalities operated Animal Control divisions,
usually consisting of a temporary shelter for the intake of abandoned or found animals
(species used as pets – namely cats and dogs), and some areas had formal shelters with
adoption programs. Various small-scale private rescue and shelter operations existed
throughout the state. The only active SMO surrounding issues of Animal
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Rights/Protection was a chapter of the National Audubon Society located in Silver City.
This chapter, incorporated officially in 1968 focused:
To conserve and restore natural ecosystems, focusing on birds, other wildlife, and
their habitats for the benefit of humanity and the earth's biological diversity
(Audubon.org).
Nationally, organizations such as the ASPCA and Humane Society dominated the public
arena surrounding animal treatment. Public and private shelters and rescues were
common in every state. More often than not, these operations focused on “Lost and
Found” services, providing temporary shelter for found animals with limited adoption
services.
This was a time of massive social unrest and mobilization in the United States
surrounding various movements. This was the heart of the “counter-cultural” era and the
protest cycle of the 1960s. The emergence of various forms of non-routine political
strategy – mass protest, sit-ins, boycotts, occupations of university and other public
facilities - dramatically shaped the political and social context of the time. SMOs of all
strategic forms were present, and many were vital players in the political discussions and
conflicts of the day. In sum, the organizational landscape within the Animal
Rights/Protection movement centered on public and private pet rescue and animal control
operations, with limited organizational activity surrounding issues of wildlife protection
and the prevention of cruelty.
The institutional political context was not much different than that discussed
above relating to the 1970s and 1980s surrounding PETA, with the exception that the
Animal Welfare Act had yet to be codified into law. At this time, the laws and processes
associated with animal protection were primarily the purview of state and municipal
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governments. In New Mexico, laws relating to the treatment of animals were codified in
the general state laws, known as the New Mexico Statute Annotated (NMSA). The
compilation of the NMSA applicable at the time was passed in 1953 (the subsequent
NMSA was compiled in 1978). In the 1953 Compilation, the state regulations regarding
animals delegated that authority to municipal governments:
A municipality may: (1) Prohibit cruelty to animals; (2) regulate, restrain, and
prohibit the running at large of any animal within the boundary of the
municipality; (3) provide by ordinance for the impounding and disposition of
animals found running at large. Prior to the time set for disposing of the animals
as provided in the ordinance, the owner my regain possession of the animal by
paying the pound-master all costs incurred in connection with impounding the
animal. (3-18-3)
Cruelty to animals consists of: (a) Torturing, tormenting, depriving of necessary
sustenance, cruelly beating, mutilating, cruelly killing or overriding any animal;
(b) unnecessarily failing to provide any animal with proper food or drink; or (c)
cruelly driving or working any animal when such animal is unfit for labor.
Whoever commits cruelty to animals is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. (30-18-1)
Injury to animals consists of willfully and maliciously poisoning, killing, or
injuring any animal or domesticated fowl which is the property of another.
Whoever commits injury to animals is guilty of a misdemeanor. (30-18-2)
Therefore, in New Mexico in the 1960s, animals were considered to be (1) property, and
(2) only a matter of concern if said property is threatened, the animal is mistreated, or
becomes a public nuisance.
The relative inefficiency of the Animal Control Division of Albuquerque may
have played a role in the development of Service Provision as the strategy at founding for
AHNM. The shelters and operations of the Animal Control Division were not “no-kill”
operations, and were not efficiently providing new homes to the animals that they had
temporarily housed (according to the historical documentation of AHNM). AHNM
claims that Animal Control could only find adoptive homes for 9% of the animals in their
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facilities as of 1972 (AHNM “The Organization: 1965-1980”). The rate was likely not
substantially different seven years prior when the Evans's decided to launch their new
organization. This lack of efficient use of strategy may have been an influence in their
decisions to engage in Service Provision (specifically, rescue and adoption services).
In sum, the political and social context surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at
the time of AHNM's founding contained organizations protecting animals from cruel
treatment, controlling the lost/abandoned pet populations via public departments or
private shelter/rescue operations, and political control of animals only in regard to their
location as property, food-supply inputs, or wildlife.
Biographies, Experiences, and Skills of Organizational Founders
PETA: FOUNDERS
While PETA did not enter the national and international public arena until the
“Silver Springs Monkeys” case in 1981 (to be revisited in the analysis of strategic
continuity later in the chapter), the organization engaged in strategic action as early as
1980. Two acquaintances with diverse experiences in the movement for Animal
Rights/Protection (both offered a different toolkit of skills) founded the organization.
No-one is more synonymous with PETA than co-founder and current President Ingrid
Newkirk. Born in Surrey, UK, in 1949, Newkirk is the daughter of upper-middle class
English parents who worked internationally while she was a young child. She reportedly
worked alongside her mother in New Delhi, India, at the leper colony founded by Mother
Theresa (IngridNewkirk.com). She moved with her family to Florida at the age of
eighteen, and then on to Washington D.C., where she worked at a local kennel following
an experience with abandoned kittens at a euthanizing shelter (ibid). Later, she became
an Animal Protection Officer for the metropolitan division of animal control, and
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eventually the city's first female “Pound-master.” She became the head of the Animal
Disease Control Division of the Commission of Public Health in Washington D.C. (ibid).
Her professional life prior to the emergence of PETA was that of an institutional insider
and formal agent of social control, in the context of Animal Control and as a deputy
sheriff in Maryland (ibid). While working for the Commission of Public Health, she met
a kindred animal lover and spirit who would ultimately shape her philosophies
surrounding Animal Rights/Protection and partner with her in the founding of PETA.
Alex Pacheco was born in Joliet, Illinois, in 1958. He lived in Mexico for much
of his youth with his family before heading to seminary in Ohio to pursue the priesthood.
While in school in the late 1970s, he was introduced to Singer's Animal Liberation by a
friend and fellow animal lover. The book led Pacheco to adopt the ideology of the
inherent rights of animals and was instrumental in his early activist career on campus.
He left seminary and attended The Ohio State University. While there, he engaged in
various actions directed toward stopping animal cruelty and advocating for animal rights.
In a heavily agricultural area of the country, Pacheco often felt that his work was at best
dismissed, and at worst, often met with violent resistance (Guillermo 1993). In early
1980, Newkirk and Pacheco met at a local shelter, where, in time, he gave Newkirk a
copy of Singer's Animal Liberation. The book also greatly affected her attitudes towards
animal rights and the issues surrounding their protection. PETA, as an organization,
began with the two of them in an apartment, incorporating a small gathering of likeminded friends and activists (Galkan 2007).
Details of the earliest PETA actions (presented in the analysis of strategic
continuity at the end of the chapter) can only be found through a search of local DC-area
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news outlets in 1980 and 1981. PETA does not discuss any action prior to the “Silver
Springs Monkeys” case in 1981 in their official organizational publications. Prior to that
case, PETA was involved in a variety of protests aimed at convincing political leaders and
community members to stop (what they viewed as) cruel abuses of animals in butcher
shops, federal spaces, and public policies. These early actions were not simply aimed at
instrumental goals such as shutting down shops or changing policy, but were overtly
directed at shaping public opinion surrounding the treatment of animals in society. In
their first action – the protest and attempt to close DC's only “live-kill” poultry shop
(Arrow Live Poultry Company) - PETA activist Karen Jackson was quoted as stating:
This is just another element of social justice. You know, it's just like the way the
blacks and the Jews were oppressed," she said. "It diminishes society if you
exploit [the chickens]. It's just one more of the social injustices. We deny animals
the right to live in an environment that doesn't oppress them (Washington Post
6/26/1980).
This shows a clear effort to frame the use of animals as food as a civil rights issue, by
invoking the civil rights “master frame” (Snow & Benford 1992). The protest was
explicitly moral, and aimed at generating – via media coverage and interactions with
passers-by – the “hot cognition” and indignation needed to address such issues of
perceived injustice (Gamson 1980). Subsequent events utilized similar strategies and
framing of the issues in the context of the poisoning of pigeons around federal buildings,
regulations regarding the withholding of water from cattle prior to slaughter, the use of
animal testing by the National Institute of Health, and a protest at the Canadian Consulate
regarding the practices of government-sponsored seal hunts.
The founders of PETA were not career activists with extensive experiences in
other SMOs. Ingrid Newkirk worked in shelters, the formal Animal Control divisions in
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Washington DC, and in law enforcement. This work history provided a specific set of
skills and insider knowledge into the operation of various institutions and organizations
working around issues of animal control and protection. Her “activist toolkit,” however,
was likely neither substantial nor formally-trained through prior SMO experience. Alex
Pacheco had been involved in limited activism in his college years, but had not held
formal roles in SMOs surrounding animals or any other issues at this time. A key
element to the formation of PETA and the strategies employed appears to be the shared
influence of the philosophy of animal rights in Pete Singer's Animal Liberation.
Potentially, this shared ideology regarding the treatment of animals as beings with rights
worthy of protection was a factor in developing an expressive and cultural strategy.
ANIMAL HUMANE OF NEW MEXICO: FOUNDERS
As is the case of many SMOs, the founding of Animal Humane of New Mexico is
a story of a small group of passionate, committed individuals in their homes deciding that
(a) something is wrong, and (b) they should do something about it. In this case, those
individuals were Albuquerque residents Thelma and Col. Edmund Evans. The Evans'
journey began as early members of the Taxpayers Anti-Cruelty Federation of New
Mexico in 1965. Soon, they were in charge of the nascent organization meeting in their
home, which had changed its name and incorporated as Animal Humane of New Mexico
in November of 1968. The organization began simply as a “Lost and Found” service for
pets. One year later, according to its initial Mission Statement, the organization had
transitioned to providing injured animal rescues, continuing “Lost & Found” services,
advocacy for animal protective laws, and investigating cases of cruelty. Generally, it
sought to “protect animals from the abuses of people” (AHNM “Our Founders”).
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Thelma Evans was a farmer's daughter in rural Kansas. She worked as a secretary
until her retirement in the 1950s. She was a woman small in stature, but described as
“having the determination of a pit bull” by future Board president Bob Wolf (AHNM
“Our Founders). Her husband, Col. Edmund Evans, retired in the 1950s following a
career which included time as the Commandant of a secretive nuclear facility in New
Mexico. They founded Animal Humane of New Mexico at their kitchen table after an
experience with an abandoned dog that changed their attitudes towards animals and their
needs in the community (ibid).
In the first two years of operation (1966-1967), the organization boarded and
subsequently adopted more than 100 animals (mostly cats and dogs). In 1969, it
instituted an adoption fee of $24 to cover the costs associated with boarding. The
primary source of revenue prior to these fees was direct contributions from members. In
1965, the organization consisted of only four members: Thelma and Col. Edmund Evans,
and two others. By 1968, membership had grown to 362 members, and by 1980 it was
4,000 strong (Animal Humane “Our Founders”). This was a rapidly growing
organization, in terms of members, resources, and services provided. From the start,
Animal Humane proved it was a very capable rescue and adoption service relative to the
institutional Animal Control Division of Albuquerque. In 1972, while Animal Control
was only able to service adoptions for 9% of its boarded animal population, Animal
Humane's rate of adoption was more than 50% (ibid), leading to a much lower rate of
euthanasia by comparison.
The founders of AHNM were not activists when they formed this new
organization in 1965. Their personal biographies and careers seem to have little relation
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to the world of activism as we generally conceptualize it. The key moment in their
development of the organization and their decision to employ a strategic repertoire of
Service Provision has been described as a particularly emotional attachment to a
lost/abandoned dog they decided to care for in their home in the early 1960s. While
information about the Evans's is limited to the official documents provided by the
organization – they passed away in 1988 (Col. Edmund) and 2003 (Thelma Evans)
respectively, and thus could not be interviewed for this research – they do not appear to
have been directly influenced by participating in any other SMOs or institutional agencies
related to animal protection.
PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico: Initial Resources
In the exploratory analyses presented in Chapter 5, I propose various relationships
between financial resources and the development of political strategy by SMOs. The data
for PETA and AHNM regarding their resources at the time of emergence is available
primarily through organizational documentation, as official 990 forms cannot be publicly
accessed for the earliest years for these organizations. There is little information
provided by PETA as to their resources available at the time of founding. It may be
posited that its resource base was limited from the discussions about the organization's
founding given by Newkirk in various interviews: She describes the initial meetings as
taking place in a small, cold, two-bedroom apartment (Galkan 2007). Early media
depictions of the organization describe “few activists” with placards.
AHNM reports that in its first year of operation (1965), the organization operated
out of the Evans's private residence with an operating budget of $125, and four members.
Expenses were roughly $100, which represents a very limited resource base in financial
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and other terms at the time of the organization's founding. From December of 1966 to
December 1997, 124 animals were processed for adoption through AHNM. The
organization did not have its own sheltering facilities at the time, so all animals were
housed in various shelters and veterinary facilities in the area (AHNM “A Bit of
History”). After two years, the budget rose to more than $2,000 in 1967 (ibid) and
membership grew to 362 by the end of 1968. In the first years, the organization risked
“going broke” (ibid), with most of the organization's money coming from adoption fees
and individual contributions. AHNM did not have an administrative location until 1969,
when they purchased property – still their current primary facility – for $26,500 (ibid).
The organization built its first sheltering, adoption processing, and veterinary clinic
facilities on site in 1977 following an estate gift which funded construction (ibid). In
sum, for both PETA and AHNM, it does not appear that a significant coffer of resources
was at the founders' disposal at emergence.
Qualitative Analysis: Processes of Strategic Development at Emergence
In the following analysis, I use the archival and organizational data presented
above to discuss the relationships proposed in Chapter 2 – i.e., the hypotheses relating to
the influence of context and leaders on strategy. I do so in order to build upon the
findings of the statistical analysis of Chapter 5, and to explore the dynamics of strategic
continuity over time for these movement organizations.
In Hypothesis #1, I propose a relationship between the amount of resources
available to movement founders and the source of those resources as factors contributing
to the choice of political strategy at emergence for social movement organizations. In the
data for PETA, there is little concrete information regarding the resources available to the
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founders at that time. However, it appears that they had no explicit meeting space,
limited financial resources, and a few members – somewhere between five and thirty
depending on media reports. Resources may have played a part in strategic development
– the lack of resources may have inhibited more “costly” strategies such as Routine
Politics, Legal Strategies, Service Provision, or Organizational Funding. However, given
the data, I am unable to attribute any firm weight to the effect of resources on strategy in
this case. For AHNM, it operated with only four members and $125 for its first year of
existence: a clear lack of resources by any measure. Nonetheless, the founders chose to
employ Service Provision – sheltering and adoption services – despite its apparent costs.
This suggests that perhaps, in this case, resources did not inhibit the choice of a costly
strategy – the organization even claims it was on the verge of “going broke” in those
early years. For both organizations, all resources came from members originally, and
thus no comparison can be drawn in terms of the effect of their source on strategy. It
does appear, in both cases, that it was possible that none of the strategies were prohibitive
based on the source of resources.
The findings in the statistical analysis regarding financial resources and strategy
for movement organizations at emergence largely mirror those discussed above. In
Chapter 5, when analyzing the recent samples (organizations with 2000-2005 and 20032005 Ruling Dates), no statistically-significant effect was found for Contribution Funding
Source. This suggests – as is found in the qualitative analysis - that the dynamics
proposed by Ganz regarding flexibility on strategy have no effect in this analysis (Ganz
2000). The other findings of the statistical analysis suggest that increases in the net
income and the overall fund balance of an organization increases the likelihood of using
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Routine Politics or Organizational Funding strategies as compared to Service Provision.
The use of Service Provision despite a lack of resources by AHNM does not refute this
finding. However, nothing in the qualitative data suggests that this lack of resources led
the founders to opt not to use Routine Politics or Organizational Funding strategies. The
findings of the full sample of Animal Rights/Protection organization and exploratory
models find a similar lack of effect between the source of resources and strategic choice.
The net income of the organization appears to be related to the use of Non-Routine versus
Service Provision (negatively) and Cultural/Expressive versus Service Provision
(positively). The qualitative data, which show a lack of resources for both PETA and
AHNM, cannot corroborate or refute these findings.
With Hypothesis #2(a), I propose a “market specialization” dynamic with regard
to strategic development at emergence: That new organizations choose or create
strategies that do not already exist within their social movement context. In the case of
PETA, there was not another Cultural/Expressive organization within the Animal
Rights/Protection movement at that time: Most organizations were Service Providers or
engaged in Routine Politics, with one Legal organization. It is possible that this lack of
such an organization influenced the choice of expressive strategies over others so as to
create a niche within the market of SMOs. However, data explicitly suggesting this is not
available for this research, and I cannot draw strong conclusions. It is plausible that this
dynamic shaped their choice of strategy. For AHNM, there were numerous other small
shelters in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico at the time, so the Service Provision
strategy was not absent in their market or organizational context. It does appear that the
organizational sector surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the time did include
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numerous other Service organizations, and thus this “crowding” would suggest they
would potentially opt for another strategy.
In Hypothesis #2(b), I suggest that the failure or success of strategies within the
organizational context of the new SMO will affect the choice of strategy. For PETA,
other Animal Rights/Protection organizations were not necessarily viewed as failed or
successful, but rather not engaging in the same “fight.” In its “History” section on
PETA.org, the organization states:
Before PETA existed, there were two things that you could do if you wanted to
help animals. You could volunteer at a local animal shelter, or you could donate
money to a humane society. While many of these organizations did useful work
to bring comfort to animals who are used by humans, they didn't question why we
kill animals for their flesh or their skins or why we use them for tests of new
product ingredients or for our entertainment (PETA.org “History”).
This could be interpreted as an assessment of failure of other organizations. Thus, PETA
provides limited support to this hypothesis. AHNM does not explicitly discuss the failure
or success of other organizations, but does note the inefficiency of the formal Animal
Control Division in Albuquerque around the time of the organization's emergence. This
suggests that the possible lack of effective Service Provision by institutional actors
influenced the founders to opt for the same strategy in the hopes of doing a better job
delivering those needed services.
With Hypothesis #3(a), I suggest a relationship between the experiences, in other
organizations and elsewhere, of SMO founders on the strategies at emergence. The
founders of PETA did not have extensive experience as activists or within other social
movement organizations. As such, their organizational “toolkits” were likely not well
developed. Pacheco had limited activist experience, which he likely brought to the new
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organization. Newkirk had insider or institutional experience, having worked in Animal
Control and law enforcement capacities prior to her involvement as a founder of PETA.
That knowledge and perception of those institutions as failing to adequately protect
animals from harm perhaps had some influence on the new organization, though its effect
on the choice of strategy is difficult to determine. The founders of AHNM – Col.
Edmund and Thelma Evans – had no experience in Animal Rights/Protection activism
prior to founding AHNM. Their personal experiences were in the military and office
work, respectively. Thus, it is difficult to determine if any prior experiences – beyond the
emotional story of their attachment to a lost dog they sheltered prior to founding AHNM
– had any role in the development of Service Provision as their chosen strategy. These
same data insights suggest that the unique professional or organizational skills of the
founders of either organization had little to no influence on their choice of strategy
(Hypothesis #3(b)).
In Hypothesis #4, I propose a relationship between the particular ideologies and
philosophies of the founders related to the issues surrounding their organization as
influential on strategy at emergence. A key insight in the development of the parameters
of PETA and its use of Expressive strategies to change cultural and social norms
surrounding animals appears to be the shared reading and incorporating of the
philosophies in Singer's Animal Liberation. Without this shared idea of animals as beings
worthy of rights and the protection of those rights, it is possible that the shape of PETA's
actions – both at founding and now – would not be as they are. For AHNM, there does
not appear to be any clear connection to identity or ideology from the founders to the
strategy employed at emergence.
173

Table 7-1: PETA Actions – Early, Landmark, and Current
Early

Landmark

Current

06/26/1980
Arrow Live Poultry Company
(Washington D.C.)
--Protesting cruelty in
slaughtering practices

09/11/1981
Silver Springs Monkey Case (Silver
Springs, MD)
--Covert Investigation of laboratory
animal testing

“Bannering:”
-- involves unfurling huge
banners in public
displaying graphic images
& anti-cruelty messages

09/12/1980
Hidden Oaks Nature Center
(Annandale, VA)
--Protesting skinning and tanning
exhibition

2002
Production of the “Meet Your Meat”
documentary
--Graphic video intended to change
attitudes re: animal consumption

“Ink Not Mink” / “I'd
Rather Go Naked”
--Media campaigns w/
scantily-clad celebrities to
oppose wearing fur/leather

11/12/1980
US Department of Agriculture
(Washington D.C.)
--Deliver Petition re: withholding
water from cattle

2004-2005
Tyson Foods Investigation
--Covert investigation of cruelty at
chicken processing plants

“Ringling Bros. Beats
Animals”
--Campaign exposing
cruel training practices of
circus animals

01/10/1981
US General Services
Administration (Washington D.C.)
--Protesting poisoning of pigeons
at Federal Buildings
03/15/1981
Canadian Consulate (Washington
D.C.)
--Protesting federal protection of
seal hunts
04/30/1981
National Institute of Health
(Washington D.C.)
--Protesting general use of animals
for various testing purposes

The final analysis regarding PETA and AHNM relates to the persistence of
political strategies by social movement organizations over time. In the cases of PETA
and AHNM, this appears to be the case. Table 1 shows the early, landmark, and current
actions of PETA, to demonstrate that little has changed in their strategic repertoire from
1980 to 2012 (AP 1981, Kendall 1980, 1981, Mansfield 1981a, 1981b, McQueen 1980,
White 1981).
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The campaigns and events in Table 1 suggest that the fundamental strategic
repertoire of PETA – namely the use of public action geared toward changing attitudes
and behaviors surrounding the use, protection, and rights of animals – has not changed
significantly over time. The initial actions were public protests directed toward media
attention and the halting of practices the activists considered to be cruel – live-kill
butchery, poisoning of “nuisance” animals, testing for medical purposes, and seal hunts.
The major landmark actions of PETA represent a similar adherence to Expressive
strategic actions.
The “Silver Springs Monkeys” case was a covert investigation by Alex Pacheco
into the use of monkeys in laboratory testing. The animals were subjected to various
physical strains and unnecessary medical procedures to test their responses to losing the
control over their limbs (Guillermo 1993). The video data collected by Pacheco was used
to free the animals and indict the lead researcher – Dr. Edward Taub – on charges of
animal cruelty. Taub was convicted on six counts, though all were subsequently
overturned. PETA did, however, create enough pressure to force Congressional hearings
on animal testing and cruelty that garnered massive public exposure for the organization
and its cause (Guillermo 1993). A similar investigation at Tyson Foods yielded more
publicity, but no major changes to policy or treatment.
Another landmark for PETA was the production and distribution of the “Meet
Your Meat” documentary film, which seeks to expose viewers to the conditions and
practices involved in the production of animal-related foods. PETA offers free DVDs of
the film, and its YouTube page touts thousands of views. Current PETA campaigns
include targeting Ringling Brothers and other circuses for harsh and harmful practices in
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the training of animals for performance, the use of celebrities in various states of undress
in the “Ink, Not Mink” and “I'd Rather Go Naked than Wear Fur/Leather” media
campaigns, and the use of “Bannering,” where large images and slogans are unfurled in
public places to maximize the spread of the message to the public (PETA.org
“Campaigns”).
Animal Humane of New Mexico began as a small Lost & Found shelter, rescue
and adoption operation. Through the years they have expanded in scope and capacity, but
the fundamental strategy remains the same: shelter, find homes, and provide medical care
for unwanted animals. It currently engages in public outreach programs – notably
regarding “trouble” breeds such as Pit Bull Terriers – but its primary focus and resourceoutput remains on Service Provision. This suggests that prior presumptions regarding the
fluidity of strategy throughout the life of an SMO should be questioned and re-examined.
The two pairs of founders for Animal Humane of New Mexico and PETA
represent vastly different prior experiences and activist “toolkits.” In the case of PETA,
the philosophical foundation of Animal Liberation greatly influenced their approach to
Animal Rights/Protection work and the content of their strategic efforts. The Evans’
story prior to founding Animal Humane of New Mexico is devoid of SMO activity or any
clear ideological connection to other Animal Rights/Protection actions. Their efforts
were built from a sympathy and emotional attachment to the unwanted animals in their
community. As was the case with the LGBTQ Rights SMOs examined in Chapter 6, the
role of resources and context are only influential in light of their interpretation by
founders. The founders of PETA explicitly viewed a movement landscape not engaging
in a fight for animal rights, and thus determined the necessity of their action. The context
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mattered, but only in so much as they interpreted the SMO landscape as insufficient
regarding their goals. For the founders of Animal Humane of New Mexico, they viewed
an institution – the Animal Control Division – that should have done the work of
sheltering and caring for abandoned/lost/neglected animals, as inefficient. Thus, their
presence as effective service providers was necessary to their goals of caring for this
population. Resources, for both, were scarce. Again, as was the case in Chapter 6, it
does not appear that this inhibited their choice of strategy, or was necessarily even part of
the determination of strategy at emergence.
Summary
Using the qualitative data and analysis of PETA and Animal Humane of New
Mexico, I suggest that the organizational context, specifics of the biographies and skills
of leaders, and the resources available to founders shape the strategic decisions made for
new movement SMOs. While clear causal explanations are limited by the data, these
case studies serve to both elaborate the findings of the statistical analysis and further
explore the dynamics involved in the development of strategy during organizational
foundation. To generalize these findings to a large sample of movement organizations is
not suggested, given the limited number of organizations examined and the data
limitations involved. However, the processes described above suggest future research
into the dynamics of organizational strategy at emergence.
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CHAPTER 8 - SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS
In this final chapter, I summarize the specific and general findings of the
quantitative and qualitative analyses regarding the relationships between resources,
leaders, and context on the development of political strategy by SMOs at the time of
emergence. I utilize a mixed-method approach and theoretically- and empiricallygrounded hypotheses to explore these relationships for SMOs involved in the movements
for LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection. In the next section, I detail the specific
findings of the analyses in relation to the hypotheses and core arguments of the research.
In the sections to follow, I discuss the implications of the present research for theory
regarding the dynamics of emergence for SMOs, for the methodological approaches to
studies of SMOs, and for current and potential activists regarding the development of
their own (or potential) movement efforts.
Summary of Findings: Resources and Strategy at Emergence
The multiple samples and models included in the quantitative analysis regarding
the development of strategy at emergence involve exploratory explanations regarding the
relationship between financial resources and strategy. The first finding relates to the
inclusion of two oft-excluded strategic categories into the conceptualization of movement
strategy: Service Provision and Organizational Funding. As discussed in Chapters 2 and
3, these two strategic repertoires are not often included in discussions and analyses of
SMOs, but do conceptually represent modes of action consistent with the goals and
organizational characteristics of SMOs. In both the full sample and the two samples of
recently-emerging organizations within the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights
movements, Service Provision represents the largest category of organizations. For both
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movements in the full sample, Service Provision organizations constitute 87.5% of the
distribution of cases. In the 2003-2005 and 2000-2005 samples of recently-emerging
organizations, the distributions are 92% and 90%, respectively. Organizational Funding
groups constitute nearly 5% of the distribution in the full sample, which represents the
third-largest category behind Service Provision and Cultural/Expressive action. In the
samples of recently-emerging organizations, Funding groups are the second-largest
category (behind Service Provision), with 3% and 4%, respectively. Therefore, including
these two strategic repertoires into the conceptualization of SMO strategy increases the
variation on that key characteristic, and expands the universe of potential cases of study
substantially.
The specific statistical findings on the relationship between financial resources
and strategy are both exploratory (in the full sample) and represent some causal weight
(from the samples of recently-emerging SMOs). For the analyses of recently-emerging
organizations from both movements, the following findings emerge. For the sample of
organizations with a Ruling Date between 2003 and 2005: An increase in net income
suggests an increase in the odds of Routine politics relative to Service Provision, and an
increase in the fund balance suggests an increase in the odds of Organizational Funding
compared to Service Provision. In the 2000-2005 Ruling Date sample: An increase in net
income suggests an increased odds of using Routine politics or Legal strategies (though
the presence of only two legal organizations makes this finding fairly insignificant), and
an increase in the fund balance suggests an increase in the odds of Organizational
Funding compared to Service Provision. In both samples, the ratio measures of
Contribution Funding Base and Fiscal Instability showed no significant effects on
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strategy.
From the full sample including both movements and all possible strategies, I
suggest the following relationships: There are no effects of Contribution Funding Base or
Fiscal Instability, an increase in income is related to an increase in odds of Routine
politics and Organizational Funding compared to Service Provision, and an increase in
fund balance is related to a decrease in odds of Routine politics, Cultural/Expressive
actions, and Funding relative to Service Provision.
For both movements with Service Provision removed: An increase in Contribution
Funding Base increases the odds of Non-Routine politics over Cultural/Expressive
actions, an increase in net income decreases the odds of Non-Routine politics and
increases the odds of Routine politics compared to Cultural/Expressive action, and an
increase in the fund balance is related to an increase in the odds of Organizational
Funding compared to Cultural/Expressive action.
In the model of all Animal Rights/Protection organizations, I suggest the
following relationships: An increase in Fiscal Instability relates to slight decrease in the
odds of Organizational Funding over Service Provision, an increase in net income
suggests a decrease in the odds of Non-Routine politics and an increase in
Cultural/Expressive action over Service Provision. For the model excluding Service
Providers: An increase in Contribution Funding Base suggests an increase in the odds of
Non-Routine and Legal strategies relative to Organizational Funding, and an increase in
net income suggests a decrease in both Non-Routine and Legal strategies relative to
Funding.
For the analysis of the LGBTQ Rights organizations, I suggest the following: An
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increase Contribution Funding Base relates to a decrease in the odds of
Cultural/Expressive action versus Service Provision, an increase in net income suggests
an increase in odds of Routine politics and Organizational Funding relative to Service
Provision, and an increase in the fund balance suggests a decrease in Non-Routine,
Routine, Cultural/Expressive, and Organizational Funding strategies compared to Service
Provision. The model excluding Service Providers suggests that an increase in
Contribution Funding Base increases the odds of Non-Routine, Routine, and
Organizational Funding relative to Cultural/Expressive strategies, an increase in net
income relates to an increase in the odds of Routine politics and Organizational Funding,
and an increase in the overall fund balance suggests a decrease in Routine politics relative
to Cultural/Expressive strategies. Table 8-1 summarizes the findings listed above,
showing the effects of increases in the independent variables on strategy for each model
(RP = Routine Politics; NR = Non-Routine Politics; CE = Cultural/Expressive Strategies;
L = Legal Strategies; OF = Organizational Funding).
In all of the models of the exploratory full sample and the causal recentlyemerging organizations, some regional effects are significant in the analyses. However,
the mechanisms that are involved in these regional effects cannot be determined from
these data, and thus they are not considered significant findings for this research.
The work of Marshall Ganz (2000) suggests that the ratio of contributions from members
– versus single donors or outside funding agencies – influences the strategic flexibility of
SMOs. Namely, that an SMO with a single outside donor responsible for a greater
percentage of finances and resources will be more constrained strategically: That SMO
can only engage in actions viewed as legitimate and acceptable by that single outside
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donor. SMOs that derive a greater percentage of resources from member contributions,
on the other hand, have greater flexibility due to this diversification of funding sources
and direct involvement of the contributors. The statistical findings in Chapter 5 suggest
that this ratio may not be as influential as Ganz’s work suggests. In the samples of
recently-emerging SMOs (2000-2005 and 2003-2005), there is no statistically-significant
relationship between the Contribution Funding Base and the strategy at emergence. For
these SMOs, it does not appear that their strategic flexibility is at all influenced by the
source of their finances.
The relationship between Net Income and the increased odds of using Routine
Politics is the most consistent finding across the samples in these analyses. As seen in
Table 8-1, this relationship is statistically-significant in nearly every sample. Due to the
limitations of these analyses, it is unclear exactly what this relationship suggests about
finances and Routine Politics. It is possible that either (a) SMOs who engage in Routine
Politics require a greater coffer of resources prior to determining to use this strategy at
emergence, or (b) that once an SMO chooses to use Routine Politics, they actively engage
in greater fundraising efforts to defray the (anticipate or real) costs of this strategy. Either
of these plausible explanations suggests that Routine Politics is interpreted as a resourceheavy strategy. The objective costs of this strategy are likely variable, based on the
number of activists engaged in lobbying efforts, travel costs, promotional materials, and
other related actions. It does appear from these analyses that founders likely interpret
Routine Politics as resource-dependent as compared to Service Provision (in most
models), Cultural/Expressive Strategies, or Organizational Funding.
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Table 8-1: Summary of Findings from Quantitative Analyses (Chapter 5)*
2003- 2000- Full:
Full:
Full:
Full:
Full:
Full:
2005
2005 AR/P
AR/P
LGBTQ LGBTQ
Both
Both (w/o
(w/Svc) (w/o Svc) (w/Svc)
(w/o Svc) (w/Svc) Svc)
Contribution
Funding
Base
Fiscal
Instability
Net Income
(Logged)
Fund
Balance
(Logged)
Service
Provision
Frequency

0

0

0

↑ NR, L

↓ CE

↑ NR,
RP, OF

0

↑ RP

0

0

↓ OF

0

0

0

0

0

↑ RP

↑ RP,
L

↓ NR,
↑ CE

↓ NR, L

↑ RP,
OF

↑ RP, OF

↑ RP,
OF

↓ NR,
↑ RP

↑ OF

↑ OF

0

0

↓ NR,
CE, OF

↓ RP

↓ RP,
CE, OF

↑ OF

92%

90%

94.4%

N/A

50.6%

N/A

87.5%

N/A

*All of the above models use Service Provision as the reference category except: Full AR/P w/o
Svc (Organizational Funding = Reference), Full LGBTQ w/o Svc & Full Both w/o Svc (Cultural /
Expressive Strategy = Reference)

Using the qualitative data and comparative analysis of the two LGBTQ Rights
organizations – Lambda Legal and Equality New Mexico – and the two Animal
Rights/Protection organizations – PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico – I suggest
that the importance of resources in the decisions regarding strategy at SMO emergence is
limited in most cases. Except for EQNM, which had a substantial financial and labor
base at its founding due to strong organizational connections with pre-existing groups,
the other organizations operated with miniscule initial budgets and very few members.
This did not clearly seem to inhibit the strategic choices they made as they developed the
new organizations. EQNM’s use of routine politics echoes the quantitative findings of
recently-emerging SMOs in that increases in finances are associated with an increased
likelihood of routine politics relative to service provision. However, as is shown below, it
183

is not clear from the qualitative analysis that the presence of substantial resources played
a major role in the determination of strategy. It is difficult to determine this causal link
from these data, however, so I suggest further research with other – perhaps newly
emerging at the present time – organizations in an in-depth, possibly ethnographic
method to determine exactly the mechanism between resources and strategy.
Summary of Findings: Leaders/Founders and Strategy at Emergence
The relationship between the characteristics, histories, experiences, and
skills/education/training of organizational founders and leaders appears to have the
strongest determining effect on the development of strategy by emerging SMOs. This
appears particularly true for the founders of the LGBTQ Rights organizations. The
founders and original members of Lambda Legal were all experienced and trained legal
professionals and lawyers. They had some past experiences in SMOs using other
strategies, but it seems reasonable to presume that this specific skill-set was instrumental
in their decisions to become legal advocates on behalf of the LGBTQ community. The
founders of EQNM had long histories in activism, and particularly in engaging in
lobbying and other Routine political tactics in New Mexico surrounding LGBTQ Rights
through other organizations. According to interviews with founders, other strategies were
never considered: They worked within the institutional political arena because that was
where they viewed the fight to be occurring, and was the toolkit they all possessed.
In the Animal Rights/Protection organizations, the effect was not as clear due to
both a lack of available data and a lack of any clear movement-specific characteristics of
founders. For the founders of PETA, their past limited experiences in activism and their
experience as institutional insiders in Animal Control departments did impart a sense of
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inefficiency in terms of animal protection and a limited activist toolkit. The founders of
Animal Humane of New Mexico had no background in SMOs, and no clear connection to
other Service Provision institutions or organizations. Given that the organization was
founded in 1965 and the original members are no longer alive, it was impossible to gather
sufficient data, however, to truly make any claims regarding their skills or experiences.
Summary of Findings: Organizational/Political Context and Strategy at Emergence
In the hypotheses regarding the relationship between the organizational and
political contexts for organizations involved in LGBTQ Rights and Animal
Rights/Protection issues, I suggested that the “market-space” available to organizations
and the success and failure of other SMOs influence the decisions of founders on the
development of strategy at emergence. The findings on these hypotheses from the
qualitative data are mixed. For Lambda Legal, the organizational context surrounding
LGBTQ Rights was still emerging and growing in the wake of the Stonewall riots. There
did not exist, at that time, any other legal advocacy organization working on behalf of
that community. The founders did, however, explicitly use the example and specific
official documentation of other legal advocacy groups working for the rights of other
minority constituencies – most notably the PRLDEF – to form the by-laws, mission, and
documents of incorporation for their new organization. The founders of EQNM were
heavily influenced by preceding organizations in New Mexico – most importantly the
Coalition for Equality – and influence from outside organizations in terms of training for
political work (primarily from the NGLTF). Without those organizations, the
interviewees involved in this research suggested that their specific movement actions
would likely have taken a different form.
185

The founders of PETA appear to have been most influenced by the failure of other
Animal-related organizations to even address the issue of animal rights. Their
organizational literature suggests that they were unsatisfied with the options available to
those interested in helping animals in the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Those
options, they state, only included volunteering at a shelter or donating to a humane
society. The options did not include, however, advocating for the protection of all
animals from harm and their basic rights as living beings. It is unclear how the Evans
viewed the success or failure of other Animal Rights/Protection Service Provider
organizations in New Mexico from the collected data. It does appear from the
organizational history that there was a conscious understanding by the founders and early
members of Animal Humane of New Mexico that the city's Animal Control division was
not doing enough to rescue, protect, or re-home the animals processed through their
department. This lack of effective service provision by institutional actors does seem to
have been a key component of the development of their new organization.
In the following sections, I discuss the implications of the quantitative and
qualitative analyses of the development of political strategy at the founding of Animal
Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights organizations on existing and future theory in the
study of social movements, the methodological approaches available to scholars
empirically evaluating SMOs, and suggestions for how these findings may be useful for
those involved in current or future SMOs.
Implications: Theory and Social Movements
As initially discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this research, one of my efforts in
this project was to improve and expand our conceptualization of those organizations
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classified as social movement organizations. In most of the literature, SMOs are viewed
as overtly political organizations, engaged in some variant of routine or non-routine
political strategy. However, including other types of organizations – those engaging in
providing services directly to potential constituents and beneficiaries of the movement,
those engaging in explicitly expressive and normative action, those fighting for justice
and change in the courts, and those organizations who serve the necessary function of
acting as a conduit for resources to other organizations via funding programs – expands
the scope of organizations pursuing the general goals of social movements. By narrowly
focusing on only those employing routine and non-routine tactics, we ignore various
other ways in which activists and citizens can engage in pursuing movement goals. The
largest category of organizations involved in LGBTQ Rights and Animal
Rights/Protection issues are Service Providers. The exclusion of those organizations,
along with the often-excluded Organizational Funding groups, greatly reduces the
universe of cases available to our inquiries. Their inclusion may suggest that many of our
previous findings regarding the internal and external dynamics of SMOs should perhaps
be re-examined.
Another implication of this research is that the propositions regarding the
importance of resources (notably in the still-prevalent Resource Mobilization
perspective) to the emergence of SMOs should be questioned and further explored
empirically. The roles of leaders and initial founders in emerging SMOs appear to be
fundamental in the development of various characteristics including their political
strategy. Or, agents appear to be at least as critical as structural factors in determining
SMO strategy: At a minimum, how those factors interact must be taken into account.
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While leaders have often been considered important in these processes, our focus on
other factors – resources, political opportunity, organizational diffusion, social networks
among organizations, collective identity – may have obscured their importance in recent
theoretical discussions. Lastly, it is clear from this research that no organization exists or
emerges in a vacuum. The organizational context and connections, both formal and
informal, to pre-existing organizations do play a key role in the development of strategy –
and likely other important characteristics – at the time of organizational foundation. This
suggests further empirical exploration building from the Organizational Diffusion,
Networks, and Organizational Ecology literatures discussed in Chapter 2.
Implications: Methods of Data Collection/Analysis and Social Movements
Despite a variety of data and analytic limitations discussed above, this study’s use
of statistical, archival/secondary, and interview data for exploring the dynamics of
emerging organizational strategy demonstrates the utility of multiple sources of data in
answering our questions of interest. Empirical analyses of SMOs employing statistical
data and quantitative analytic techniques are often only able to demonstrate relationships
of variables to one another, but lack the ability to convincingly elaborate the mechanisms
involved in various organizational processes. In this research, statistical analyses of
Chapter 5 suggest possible relationships between financial resources and strategy at
emergence. Limitations of data collection temper this study’s ability to show how
financial resources are taken into account, interpreted, and seen as prohibitive (or not
prohibitive) to those involved in forming new SMOs. These data and analyses help with
an overview of the sample of cases, and suggest some dynamics that may be involved,
but are unable to explore the complexities of the intra- and inter-organizational dynamics
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involved in the development of strategy.
In turn, the small-N qualitative approach is limited in its ability to generalize
beyond a small sample of organizations. While this methodological toolkit provides
tremendous depth of understanding and insight into specific mechanisms relating causes
and effects, questions always remain as to whether those insights are unique to the few
cases under review or applicable to a broader population of organizations. By employing
both of these analytic approaches and multiple methods of data collection, I attempt to
capitalize on their respective strengths while mitigating their respective weaknesses.
Future research should, when possible and data are available, employ similar mixedmethod approaches when exploring internal and external SMO dynamics.
Implications: Current and Potential Movement Organizers
Lastly, I propose some implications for those individuals who are currently or
potentially could be involved in the development of social movement organizations.
Through these analyses of LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection organizations, I
suggest that a lack of resources – in terms of money, time, and members – need not be an
insurmountable barrier to the formation of SMOs or to the possibility of sustained
activism. The founders of three of the four organizations in the qualitative analysis faced
varying degrees of resource-deprivation, yet still developed organizations that have
survived for decades. Resource constraints may inhibit costly strategies, but this is not
clear from these analyses. Instead, the key dynamics of organizational development
appear to be the skills, commitment, and histories of those involved in founding new
organizations, and their connections to other organizations in their movement and general
context. In sum, a lack of money is not a sufficient deterrent to forming an organization
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dedicated to various strategic efforts in our contemporary political and social world.
Conclusion: How We Fight
This research began from a theoretical gap in the literature on social movements
in sociology: How and why do movement organizations develop their strategies at the
time of emergence? Through a thorough theoretical review, re-conceptualization of
movement strategy, and mixed-method analyses, I hope to have shed some light into this
previous “black box” of movement emergence. The other seed of this project was a
desire to understand and explore the dynamics of two movements – Animal
Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights – of contemporary resonance in the political and
social world. I believe that this research furthers our understandings of SMOs in these
areas, and improves our general knowledge of organizational dynamics. Lastly, it serves
as a reminder to this researcher that activism, in all of its various strategic forms,
continues to be a vibrant and necessary element of our society. Whether in the streets, the
halls of government, the courts, or clinics: This is how we fight.
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APPENDIX A:
Raw STATA Output for Quantitative Analysis
Table 1: Raw STATA Output - Both Movements, All Strategies
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Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
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Licensed to:
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log likelihood = -2035.6665
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.1718843
.2441723
.1937504

-0.41
-4.64
-1.87

0.679
0.000
0.062

-.4080386
-1.61179
-.7417847

.2657356
-.6546522
.0177029

.0017992
.0000569
.0562229
.0547469
.2499458

-1.67
-2.03
0.86
-3.47
-6.09

0.094
0.042
0.388
0.001
0.000

-.0065365
-.0002275
-.0616535
-.2973168
-2.013272

.0005161
-4.27e-06
.1587361
-.0827129
-1.033502

.3268684
-1.675795
-.5230238
(omitted)
.0000553
-.0004654
.0453933
-.0692385
-4.644347

.5214638
1.070464
.6929326

0.63
-1.57
-0.75

0.531
0.117
0.450

-.6951819
-3.773866
-1.881147

1.348919
.4222755
.8350991

.0007575
.0005931
.18265
.1864801
.8200126

0.07
-0.78
0.25
-0.37
-5.66

0.942
0.433
0.804
0.710
0.000

-.0014294
-.0016279
-.3125941
-.4347328
-6.251542

.00154
.0006972
.4033807
.2962558
-3.037152

-.1043266
-.6166875
-.471362
(omitted)
1.25e-06
-5.21e-06
.2150707
-.0944957
-2.990933

.1956676
.2373374
.2317552

-0.53
-2.60
-2.03

0.594
0.009
0.042

-.4878281
-1.08186
-.9255938

.2791749
-.1515146
-.0171301

.0003954
.0000149
.0668013
.0583331
.223349

0.00
-0.35
3.22
-1.62
-13.39

0.997
0.727
0.001
0.105
0.000

-.0007738
-.0000344
.0841425
-.2088264
-3.428689

.0007763
.000024
.3459988
.0198351
-2.553177

3
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
4
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
5
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
6
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
.
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Table 2: Raw STATA Output - Both Movements, Service Omitted
___ ____ ____ ____ ____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number: 30110578975
Licensed to: Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\BOTH GM\nosvc_logs_1_23_12.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho
> us
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -611.06269
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -582.81478
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -579.4172
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -578.77637
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -578.72761
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -578.7274
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -578.7274
Multinomial logistic regression
Log likelihood =

Number of obs
LR chi2(28)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

-578.7274
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

492
64.67
0.0001
0.0529

ext_strat

Coef.

[95% Conf. Interval]

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

.5180422
-.0667312
-.9511413
(omitted)
.0257024
-.000656
-.2910198
.080186
-4.137547

.6373591
.9729583
1.123715

0.81
-0.07
-0.85

0.416
0.945
0.397

-.7311586
-1.973694
-3.153583

1.767243
1.840232
1.2513

.010321
.0007096
.169584
.2288525
1.386463

2.49
-0.92
-1.72
0.35
-2.98

0.013
0.355
0.086
0.726
0.003

.0054736
-.0020468
-.6233984
-.3683567
-6.854965

.0459312
.0007347
.0413587
.5287287
-1.420129

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

.7242986
.7954507
.0466141
(omitted)
.0060618
.000139
.2911379
-.1097121
-2.33794

.3353253
.4556922
.4348833

2.16
1.75
0.11

0.031
0.081
0.915

.067073
-.0976896
-.8057414

1.381524
1.688591
.8989696

.0041538
.0000731
.1201286
.1169517
.5181772

1.46
1.90
2.42
-0.94
-4.51

0.144
0.057
0.015
0.348
0.000

-.0020795
-4.23e-06
.0556902
-.3389333
-3.353549

.014203
.0002822
.5265856
.1195091
-1.322331

4

(base outcome)

2

3

5
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

.3897651
-.5912416
-.1342105
(omitted)
.0095271
-.0004754
-.0644246
.193116
-3.683265

.5498889
1.106276
.7226963

0.71
-0.53
-0.19

0.478
0.593
0.853

-.6879974
-2.759503
-1.550669

1.467528
1.57702
1.282248

.0075917
.0006625
.1811212
.2009739
1.024751

1.25
-0.72
-0.36
0.96
-3.59

0.210
0.473
0.722
0.337
0.000

-.0053524
-.0017739
-.4194157
-.2007856
-5.69174

.0244065
.0008231
.2905666
.5870177
-1.67479

-.0533146
.5946251
-.0641545
(omitted)
.0039288
.0001283
.1308569
.1624383
-1.751866

.259829
.3411657
.3019434

-0.21
1.74
-0.21

0.837
0.081
0.832

-.5625701
-.0740475
-.6559526

.4559409
1.263298
.5276436

.0030702
.0000704
.0824401
.083522
.4005462

1.28
1.82
1.59
1.94
-4.37

0.201
0.069
0.112
0.052
0.000

-.0020888
-9.78e-06
-.0307227
-.0012618
-2.536923

.0099463
.0002663
.2924364
.3261383
-.9668102

6
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
.
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Table 3: Raw STATA Output - LGBTQ Organizations, All Strategies
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\LGBTQ\lgbtq_all_logs_1_23_12.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho
> us
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -793.58135
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -726.67952
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -714.21401
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -710.03926
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -708.76278
Iteration 5:
log likelihood =
-708.4874
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -708.45709
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -708.45516
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -708.45476
Iteration 9:
log likelihood = -708.45468
Iteration 10:
log likelihood = -708.45466
Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(35)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -708.45466
ext_strat
1

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

622
170.25
0.0000
0.1073

[95% Conf. Interval]

(base outcome)

2
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

14.48687
-2.315011
-1.304899
(omitted)
.072609
-.003923
1.374495
-1.599975
-20.77517

687.8336
1008.653
1067.403

0.02
-0.00
-0.00

0.983
0.998
0.999

-1333.642
-1979.238
-2093.377

1362.616
1974.608
2090.767

.0512449
.0032593
.9006158
.885149
687.8498

1.42
-1.20
1.53
-1.81
-0.03

0.157
0.229
0.127
0.071
0.976

-.0278292
-.0103112
-.3906793
-3.334836
-1368.936

.1730472
.0024651
3.13967
.1348847
1327.386

.4705522
-.1889812
.2909524
(omitted)
-.0034863
-.0000494
.4260631
-.6295272
-.3067628

.3817594
.4838967
.5416051

1.23
-0.39
0.54

0.218
0.696
0.591

-.2776825
-1.137401
-.7705741

1.218787
.7594389
1.352479

.0049594
.0000343
.1473941
.1323118
.5990226

-0.70
-1.44
2.89
-4.76
-0.51

0.482
0.149
0.004
0.000
0.609

-.0132065
-.0001166
.1371759
-.8888535
-1.480826

.006234
.0000177
.7149503
-.3702009
.8672999

-.4931542
-.9017204
.1587063
(omitted)
-.0157846
-.000343
-.1180397
-.3873773
2.99072

.2622478
.3278134
.3199833

-1.88
-2.75
0.50

0.060
0.006
0.620

-1.00715
-1.544223
-.4684494

.020842
-.2592181
.785862

.0031906
.0000995
.0864412
.0904827
.4428123

-4.95
-3.45
-1.37
-4.28
6.75

0.000
0.001
0.172
0.000
0.000

-.022038
-.000538
-.2874614
-.56472
2.122824

-.0095312
-.0001481
.051382
-.2100345
3.858616

.7593897
-.6298931
.5564354
(omitted)
-.0110029
-.0010761
.2550401
-.3577817
-1.32445

.7098147
1.173081
.9421565

1.07
-0.54
0.59

0.285
0.591
0.555

-.6318215
-2.929089
-1.290157

2.150601
1.669302
2.403028

.0083082
.0008526
.2651808
.2661949
1.22605

-1.32
-1.26
0.96
-1.34
-1.08

0.185
0.207
0.336
0.179
0.280

-.0272867
-.0027471
-.2647047
-.8795141
-3.727464

.0052808
.0005949
.7747848
.1639506
1.078565

-.1568616
-.7810452
.1832032
(omitted)
-.0016374
-.00003
.3328512
-.3378811
-.4952896

.2919023
.4006681
.3891115

-0.54
-1.95
0.47

0.591
0.051
0.638

-.7289796
-1.56634
-.5794414

.4152564
.0042498
.9458478

.0041736
.0000241
.11218
.0993908
.4954743

-0.39
-1.25
2.97
-3.40
-1.00

0.695
0.213
0.003
0.001
0.317

-.0098176
-.0000772
.1129823
-.5326836
-1.466401

.0065427
.0000172
.55272
-.1430786
.4758222

3
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
4
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
5
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
6
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
.
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Table 4: Raw STATA Output - LGBTQ Organizations, Service Omitted
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\LGBTQ\lgbtq_nosvc_logs_1_23_12.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho
> us
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -362.45667
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -326.06773
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -319.50233
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -318.09251
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -317.72403
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -317.67502
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -317.66694
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -317.66563
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -317.66531
Iteration 9:
log likelihood = -317.66525
Iteration 10:
log likelihood = -317.66523
Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(28)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -317.66523
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

309
89.58
0.0000
0.1236

ext_strat

Coef.

[95% Conf. Interval]

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

15.36677
-2.68548
-1.851638
(omitted)
.0824376
-.0027293
1.407503
-1.412386
-22.63074

840.4089
1270.859
1283.976

0.02
-0.00
-0.00

0.985
0.998
0.999

-1631.804
-2493.522
-2518.399

1662.538
2488.152
2514.696

.0489649
.0030459
.968079
1.006217
840.4199

1.68
-0.90
1.45
-1.40
-0.03

0.092
0.370
0.146
0.160
0.979

-.0135319
-.0086991
-.4898971
-3.384534
-1669.823

.1784072
.0032405
3.304903
.5597626
1624.562

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

1.268691
.8693834
.1928551
(omitted)
.0116684
.000209
.6267709
-.4187905
-2.851872

.4412392
.5639192
.5693885

2.88
1.54
0.34

0.004
0.123
0.735

.4038782
-.2358779
-.9231258

2.133504
1.974645
1.308836

.0052907
.0000996
.1714194
.1682884
.6529033

2.21
2.10
3.66
-2.49
-4.37

0.027
0.036
0.000
0.013
0.000

.0012989
.0000139
.2907951
-.7486297
-4.131539

.0220379
.0004042
.9627467
-.0889512
-1.572205

4

(base outcome)

2

3

5
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

1.151745
.2577583
.2851516
(omitted)
.001842
-.00028
.3324951
.0457732
-4.194265

.7287817
1.1949
.9478588

1.58
0.22
0.30

0.114
0.829
0.764

-.2766411
-2.084202
-1.572618

2.580131
2.599719
2.142921

.0088427
.000679
.2766334
.2918012
1.184727

0.21
-0.41
1.20
0.16
-3.54

0.835
0.680
0.229
0.875
0.000

-.0154894
-.0016107
-.2096963
-.5261467
-6.516287

.0191733
.0010507
.8746866
.617693
-1.872243

.3926036
.2520837
-.0668754
(omitted)
.0124029
.0002193
.4648924
-.052862
-2.89797

.354225
.4811954
.4242599

1.11
0.52
-0.16

0.268
0.600
0.875

-.3016647
-.691042
-.8984096

1.086872
1.195209
.7646587

.0044938
.0000972
.1373417
.1364002
.5564598

2.76
2.26
3.38
-0.39
-5.21

0.006
0.024
0.001
0.698
0.000

.0035953
.0000288
.1957075
-.3202015
-3.988611

.0212104
.0004099
.7340772
.2144775
-1.807329

6
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
.
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Table 5: Raw STATA Output - Animal Rights Organizations, All Strategies
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\ANIMAL\anim_all_logs_1_23_12.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho
> us
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -940.51167
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -920.99575
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -914.53478
Iteration 3:
log likelihood =
-913.5977
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -909.81423
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -903.32672
Iteration 6:
log likelihood =
-900.4223
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -900.24693
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -900.24511
Iteration 9:
log likelihood =
-900.2451
Multinomial logistic regression
Log likelihood =
ext_strat
1

Number of obs
LR chi2(35)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

-900.2451
Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

3293
80.53
0.0000
0.0428

[95% Conf. Interval]

(base outcome)

2
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

-.2049729
-.6595706
-1.283908
(omitted)
.0001494
-.0005446
-.4148876
-.0290823
-4.060897

.7352158
.8401803
1.104529

-0.28
-0.79
-1.16

0.780
0.432
0.245

-1.645969
-2.306294
-3.448745

1.236024
.9871525
.8809286

.0006553
.0006954
.1594903
.2344787
1.10602

0.23
-0.78
-2.60
-0.12
-3.67

0.820
0.434
0.009
0.901
0.000

-.001135
-.0019076
-.7274828
-.4886521
-6.228656

.0014337
.0008184
-.1022924
.4304874
-1.893138

.4175471
-.703038
-.4173244
(omitted)
.0000452
-.0006979
.2134285
-.0851608
-4.837828

.4791805
.6796704
.615676

0.87
-1.03
-0.68

0.384
0.301
0.498

-.5216295
-2.035167
-1.624027

1.356724
.6290914
.7893784

.0007283
.000797
.1742473
.172081
.7697133

0.06
-0.88
1.22
-0.49
-6.29

0.951
0.381
0.221
0.621
0.000

-.0013823
-.0022599
-.12809
-.4224335
-6.346438

.0014727
.0008642
.5549469
.2521118
-3.329217

-.0055937
-1.84298
-.5196553
(omitted)
.0000442
-.0000502
.1830269
-.0776187
-3.791281

.3054116
.6132815
.3660013

-0.02
-3.01
-1.42

0.985
0.003
0.156

-.6041894
-3.04499
-1.237005

.5930021
-.6409706
.1976941

.0004557
.0000959
.1114841
.1014177
.387315

0.10
-0.52
1.64
-0.77
-9.79

0.923
0.600
0.101
0.444
0.000

-.000849
-.0002381
-.0354779
-.2763937
-4.550405

.0009374
.0001377
.4015316
.1211563
-3.032158

-1.141132
-14.90258
-1.144888
(omitted)
.0000975
-.0050002
-.2987666
-.1028257
-3.437802

1.122732
971.3477
1.1268

-1.02
-0.02
-1.02

0.309
0.988
0.310

-3.341646
-1918.709
-3.353375

1.059382
1888.904
1.063598

.0007703
.0044995
.2291611
.3461618
1.859808

0.13
-1.11
-1.30
-0.30
-1.85

0.899
0.266
0.192
0.766
0.065

-.0014122
-.0138191
-.747914
-.7812903
-7.082959

.0016072
.0038187
.1503808
.5756389
.207355

-.3221681
-.4537656
-.530917
(omitted)
-.0025197
-.0030867
.0393792
-.1356774
-2.122236

.2955255
.3120818
.3188485

-1.09
-1.45
-1.67

0.276
0.146
0.096

-.9013875
-1.065435
-1.155849

.2570512
.1579035
.0940145

.0025522
.0009804
.0863537
.0971787
.5382834

-0.99
-3.15
0.46
-1.40
-3.94

0.324
0.002
0.648
0.163
0.000

-.0075219
-.0050082
-.1298709
-.3261441
-3.177252

.0024825
-.0011651
.2086293
.0547894
-1.06722

3
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
4
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
5
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
6
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
.
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Table 6: Raw STATA Output - Animal Rights Organizations, Service Omitted
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\ANIMAL\anim_nosvc_logs_1_23_12.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho
> us
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -233.81098
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -214.89366
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -209.68598
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -208.64113
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -208.56118
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -208.55167
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -208.55001
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -208.54964
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -208.54955
Iteration 9:
log likelihood = -208.54953
Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(28)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -208.54953
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

183
50.52
0.0057
0.1080

ext_strat

Coef.

[95% Conf. Interval]

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

.2128692
-.5113537
-.7124137
(omitted)
.0214401
.0026216
-.4801693
.0349136
-2.883191

.8375269
1.04689
1.193464

0.25
-0.49
-0.60

0.799
0.625
0.551

-1.428653
-2.563219
-3.05156

1.854392
1.540512
1.626733

.0124748
.0014243
.1964318
.2935503
1.774026

1.72
1.84
-2.44
0.12
-1.63

0.086
0.066
0.015
0.905
0.104

-.0030101
-.00017
-.8651687
-.5404344
-6.360219

.0458902
.0054132
-.09517
.6102617
.593836

.6362874
-.2638561
.1482126
(omitted)
.0070045
.00244
-.0050877
.1799133
-3.066804

.5756593
.7528149
.7005867

1.11
-0.35
0.21

0.269
0.726
0.832

-.4919841
-1.739346
-1.224912

1.764559
1.211634
1.521337

.0070935
.0014156
.176449
.1920599
1.114195

0.99
1.72
-0.03
0.94
-2.75

0.323
0.085
0.977
0.349
0.006

-.0068985
-.0003344
-.3509214
-.1965172
-5.250586

.0209075
.0052145
.3407459
.5563439
-.8830223

.1918146
-1.373319
.1396664
(omitted)
.0059438
.0033994
-.0254006
.1836479
-2.048017

.4496487
.7070964
.4971532

0.43
-1.94
0.28

0.670
0.052
0.779

-.6894806
-2.759203
-.834736

1.07311
.0125643
1.114069

.005447
.0012442
.1438168
.157904
.869887

1.09
2.73
-0.18
1.16
-2.35

0.275
0.006
0.860
0.245
0.019

-.0047321
.0009609
-.3072764
-.1258382
-3.752964

.0166197
.0058379
.2564753
.4931341
-.3430696

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons

-.5663865
-15.32141
-.138057
(omitted)
.0461524
-.0032624
-.6508607
.3662583
-5.51515

1.212654
557.0673
1.250953

-0.47
-0.03
-0.11

0.640
0.978
0.912

-2.943144
-1107.153
-2.58988

1.810371
1076.51
2.313766

.0247512
.0053039
.3323562
.3975537
3.078147

1.86
-0.62
-1.96
0.92
-1.79

0.062
0.538
0.050
0.357
0.073

-.0023591
-.0136579
-1.302267
-.4129325
-11.54821

.0946639
.007133
.0005456
1.145449
.5179078

6

(base outcome)

2

3
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
4
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_o_fb
log_netinc~s
log_fb_thous
_cons
5

.
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Table 7: Raw STATA Output – 2003-2005
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\2003_2005.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_fb log_ni log_fb
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -222.86114
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -219.58872
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -213.26497
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -203.81972
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -203.63552
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -202.61979
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -202.38943
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -202.24821
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -202.22183
Iteration 9:
log likelihood = -202.21945
Iteration 10:
log likelihood = -202.21938
Iteration 11:
log likelihood = -202.21937
Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(35)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -202.21937
ext_strat
1

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

548
41.28
0.2151
0.0926

[95% Conf. Interval]

(base outcome)

2
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

14.95976
.3944671
14.15402
(omitted)
.0034398
-.0017682
.6527273
-.1435918
-19.8915

866.004
1298.774
866.0043

0.02
0.00
0.02

0.986
1.000
0.987

-1682.377
-2545.156
-1683.183

1712.296
2545.945
1711.491

.0051151
.0034562
.8307512
.8398882
866.0073

0.67
-0.51
0.79
-0.17
-0.02

0.501
0.609
0.432
0.864
0.982

-.0065857
-.0085421
-.9755151
-1.789742
-1717.235

.0134653
.0050057
2.28097
1.502559
1677.452

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

2.020953
2.032859
.6558462
(omitted)
-.0034554
-3.10e-06
.5507615
-.3113964
-5.351069

1.130508
1.107846
1.424213

1.79
1.83
0.46

0.074
0.067
0.645

-.1948027
-.1384796
-2.135561

4.236709
4.204197
3.447253

.0091815
9.64e-06
.2928827
.255067
1.302767

-0.38
-0.32
1.88
-1.22
-4.11

0.707
0.748
0.060
0.222
0.000

-.0214508
-.000022
-.0232781
-.8113185
-7.904446

.0145399
.0000158
1.124801
.1885258
-2.797693

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

.0211246
-.5952282
.2609683
(omitted)
.0001549
-.0000618
.0688631
.1979263
-4.187049

.7221706
.8280861
.6616206

0.03
-0.72
0.39

0.977
0.472
0.693

-1.394304
-2.218247
-1.035784

1.436553
1.027791
1.557721

.0055936
.0002102
.2318201
.2618861
.9341596

0.03
-0.29
0.30
0.76
-4.48

0.978
0.769
0.766
0.450
0.000

-.0108084
-.0004739
-.385496
-.3153611
-6.017968

.0111182
.0003502
.5232222
.7112137
-2.35613

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

-14.74681
-13.38671
-20.45562
(omitted)
.016574
-.0007073
2.323949
-1.573857
-8.338955

2387.311
1284.639
2153.809

-0.01
-0.01
-0.01

0.995
0.992
0.992

-4693.79
-2531.233
-4241.844

4664.297
2504.46
4200.933

.0399289
.0033108
2.210642
2.200604
5.824318

0.42
-0.21
1.05
-0.72
-1.43

0.678
0.831
0.293
0.474
0.152

-.0616851
-.0071963
-2.008829
-5.886961
-19.75441

.0948331
.0057817
6.656727
2.739247
3.076498

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

.5362398
-.1573144
.0001264
(omitted)
.0027624
3.58e-06
.0744368
.3880804
-5.153747

.6298348
.7269131
.7299868

0.85
-0.22
0.00

0.395
0.829
1.000

-.6982138
-1.582038
-1.430621

1.770693
1.267409
1.430874

.0037701
9.97e-06
.213206
.214591
.7832351

0.73
0.36
0.35
1.81
-6.58

0.464
0.719
0.727
0.071
0.000

-.0046269
-.000016
-.3434394
-.0325103
-6.68886

.0101516
.0000231
.4923129
.8086711
-3.618635

3

4

5

6

.
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Table 8: Raw STATA Output – 2000-2005 Sample
___
____
____
____
____ (R)
/__
/
____/
/
____/
___/
/
/___/
/
/___/
11.1
Statistics/Data Analysis

Copyright 2009 StataCorp LP
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number:
30110578975
Licensed to:
Grad Lab
University NM
Notes:
1.
2.

(/m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\2000_2005_bothgm.dta"
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_fb log_ni log_fb
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:
log likelihood = -509.37533
Iteration 1:
log likelihood = -484.41438
Iteration 2:
log likelihood = -475.39669
Iteration 3:
log likelihood = -474.24241
Iteration 4:
log likelihood = -473.81705
Iteration 5:
log likelihood = -473.47358
Iteration 6:
log likelihood = -473.39771
Iteration 7:
log likelihood = -473.39446
Iteration 8:
log likelihood = -473.34914
Iteration 9:
log likelihood =
-473.3489
Iteration 10:
log likelihood = -473.34885
Iteration 11:
log likelihood = -473.34884
Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(35)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -473.34884
ext_strat
1

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=

1157
72.05
0.0002
0.0707

[95% Conf. Interval]

(base outcome)

2
ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

1.225911
-15.38552
.5700943
(omitted)
-3.39e-06
-.000398
.530657
-.4315367
-5.536504

1.231329
2669.694
1.420281

1.00
-0.01
0.40

0.319
0.995
0.688

-1.187448
-5247.889
-2.213606

3.639271
5217.118
3.353795

.0008679
.000837
.5923046
.6502999
1.887647

-0.00
-0.48
0.90
-0.66
-2.93

0.997
0.634
0.370
0.507
0.003

-.0017044
-.0020384
-.6302388
-1.706101
-9.236224

.0016977
.0012424
1.691553
.8430275
-1.836784

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

.9382994
.7095137
-.3452653
(omitted)
-.0005923
-5.00e-06
.6088287
-.2798937
-4.852421

.5805872
.5968798
.84719

1.62
1.19
-0.41

0.106
0.235
0.684

-.1996306
-.4603492
-2.005727

2.076229
1.879377
1.315197

.0054613
.0000169
.2122582
.1895162
.7659888

-0.11
-0.30
2.87
-1.48
-6.33

0.914
0.767
0.004
0.140
0.000

-.0112963
-.0000381
.1928103
-.6513386
-6.353731

.0101116
.0000281
1.024847
.0915513
-3.35111

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

.2257581
-1.10673
.1905646
(omitted)
-.0034024
-.0001084
.1310666
-.0462609
-3.136514

.430254
.6469421
.4483195

0.52
-1.71
0.43

0.600
0.087
0.671

-.6175242
-2.374714
-.6881254

1.06904
.1612529
1.069255

.0047038
.0001477
.1572358
.1751473
.6598073

-0.72
-0.73
0.83
-0.26
-4.75

0.469
0.463
0.405
0.792
0.000

-.0126217
-.0003979
-.17711
-.3895433
-4.429713

.0058168
.0001812
.4392432
.2970215
-1.843316

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

-15.95477
-16.3313
-75.62126
(omitted)
.0051252
-.000026
1.820595
-.9738534
-7.978624

2469.274
2049.357
834.0775

-0.01
-0.01
-0.09

0.995
0.994
0.928

-4855.643
-4032.998
-1710.383

4823.733
4000.336
1559.141

.0099647
.0002447
1.05878
.9491043
2.425068

0.51
-0.11
1.72
-1.03
-3.29

0.607
0.915
0.086
0.305
0.001

-.0144053
-.0005056
-.2545759
-2.834064
-12.73167

.0246557
.0004536
3.895766
.8863569
-3.225577

ne_reg
se_reg
mw_reg
w_reg
pct_cont_tr
pct_ex_fb
log_ni
log_fb
_cons

-.0048961
-.599839
-.0107911
(omitted)
-.000086
8.29e-07
-.1005215
.5228474
-4.615107

.3758944
.4536057
.4060554

-0.01
-1.32
-0.03

0.990
0.186
0.979

-.7416356
-1.48889
-.8066451

.7318435
.2892118
.7850628

.0008857
6.97e-06
.1049449
.111211
.4380664

-0.10
0.12
-0.96
4.70
-10.54

0.923
0.905
0.338
0.000
0.000

-.0018219
-.0000128
-.3062098
.3048778
-5.473701

.0016499
.0000145
.1051668
.7408171
-3.756512

3

4

5

6

.
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APPENDIX B: EXPANDED QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS (FROM CHAPTER 5)
As shown in Table 9 (Chapter 5), when the large subset of Service Providers are
included in the model (3,453 of the 3,948 total cases: 87.4%), all of the variables except
for the percentage of an organization's total revenue derived from contributions are
significant additions to the model.
Table 14: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements
All Strategies (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Service

Routine v.
Service

Cultural v.
Service

Legal v.
Service

Funding v.
Service

NE v W

1.539

1.836**

0.931

1.387

0.901

SE v W

0.511

0.661

0.322****

0.187

0.540***

MW v W

0.274

0.687

0.696*

0.593

0.624**

Contribution Funding
Base

1.000

1.000

0.997

1.000

1.000

Fiscal Instability

0.999

1.000

1.000**

1.000

1.000

Net Income (Logged)

0.976

1.043****

1.005

1.004

1.021****

Fund Balance
(Logged)

0.992

0.965****

0.982****

0.993

0.991*

REGION

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 3,948
The relationships of the ratio financial variables for the full population of cases
are not substantively different than the effects show for either the Animal
Rights/Protection or LGBTQ Rights samples: little to no real effect on any of the
strategic comparisons. A 10% increase in the net income of the organization corresponds
to a 4.3% increase in the likelihood of Routine strategies and a 2.1% increase in
Organizational Funding strategies compared to Service Provision. The same increase in
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the overall fund balance corresponds to a 3.5% decrease in Routine strategies, 1.8%
decrease in Cultural/Expressive strategies, and a 0.9% decrease in Organizational
Funding relative to Service Provision.
A number of statistically-significant relationships emerge from the analysis of
regional location on strategy comparisons. First, Northeastern organizations are 83.6%
more likely to be involved in Routine Politics, as compared to Service Provision, than
Western organizations. Meanwhile, Southeastern organizations are 67.8% less likely to
engage in Cultural tactics and 46% less likely to engage in Organizational Funding as
their primary strategy, relative to Service Provision, than Western organizations. For the
only time in any of the models, location in the Midwest of the United States present
statistically- significant relationships to strategy: those organizations are 39.4% less
likely to use Cultural/Expressive strategies, and 37.6% less likely to use Organizational
Funding their than their Western organizations, relative to Service Provision.
In the final full-sample model (omitting Service Provision from both movements
combined, Table 15), only Fiscal Instability, net income, and overall financial balance
were significant contributions to the overall model (Table 9). A 1% increase in
Contribution Funding Base corresponds to a 2.6% increase in the odds of using NonRoutine strategies compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies. Expenses expressed as a
percentage of the overall fund balance continues to demonstrate no substantive
significance relative to any of the comparisons of strategic categories.
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Table 15: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements
Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)
Non-Routine v.
Cultural

Routine v.
Cultural

Legal v.
Cultural

Funding v.
Cultural

NE v W

1.679

2.063**

1.477

0.948

SE v W

0.935

2.215*

0.554

1.812*

MW v W

0.386

1.048

0.874

0.938

Contribution Funding
Base

1.026**

1.006

1.010

1.004

Fiscal Instability

0.999

1.000*

1.000

1.000*

Net Income (Logged)

0.973*

1.028**

0.994

1.013

Fund Balance (Logged)

1.008

0.990

1.019

1.016**

REGION

P < .1 *

P < .05 **

P < .01 ***

P < .001 ****

N = 495
Increases in the net income and overall fund balance of 10% have small
substantive relationships to the strategic comparisons when services are omitted from the
sample of both movements. First, a 10% increase in net income corresponds to a
decrease in the odds of using Non-Routine strategies compared to Cultural strategies, and
a 2.8% increase in the use of Routine strategies compared to Cultural strategies. The
same increase in overall fund balance only has a small (1.6%) effect on the increasing
odds of using Organizational Funding versus Cultural strategies. Two regional
relationships do emerge. First, Northeastern organizations are roughly twice as likely to
employ Routine Politics than Cultural or Expressive actions relative to Western
organizations when Service Provision is omitted. Southeastern organizations are nearly
2x (1.8x) more likely to use Organizational Funding relative to Cultural actions compared
to their Western analogues.
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There continue to be some statistically-significant geographic relationships on
strategic deployment. Again, it appears that location in the Northeast for all organizations
positively affects their implementation of Routine Political strategies (relative to Western
organizations), possibly due to proximity to federal decision-makers: lobbying happens
where government happens. This is speculative at best, however, because it cannot be
determined from this analysis whether those organizations are national in focus or
whether their attentions are directed at local political institutions.
Southeastern organizations continue to eschew the Cultural and Expressive
strategic repertoire, preferring Service Provision and Organizational Funding instead.
This also suggests, perhaps, something unique to the cultural and normative milieu of the
American South. Challenges to normative expectations regarding rights of Animals,
which are not typically considered to be equal to humans by many, are perhaps less likely
to find political and cultural resonance in the traditional and more Conservative South.
Southern states and their majority populations have generally not been on the forefront of
movements for the civil rights of minority or repressed populations. Among those states
with the most repressive policies toward the LGBTQ community, nearly all are located
within the Southeastern region: Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi to name a
few, with regard to marriage, adoption, and family rights. Again, these dynamics are
impossible to parse from this analysis and are only speculations.
These analyses from the full sample represent an exploration into the possible
dynamics and relationships between financial organizational resources and the use of
various categories of organizational political strategy without the ability to make any
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valid causal claim.
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